International Distributive Justice
| DOI | 10.1111/1467-9248.00351 |
| Date | 01 December 2001 |
| Author | Simon Caney |
| Published date | 01 December 2001 |
| Subject Matter | Review Article |
Review Article:
International Distributive Justice
Simon Caney
University of Newcastle
The literature on global justice contains a number of distinct approaches. This article identifies
and reviews recent work in four commonly found in the literature. First there is an examin-
ation of the cosmopolitan contention that distributive principles apply globally. This is followed by
three responses to the cosmopolitanism, – the nationalist emphasis on special duties to co-nationals,
the society of states claim that principles of global distributive justice violate the independence of
states and the realist claim that global justice is utopian and that states should advance national
interest.
Our normal attitude to foreigners is a complete negation of that absence
of discrimination on irrelevant grounds which we have recognized as the
principle of equality (E. H. Carr, 1995, p. 149).
I believe in the right of every living human being, without distinction of
colour, race, sex, or professed belief or opinion, to liberty, life and subsist-
ence, to complete protection from ill-treatment, equality of opportunity
in the pursuit of happiness and an equal voice in the collective govern-
ment of mankind (H. G. Wells, 1940, p. 101).
Political philosophers have traditionally assumed that ideals of distributive justice
should operate, if they operate at all, within countries. On this view, principles of
distributive justice should be adopted at the state-level or nation-level and may
require the redistribution of wealth from the wealthy within the state or nation to
the less advantaged members of that society. The standard assumption, thus, has
been that what has been called the ‘scope of justice’ – the account specifying from
whom and to whom goods should be distributed – should include other members of
one’s state or one’s nation.1 It should not, however, include everyone. Recently,
however, this assumption has been vigorously challenged and a number of political
philosophers have argued that there are global principles of justice. Principles of
distributive justice, that is, should have a global scope.
This review article examines recent work on international distributive justice.
Within the literature on global justice, one can distinguish between a number of
competing approaches. In this article, I shall focus on four commonly expressed
approaches. In particular I shall examine the cosmopolitan contention that dis-
tributive principles should operate globally (first section) before then examining three
responses to this position, namely the nationalist emphasis on special duties to
fellow-nationals (second section), the society-of-states claim that principles of global
distributive justice violate the independence of states (third section) and realist
© Political Studies Association, 2001.
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R E V I E W A R T I C L E
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claims that global justice is utopian and that states should advance the national
interest (fourth section).2
Prior to analysing these different traditions, three preliminary points should be
made. First, it is worth noting that the characterizations of the four perspectives I
have given above are approximate and require further qualification. Moreover, the
philosophical perspectives adopted are not intended to be seen as rigidly defined
mutually exclusive doctrines: rather they refer to philosophical perspectives which
may overlap and whose borders are not precisely demarcated. Indeed, what I hope
to show is that the approaches outlined above have more in common than is often
recognized.
Secondly, it is worth distinguishing between strong and weak versions of the claim
that there are international principles of distributive justice. On the weak claim,
individuals have obligations of distributive justice to some but not all those who
live outside their state or nation. On this account, obligations of distributive justice
may operate beyond the nation or state – and are, in this sense, international – but
may not incorporate everyone: the scope of justice is not simply domestic but is not
global either. Thus, the British might have obligations of distributive justice to
other members of the European Union, say, but not to Malaysians.3 On the strong
version of the claim, by contrast, individuals have obligations of distributive justice
to everyone: the scope of justice is global. This review focuses on the stronger
claim but it is also worth noting that even if we reject this we are not committed
to the traditional view that ideals of distributive justice specify the distribution of
resources within states.
