Interethnic conflict and the potential dangers of cross-group ties
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343316630781 |
| Author | Jennifer M Larson |
| Date | 01 May 2016 |
| Published date | 01 May 2016 |
| Subject Matter | Research Articles |
Interethnic conflict and the potential
dangers of cross-group ties
Jennifer M Larson
Department of Politics, New York University
Abstract
Bridging social ties is thought to reduce the likelihood of interethnic violence. This logic has motivated countless
development projects and international programs seeking to forge cross-group ties between groups with a conflictual
history. However, this article identifies an important mechanism by which certain cross-group ties can make
interethnic peace strictly less likely. The results stem from a game-theoretic model which formalizes civil society
as a network and relates intergroup cooperation to the particular networks that transmit information from person to
person in each group. The model reveals that, first, groups are capable of enforcing cross-group cooperation, even
when no cross-group ties are present and the networks within each group are missing links, using peer-enforcement
strategies, and their ability to do so depends on the structure of these networks. Second, when attempting to enforce
intergroup cooperation, groups with sparse networks may be at risk of a long-lasting series of back-and-forth
retaliation that groups with denser networks would avoid. Finally, there exists a mechanism by which some cross-
group ties make intergroup cooperation strictly less likely. When interethnic cooperation is enforced by threatening
coordinated retaliation for any misbehavior, success depends on expectations about how quickly retaliation can be
coordinated and how many will participate in it. Some individuals in a network are in a position to send news to
many others quickly; others are not. The latter therefore coordinate retaliation more slowly and would be relatively
vulnerable to cross-group defections if they could be identified. Cross-group ties expose the vulnerability and
generate incentives to disrupt interethnic peace; cross-group ties between the least embedded individuals in each
ethnic group are the most dangerous. Programs seeking to impose ties should avoid exposing this vulnerability
without taking steps to mitigate its danger.
Keywords
civil society, cooperation, interethnic conflict, social networks
Introduction
Some neighboring ethnic groups violently conflict with
each other; many more coexist peacefully (Fearon &
Laitin, 1996). A leading explanation of the difference
focuses on the presence or absence of social connections
between individuals of different ethnicities, so-called
‘cross-group ties’. Individuals’ relationships have become
central to explanations of subnational conflict, so much
so that the peace interventions by international organi-
zations frequently have a civil society component that
focuses on building social contacts (Belloni, 2001).
This article formalizes the full set of social contacts
within and across ethnic groups in order to better isolate
their role in intergroup peace. I present a game-theoretic
model which explicitly accounts for the constellation of
relationships, the socia l networks, within neighboring
ethnic groups. This setup reveals a number of new
insights about the role of cross-group ties.
First, this setup shows how the strategic enforcement
of intergroup cooperation via a coordinated response (as
in Fearon & Laitin, 1996) depends on networks even
when no cross-group ties are present. The faster news
spreads from person to person within each group, the
more easily the groups can coexist in peace.
Corresponding author:
jenn.larson@nyu.edu
Journal of Peace Research
2016, Vol. 53(3) 459–471
ªThe Author(s) 2016
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DOI: 10.1177/0022343316630781
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