International Cooperation: Transforming 'Needs' into 'Deeds'
| Author | Arild Underdal |
| Date | 01 June 1987 |
| Published date | 01 June 1987 |
| DOI | 10.1177/002234338702400206 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
International
Cooperation:
Transforming
’Needs’
into
’Deeds’*
ARILD
UNDERDAL
Norwegian
School
of
Management
Why
is
effective
international
cooperation
sometimes
so
hard
to
establish
even
when
a
seemingly
convincing
rationale
can
be
given
for
its
usefulness?
Working
from
the
assumption
that
accurate
problem
’diagnosis’
is
a
necessary,
though
not
sufficient,
condition
for
successful
’political
engineering’
of
voluntary
cooperation,
the
author
starts
out
with
an
attempt
at
identifying
the
main
political
mechanisms
of
interdependence
that
can—if
unchecked
by
adequate
cooperative
arrangements
— lead
to
suboptimal
outcomes.
He
points
to
two
such
mechanisms:
incongruity
and
cost-efficiency.
The
former
is
split
into
relationships
of
externalities
and
competition,
the
latter
into
relationships
of
synergy
and
contingencies.
Using
this
typology
as a
basis,
the
author
then
proceeds
to
examine
the
problems
involved
m
transforming
the
integrative
potentials
generated
by
each
of
these
relationships
into
cooperative
achievement.
He
shows
that
relationships
characterized
by
incongruity,
particularly
those
involving
competition,
are
more
’malign’
than
are
problems
of
cost-efficiency,
and
that
the
dynamics
of
adversanal
bargaining
implies
an
inherent
risk
of
blocking,
possibly
even
’destroying’,
the
integrative
potential
that
provides
the
basic
rationale
for
cooperation
efforts.
ISSN
0022-3433
Journal
of
Peace
Research,
vol.
24,
no.
2,
1987
1.
Purpose
and
Scope
An
assertion
common
to
political
rhetoric
as
well
as
academic
studies
over
the
past
few
decades
states
that
international
interde-
pendence
generates
a
need
for
cooperative
efforts
and
institutions.
Another,
perhaps
slightly
less
frequent,
observation
is
that
effective
cooperation
is
hard
to
establish
even
when
a
seemingly
convincing
rationale
can
be
given
for
its
usefulness.
Taking
these
two
assertions
as
its
point
of
departure,
this
article
aims
at
exploring
the
relationship
between
the
need
for
cooperation
and
the
actual
accomplishment
in
terms
of
coop-
erative
problem-solving.
Working
from
the
assumption
that
effective
’therapy’
depends
on
accurate
’diagnostics’,
I
shall
proceed
in
two
main
steps:
First,
I
shall
try
to
provide
a
typology
of
cooperation
problems,
i.e.
try
to
identify
the
main
interdependence
mech-
anisms
that
can,
in
the
absence
of
adequate
cooperative
arrangements,
lead
to
subop-
timal
outcomes.
The
second
step
is
to
exam-
ine
the
problems
involved
in
transforming
the
integrative
potential
generated
by
each
of
these
mechanisms
into
cooperative
achievement.
As
we
shall
see,
some
coop-
*The
author
gratefully
acknowledges
comments
from
Jon
Hovi,
Nils
Petter
Gleditsch,
and
four
anonymous
referees
to
an
earlier
version
of
this
paper.
eration
problems
are
considerably
more
’malign’
than
others.
And
much
can
be
lost
in
the
process
of
trying
to
solve
the
’malign’
ones.
2.
’Diagnosis’
Cooperation
can
be
useful
whenever
actors
face
a
collective
problem
that
deliberate
coordination of
behavior
can
possibly
solve
or
alleviate.
So
let
us
start
by
exploring
what
characterizes
the
class(es)
of
problems
that
voluntary
cooperation
can
solve.
In
general
terms,
what
can
be
ac-
complished
through
processes
of
joint
decision-making
is
a
function
of
three
basic
determinants:
viz.
(a)
decision
rule(s),
(b)
the
configuration
of
actor
preferences,
and
(c)
the
level
and
distribution
of
relevant
pol-
itical
resources,
including
the
elusive
asset
of
’skill’.
In
international
cooperation
the
basic
decision
rule
is
that
of
agreement
(unanimity).
A
necessary
but
not
sufficient
condition
for
cooperation
to
emerge
through
agreement
between
rational
actors
is
the
mutual
perception
of
some
integrative
poten-
tial,
i.e.
the
possibility
of
achieving
some
cooperative
solution(s)
preferred
to
the
best
available
non-cooperative
outcome
by
at
least
one
actor,
and
perceived
as
worse
by
none
of
its
prospective
partners.
1
In
Fig.
1,
the
best
non-cooperative
out-
168
Fig.
1.
Utility
Space
for
Actors
A
and
B
come
is
located
in
the
origin.
Any
coop-
erative
outcomes
that
can
be
identified
in
sector
III
are
integrative
solutions;
outcomes
bordering
on
one
of
the
coordinates
of
sector
III
will
be
labelled
’weakly
integrative’
solu-
tions.
Options
located
in
sections
I
or
IV
may
increase
the
’sum’
of
benefits
beyond
the
level
of
any
integrative
solution,
but
-
if
evaluated
strictly
on
their
own
merits
-
they
all
leave
one
of
the
parties
with
an
outcome
which
it
considers
inferior
to
what
it
could
have
accomplished
all
by
itself.
With-
out
issue
linkage
or
(other)
compensatory
arrangements,
options
found
in
all
sectors
except
III
fall
outside
the
range
of
possible
agreements.
Even
options
that
are
highly
attractive
by
professional
standards
-
such
as
solutions
maximizing
overall
physical
or
economic
yield
from
some
biological
resource
-
often
produce
non-integrative
outcomes
(Underdal 1980).
So
probably
do
numerous
actor
proposals,
particularly
those
that
are
designed
to
impress
some
larger
audience.
Thus,
it
seems
that
many
of
the
proposals
for
arms
control
measures
publicly
orchestrated
by
the
parties
themselves
essen-
tially
boil
down
to
demanding
that
one’s
opponent
abstain
from
catching
up
where
Actor
himself
is
strong
or
from
developing
a
competitive
edge
where
Actor
feels
vul-
nerable.
Issue
linkages
or
other
re-struc-
turing
measures
may
bring
options
that
are
non-integrative
on
their
own
merits
into
the
settlement
range
of
sector
III
(Sebenius
1983).
It
should
be
added,
though,
that
at
the
international
level
issue
linkage
tends
to
be
a
considerably
more
complex
and
delicate
undertaking
than
portrayed
in
formal
bar-
gaining
theory.
The
outer
limit
of
the
integrative
potential
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