A third and final point should be made, namely that the aim of this review is to
examine recent discussions of international distributive justice. That is, it analyses the
obligations issued by a theory of distributive justice, and it is important to dis-
tinguish between these obligations and other types of moral obligation. There are,
for example, arguments for a global redistribution of wealth which appeal not to
justice but to humanity or charity.4 This paper will not examine such claims.5
Cosmopolitanism
Having made these preliminary points, let us begin with contemporary defences
of global principles of distributive justice. Recently a number of political philoso-
phers – including Brian Barry, Charles Beitz, Thomas Pogge, among others – have
advocated what has come to be known as a cosmopolitan position, arguing that
principles of distributive justice should be applied to the world as a whole.6 Duties
of distributive justice thus apply to all human beings. To get a full picture of the
cosmopolitan perspective and the various forms it takes, it is important to bear four
further points in mind.
First, it is important to distinguish between what might be termed ‘radical’ and
‘mild’ cosmopolitanism.7 Radical cosmopolitanism, as I define it, makes the two follow-
ing claims: first, there are global principles of distributive justice (the positive claim),
and, second, there are no state-wide or nation-wide principles of distributive
justice (the negative claim). Mild cosmopolitanism, by contrast, simply affirms the
positive claim. As such it can accept the claim, denied by radical cosmopolitanism,
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that people have special obligations of distributive justice to fellow nationals or
fellow citizens. Now cosmopolitans differ in their position here. Whereas some, like
Charles Beitz, do affirm the radical view that ‘state boundaries can have derivative,
but they cannot have fundamental, moral importance’ (Beitz, 1988, p. 192, cf also
Beitz, 1999c, p. 182), others, like Brian Barry, Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen,
do not (Barry, 1999, p. 59; Nussbaum, 1996, pp. 9 and 13; Sen, 1996, pp. 112–5).
Secondly, it is worth noting Thomas Pogge’s distinction between ‘institutional’ and
‘interactive’ forms of cosmopolitanism. The former maintains that principles of
justice concern the distribution of resources within institutions and the focus of
attention is on the fairness of the institution(s). The latter, on the other hand,
maintains that principles of justice concern the behaviour of individuals and one
has obligations to other humans independently of whether they are members of
the same institutions or not.8 Pogge defends the institutional approach and argues
that given the degree of international economic interdependence, there is a global
basic structure and hence that there are global principles of distributive justice
(1994a, pp. 91–7). Other cosmopolitans, however, most notably consequentialists
like Peter Singer, would claim that persons can have obligations to help others
even if those others do not belong to the same institutions (1972, pp. 229–43).
A third feature of contemporary cosmopolitan accounts of distributive justice
concerns who is entitled to the goods transferred. Here it is clear that most con-
temporary cosmopolitans affirm that duties are owed to individuals (and not
states). This, for example is made clear by Beitz (1999c, pp. 152–3) and Pogge
(1994b, p. 202). An alternative view has been taken by Barry who once argued
that states were entitled to receive resources (1991c, pp. 203–8; 1991d, pp. 239–40).
In recent publications, however, he rejects this position. And indeed, given cos-
mopolitanism’s individualist assumptions, his later position is most in keeping with
cosmopolitan tenets (Barry, 1998, pp. 159–60; 1999, pp. 35–40).
Finally, it is worth drawing attention to the practical measures affirmed by
contemporary cosmopolitans. These vary considerably. Some like Beitz (1999c,
pp. 150–3) and David Richards (1982, pp. 287–93 (especially pp. 292–3)) have
endorsed a global difference principle, arguing that is, that resources should be dis-
tributed to maximize the condition of the least well-off humans.9 Others like
Hillel Steiner have argued that everyone is entitled to an equal proportion of the
Earth’s resources (1994, pp. 235–6, 262–5, 270; 1999, pp. 173–7).10 Barry has
defended four principles of global justice. These require in turn, that we affirm
(i) an overriddable commitment to equality, (ii) a principle compensating people
for involuntary disadvantages, (iii) a commitment to protecting people’s basic
needs, and (iv) the claim that where these three principles are already met, we may
prefer that arrangement which is most mutually advantageous (Barry, 1998,
pp. 147–9). Finally...
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