Intergovernmental Relations and Innovation: From Co-Operative to Competitive Welfare Federalism in the UK
| Published date | 01 May 2012 |
| Date | 01 May 2012 |
| Author | Michael Keating |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-856X.2011.00484.x |
| Subject Matter | Article |
doi: 10.1111/j.1467-856X.2011.00484.x
B J P I R : 2 0 1 2 V O L 1 4 , 2 1 4 – 2 3 0
Intergovernmental Relations and
Innovation: From Co-operative to
Competitive Welfare Federalism
in the UK
Michael Keating
Intergovernmental relations serve several purposes: to resolve conflicts of competence; to deal with
overlaps and externalities; to harmonise policies; and to respond to new policy challenges. The
United Kingdom is not a federation but an asymmetrically devolved system where the central
government doubles up as the government of the largest part. This makes the application of federal
intergovernmental theory problematic. At the same time, federations are tending to move from
co-operative to competitive federalism. There is no case for greater policy harmonisation. On the
contrary, the increased divergence between the dominant English legislative majority and majori-
ties in the devolved territories points to increased autonomy and less harmonisation. There is scope
for policy learning within competitive devolution, particularly on new policy challenges.
Keywords: devolution; federalism; public policy; intergovernmental relations
The Purpose of Intergovernmental Relations
There has been a lot written about the inadequacy of intergovernmental relations
(IGR) in the United Kingdom since devolution, its under-institutionalisation and its
ad hoc nature. Yet before thinking about the best mechanisms for IGR, we need to
ask just what purpose it is intended to serve. Intergovernmental relations in federal
and devolved systems serve several roles. First, they serve to resolve conflicts over
competences, especially where these are unclearly delineated. This role, present in
any federal or devolved system, may be the responsibility of the courts or be dealt
with by political means. A second, broader role addresses overlapping competences,
an inevitable feature of modern constitutions, where competences may be
described by services (for example education or policing) or by their policy objec-
tive. There are externalities or spillovers from the action of one level of government
on to the others. These may impose costs, provoke migration, create environmental
problems or consume common resources. Political spillovers may arise when pro-
vision in one territory provokes demands for parity elsewhere. A third, much more
ambitious conception of intergovernmental relations is the role of policy harmoni-
sation, where a case is made on economic, social or political grounds for the same
policies to be applied or services provided across the territory of the state. This is
particularly relevant where federalism is combined with the national welfare state
(Obinger et al. 2005; Greer 2006). It is here that much of the contribution of the
modern IGR literature has been made. A fourth conception arises from the need to
© 2012 The Author. British Journal of Politics and International Relations © 2012
Political Studies Association
I G R A N D I N N O VAT I O N
215
respond to new challenges that cut across existing divisions of competences with
innovative policies. IGR under any of these headings can be more or less coercive
or voluntary and organised through a variety of mechanisms. Competence or
jurisdictional disputes are primarily a legal matter, although they may be resolved
in a political forum. Overlaps and interdependencies can be amenable to institu-
tional solutions and working practices, as long as there are no profound policy
differences. Harmonisation is another matter, since it implies that policy differences
should be reduced.
The specific circumstances of the UK and its institutional configuration, more-
over, are such that much of what we know about IGR in federal systems is not
directly applicable. Intergovernmental jurisdictional disputes have raised few
problems in practice. Overlaps and interdependencies do raise issues that need to
be addressed but there is a limited amount that intergovernmental relations can
do, and the idea of overspill has sometimes been interpreted so broadly as to
undermine devolution. Policy harmonisation and the need for limits on
autonomy have attracted a lot of attention but many of the difficulties that have
been indentified in this field stem from different policy choices and priorities
generated from the workings of devolved political systems. The answer to inter-
governmental conflict may lie in further decentralisation rather than in im-
proving the institutional links between the levels. The nature of the UK state,
with its pluri-national composition and asymmetrical constitution, also makes
intergovernmental relations, in the sense in which that term has been used in
the literature since the 1960s, difficult. The often-lamented absence of a sys-
tematic network of IGR in the UK may not be as much of a problem as is
often claimed. On the other hand, there is scope for intergovernmental interac-
tion and comparison in facing new policy challenges and policy learning and
innovation.
From Co-ordinate to Co-operative, to
Competitive Federalism
IGR have become a staple of the literature in federalism and devolution. They are
usually defined by reference to a set of institutions and political practices mediating
between territorial tiers of government but, underneath these, lie deeper questions
about the scope and role of government and the evolution of the modern welfare
state. Intergovernmental conflict in the 1950s and 1960s in the United States
hinged on basic questions about civil and individual rights and the reach of gov-
ernment. In present-day Europe, similar large questions often underlie intergov-
ernmental tensions, as the state is reconfiguring and previously unitary welfare
states are putting the conventional wisdom of co-operative federalism under strain.
Such differences may be manifest in party conflict where there is incongruity of
control but incongruity does not itself necessarily involve such large questions
while, on the other hand, substantial differences may arise even when nominally
the same parties are in control at both levels.
In classical 19th- and early 20th-century federalism, there was a rather clear (if
never watertight) division of competences between the two levels. As an ideal-type
© 2012 The Author. British Journal of Politics and International Relations © 2012 Political Studies Association
BJPIR, 2012, 14(2)
216
M I C H A E L K E AT I N G
this is known as co-ordinate federalism, in which each level gets on with its own
business. Such intergovernmental relations as exist are largely concerned with
clarifying competences and dealing with occasional overlaps. It has long been
recognised that actual federations have ceased to function like this (to the extent
that they ever really did), and that co-ordinate federalism has given way to
co-operative federalism. This may take an institutional form, as in Germany, where
the two levels have been defined largely in relation to the stage in the policy process
at which they intervene rather than the policy domains over which they are
competent, but it has a wider application and may refer to de facto rather than
constitutionally mandated co-operation. Elements of co-operative federalism have
been identified in the US, where intergovernmentalism was even described as a
fourth branch of government, so extensive was its reach (Wright and Stenberg
2007) although the constitution itself has never been amended to incorporate it.
Systems of devolution and regional autonomy in Europe have similarly been closer
to the co-operative than the co-ordinate ideal-type.
Co-operative federalism or regionalism was favoured by the rise of the welfare
state. This postulated common social entitlements or social citizenship across the
state, rather than differentiated provision; indeed this was incorporated in the
German constitution (Basic Law). Keynesian economic management implied a role
for the centre, whether unilaterally or co-operatively, in setting fiscal and spending
limits. Regional policies, which developed across Western Europe in the 1950s and
1960s, were predicated on the need to integrate territories into a single national
economic space. They were either delivered by central government or, as in
Germany, through intergovernmental co-operation. It was widely accepted among
federal theorists that redistributive policies should be operated at a state-wide level
in order to secure territorial equity and prevent fiscal competition among federated
units from driving out redistributive policies; if they are not directly administered at
the federal level they should be organised intergovernmentally and with revenue-
sharing (Peterson et al. 1986). Intergovernmental relations in this phase were often
focused on joint policy-making and harmonisation. The territorial element came
from inputs into common policies rather than differentiated policy. These trends
were reinforced by the search for comprehensive rationality in policy systems,
through linking up fields and what was later called ‘joined-up government’.
In Europe, regional devolution started in the 1970s and has gathered pace since,
providing for a new or strengthened intermediate or ‘meso’ level of government. In
Belgium, the system has officially become federal, while there are arguments about
whether Spain is de facto a federation, and Italy under successive governments has
embraced the federal idea, however imperfectly. France, while far from being federal,
has established and gradually...
To continue reading
Request your trial