Intergovernmental Relations in Scotland: What was the SNP Effect?
| Author | Paul Cairney |
| Published date | 01 May 2012 |
| Date | 01 May 2012 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-856X.2011.00493.x |
| Subject Matter | Article |
Intergovernmental Relations in
Scotland: What was the SNP Effect?
Paul Cairney
In Scotland, the formation of a minority government in 2007 by the Scottish National Party
(SNP) provided the potential for profound changes in intergovernmental relations. This followed
eight years of a Scottish Labour-led coalition government characterised by a low-key and infor-
mal relationship with the UK Labour government. From 1999 to 2007, discussions were con-
ducted informally and almost entirely through political parties and executives (ministers and civil
servants). Although formal mechanisms for negotiation and dispute resolution existed—
including the courts, concordats and Joint Ministerial Committees—they were used rarely. The
Scottish Executive also played a minimal role in EU policy-making. Yet, an ‘explosive’ new era
of relations between the Scottish and UK governments did not arrive in tandem with the new era
of party incongruence. The aim of this article is to explore these issues by asking two main
questions: why were formal mechanisms used so rarely from 1999 to 2007, and what factors
produced muted rather than problematic IGR in the third parliamentary session, between 2007
and 2011?
Keywords: intergovernmental relations; policy communities; Scotland;
minority government
Introduction
In Scotland, the formation of a Scottish National Party (SNP) government in 2007
provided the potential for profound changes in intergovernmental relations
(IGR). The first eight years of Scottish devolution (1999–2007) were marked by
high party congruence. The Labour party formed a majority UK government from
1997 to 2010, while Scottish Labour was the main party within a coalition gov-
ernment that spanned two four-year terms. Party congruence appeared to influ-
ence strongly the nature of IGR by effectively institutionalising an informal
system of consultation and negotiation through party and ministerial channels
(supplemented by the UK civil service network). In 2007, the coalition was
replaced by a minority government led by a party committed not only to chal-
lenging that system of IGR, but also the very nature of the constitutional settle-
ment. Then, in 2010, the UK Labour government was replaced by a
Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition—suggesting that the initially high levels
of party congruence in the first eight years will be replaced by at least seven years
of low congruence. Yet, the initial change of party in 2007 did not have a dra-
matic effect on IGR, while the more general loss of high party congruence did
not lead to radically different relationships between the UK and Scottish
governments.
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doi: 10.1111/j.1467-856X.2011.00493.x BJPIR: 2012 VOL 14, 231–249
© 2012 The Author.British Journal of Politics and International Relations © 2012
Political Studies Association
This article explains why IGR remains notably stable over time by highlighting the
factors that encourage a particular intergovernmental style in Scotland within the
UK. A major aim of this special issue is to explore an ‘overall logic’ underpinning
IGR in the UK. To this end, the article draws on the policy communities literature
to identify a ‘logic of informality’ between governments that resembles the ‘logic
of consultation’ (Jordan and Maloney 1997) between governments and interest
groups. The first key argument in this literature is that governments do not try to
impose policy decisions regularly even if they appear to be in a position to do so.
It provides a useful corrective to studies that label the UK system as ‘majoritarian’
and associate it, in a very misleading way, with a concentration of power in the
centre and top-down policy-making without recourse to meaningful consultation
(Cairney 2011a, 208). Rather, top-down policy-making is expensive and, as such,
used sparingly—even by governments that are clearly more powerful than other
actors. The second is that successful ‘pressure participants’ (such as interest
groups—Jordan et al. 2004) generally pursue an insider strategy towards
government—presenting fairly reasonable demands, managing their own expecta-
tions (or recognising that the balance of power is in favour of government) and
criticising government policy infrequently—to build up their reputation and maxi-
mise their influence within policy networks. Combined, we find that most policy is
made in a relatively straightforward way by governments in consultation with
groups and beyond the public spotlight—a process that receives far less attention
than the small number of highly visible issues involving government imposition
and group opposition (Cairney 2011a, 211).
The same logic applies to IGR in two main ways. First, top-down policy-making is
often politically expensive and generally unnecessary. Consequently, the UK gov-
ernment tends not to impose policies on devolved governments. Second, Scottish
governments generally accept the reality of an asymmetry of power between UK
and Scottish governments, and recognise the benefits of pursuing the same kinds of
insider strategies associated with groups (see also Midwinter et al. 1991, for a
description of the former Scottish Office as one of the UK’s most significant pressure
groups). It would be reasonable to expect this relationship to weaken during periods
of low party congruence. However, the ‘SNP effect’ (from 2007 to 2011) was largely
undermined by the constraints of minority government and the tendency for
opposition parties to reject policies in the Scottish Parliament that would have tested
current IGR arrangements. It has also been addressed by a Conservative–Liberal
Democrat coalition government in the UK which appears to be particularly unwill-
ing to entertain the idea of top-down policy-making in Scotland.
The aim of the article is to explore these issues by asking two main questions: why
were formal mechanisms used so rarely from 1999 to 2007, and what factors
produced muted rather than problematic IGR in this new era of party incongru-
ence? The common factors are a ‘logic of informality’ that suits both sides, but also
an asymmetry of power between governments which constrains the strategies that
are realistically available to devolved governments. The article also considers the
tendency (from 2007 to 2011) for inter-party relations to pre-empt intergovern-
mental relations. It concludes with a brief discussion of the initial effects of the
formation of a Conservative–Liberal Democrat UK government in May 2010 and
the SNP’s landslide victory in 2011.
232 PAUL CAIRNEY
© 2012 The Author.British Journal of Politics and International Relations © 2012 Political Studies Association
BJPIR, 2012, 14(2)
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