Intergovernmental Relations in the UK: Co-Operation, Competition and Constitutional Change
| Author | Jim Gallagher |
| Published date | 01 May 2012 |
| Date | 01 May 2012 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-856X.2011.00485.x |
| Subject Matter | Article |
Intergovernmental Relations in the UK:
Co-operation, Competition and
Constitutional Change
Jim Gallagher
This article provides a commentary on the evolution of intergovernmental relations in the UK from
one of its leading practitioners. As the former Director General for Devolution in the UK Cabinet
Office and the UK Ministry of Justice, Jim Gallagher was at the centre of the process of intergov-
ernmental exchange, and provides rich practice-based insights into both the character and dynam-
ics of IGR before and after 2007.
Keywords: practitioner; government; JMC; co-operation
In the last dozen years the UK has moved from having one government to several,
and more recently to having clear party divisions between the different levels of
government. There is now no major party that is not in government somewhere in
the country.1These reflections, from a former practitioner in intergovernmental
relations (IGR), discuss how these bodies have got along, and how well the UK now
manages IGR under multiple parties. What should we expect from IGR, and what
do we get—and what might we see over the next few years, in the light of recent
election results?
A Dog that Did Not Bark: The Absence of
Disruptive Change
It is often remarked that big changes to the constitution will be the Blair govern-
ment’s most significant legacy, perhaps unexpectedly given how little interest Tony
Blair himself took in constitutional issues. What is less often noticed is that these
significant transfers of power were made with surprisingly little political or admin-
istrative disruption. Neither incorporation of the European Convention of Human
Rights into domestic law nor the set-up of the Supreme Court (despite the clumsy
handling of the legislation in 2005) turned the administration of justice upside
down, as some feared. Similarly devolution took effect in 1999 without rupture to
the law or administrative practices and indeed even without much change in
political leadership.
There were two main reasons for this. The first and probably more important is
institutional continuity. The Parliament and the Assemblies were wholly new, and
were discharging legislative and oversight functions that had previously been
undertaken, if at all, at Westminster. But the new devolved administrations were
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doi: 10.1111/j.1467-856X.2011.00485.x BJPIR: 2012 VOL 14, 198–213
© 2012 The Author.British Journal of Politics and International Relations © 2012
Political Studies Association
built on the pre-existing administrative institutions: the Scottish Office, the Welsh
Office and the Northern Ireland Departments (as distinct from the Northern Ireland
Office, though its justice functions were eventually devolved more than 10 years
after the start of devolution in the UK). The business of government was to be
carried out within roughly the same functional boundaries by the same depart-
ments and officials as before, albeit with new and more numerous ministers.
There was also political continuity. Labour dominated in both Scotland and Wales
and the secretaries of state for Scotland and Wales each became first minister. This
constitutional incrementalism meant that a transfer of power proceeded without
major conflict or effect on public services. Devolution involved a big reorganisation
of government but the costs of change were remarkably low.
Continuity and Path-Dependence
Two consequences followed. First, the devolved bodies were able to establish their
working practices and relationships in a very benign climate, without political
conflict between governments. It took until 2007 for there to be serious political
incongruence between London and Edinburgh, and until 2010 for Wales. More
significantly for present purposes, the pre-devolution characteristics of the institu-
tions have heavily influenced post-devolution behaviour and practices. This has
been especially true for intergovernmental relations.
Normative Expectations of Co-operation
Before devolution the territorial departments were part of government and
expected to work as such. They were bound by the rules of collective ministerial
responsibility, and the civil service culture of co-operative working. Secretaries of
state sat in cabinet, and might be influential figures. Officials moved between
Edinburgh (though seldom Cardiff) and the central departments of government.
Whitehall departments needed the Scottish and the Welsh Offices to deliver on UK
objectives in Scotland or Wales, and those offices needed the co-operation of
departments to secure domestic interests. These practices created expectations of
co-operative working which were carried through into the post-devolution period.
Those expectations were set out in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) that
was drafted to set out a common understanding of how relations between the
devolved administrations and the UK government would be conducted. This was
first drafted in 1999 and published in 2002; its most recent iteration (March 2010)
is very much the same in tone and content (MoU 2010). Underneath the MoU, as
it were, sit individual concordats between departments and their devolved coun-
terparts. Co-operation is, if not mandated, piously encouraged. Paragraph 8 of the
MoU says: ‘All four administrations want to work together, where appropriate, on
matters of mutual interest. The administrations recognise the importance of
co-operation across a range of areas’.
According to the Calman Commission on Scottish Devolution (Calman 2009), ‘The
electorate can legitimately expect the different levels of government to work
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN THE UK 199
© 2012 The Author.British Journal of Politics and International Relations © 2012 Political Studies Association
BJPIR, 2012, 14(2)
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