International Animal Protection: An Introduction
DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12082 |
Published date | 01 November 2013 |
Date | 01 November 2013 |
Author | Alasdair Cochrane |
International Animal Protection: An
Introduction
Alasdair Cochrane
University of Sheffield
The question of how we ought to relate to nonhuman
animals is not novel, nor is it confined to specific regions
of the world. All political communities have taken partic-
ular stances on how our fellow creatures ought to be
conceived of and treated. Sometimes animals have been
regarded as gods, and at other times as machines. Some-
times they have served to inspire human societies, and
other times to show how far human beings have ‘risen’.
Sometimes animals have been treated as resources for
humans to use as they please, and at other times as hav-
ing value in their own right.
Interestingly, it is this latter position –the view that
animals do have some independent value of their own –
that has come to be embraced and adopted by the vast
majority of contemporary states. Not only are modern
states instituting increasingly stringent domestic animal
welfare and anticruelty legislation, but many also recog-
nise the intrinsic worth of animals in their constitutional
documents.
The increasing acceptance of the idea that nonhuman
animals have value in their own right and are appropri-
ate subjects of political concern has no doubt been dri-
ven by two related factors. First, scientific developments
have broken down the strict dichotomy between human
beings and the rest of animal life by continually revealing
the complex capacities and abilities of nonhuman ani-
mals. There is no single capacity that all and only human
beings possess: tool use, consciousness, rationality, com-
munication and empathy, for instance, come in degrees
–both across the human species and beyond. Second,
philosophical arguments have built on these scientific
developments to make the normative case for the intrin-
sic worth of nonhuman animals. After all, if humans pos-
sess intrinsic worth and basic entitlements because they
are sentient, rational, communicative or possess some
other ‘factor X’, then consistency demands that nonhu-
man creatures possessing those very same characteristics
must also have independent worth and basic rights.
But while it may be true that nearly all contemporary
states recognise publicly the intrinsic value of animals,
the global exploitation of nonhuman animals is nonethe-
less accelerating at an unprecedented scale. Indeed, con-
sider the increase in the numbers of animals raised and
killed to satisfy global meat consumption, which has
doubled in the past 50 years and is expected to double
again over the next few decades. The vast majority of
the billions of animals bred to meet this increased con-
sumption are subject to confined industrialised condi-
tions that cause them immense suffering. The
recognition of their independent worth does not amount
to much in practice for these animals.
The reasons behind the enormous gulf between how
states purport to value animals and the reality of how
animals are in fact treated are complex and multifaceted.
However, there is no doubt that the lack of a clear,
focused and coherent set of international standards and
policies for animal protection is an important contribut-
ing factor. After all, stringent animal protection comes at
a cost, and it is easy for state legislation on animal wel-
fare to be weak or poorly enforced in the absence of
effective international oversight mechanisms. Secondly,
many of the biggest exploiters of animals are large multi-
national corporations, who find it easier than businesses
based solely in one jurisdiction to slip through even very
tight domestic regulatory systems. Thirdly, animals are
often raised in one country for ‘live export’and killing in
another, meaning that the animals involved can move
from relatively high to extremely low levels of protection.
Finally, there are also a range of international agree-
ments and supranational bodies –relating specifically to
free trade –that can actually undermine the protection
of animals domestically.
As such, in order to make good on the idea that ani-
mals do in fact have value in and of themselves, and are
not mere tools for humans to use as they wish, it is
absolutely crucial that activists, academics and policy
makers attempt to construct an effective international
regime for animal protection. This is the basic premise
behind this special section of Global Policy, and it gives
me enormous pleasure to introduce three articles that
aim specifically to discuss how such an international
regime for animal welfare might take shape.
In the first, Oscar Horta provides a clear and compel-
ling normative case for the importance of an interna-
Global Policy (2013) 4:4 doi: 10.1111/1758-5899.12082 ©2013 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Global Policy Volume 4 . Issue 4 . November 2013 369
Special Section Article
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