International functionalism and democracy
| Author | Tobias Theiler |
| Published date | 01 June 2022 |
| Date | 01 June 2022 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/13540661211073081 |
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JR
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https://doi.org/10.1177/13540661211073081
European Journal of
International Relations
2022, Vol. 28(2) 312 –336
© The Author(s) 2022
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DOI: 10.1177/13540661211073081
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International functionalism
and democracy
Tobias Theiler
University College Dublin, Ireland
Abstract
International functionalism as proposed by David Mitrany envisions non-territorial
functional agencies to supplant the states system. Mitrany makes no provision for
democracy in functional agencies. Instead, he assumes that the policies of international
technocrats would be ‘technically self-determined’ and uncontested – a stance several
critics deem antidemocratic and naive. A second, related criticism holds that even if
functional agencies were formally democratic, democracy could not operate effectively
since functional polities would be too ‘thin’ and fragmented to sustain democratic
commitments among their members. The article qualifies the first charge and rejects
the second. First, defined as an institutional decision-making principle, ‘technical self-
determination’ is Mitrany’s add-on to the underlying functionalist logic, not an inseparable
part of it. That logic instead holds that institutions work best if their form and scope of
authority follow their function and that function-specific agencies therefore could meet
some needs better than the state. Contra Mitrany, this does not privilege technocratic
over democratic decision-making and it does not imply that functional agencies would
be free from political conflict. Nor, second, would functional agencies necessarily be
unsuitable for democracy in practice. Several strands of democratic theory suggest that
even people who do not share a ‘thick’ communal identity can develop a commitment
to meet shared needs democratically. If one accepts this, it loosens functionalism’s
technocratic stigma, highlights its potential as a democratically viable alternative to
both state-centric and supranational models of international order and broadens our
conception of possible democratic futures.
Keywords
International Relations, functionalism, David Mitrany, international integration, global
governance, democracy
Corresponding author:
Tobias Theiler, University College Dublin, Dublin 4, Ireland.
Email: tobias.theiler@ucd.ie
1073081EJT0010.1177/13540661211073081European Journal of International RelationsTheiler
research-article2022
Article
Theiler 313
Introduction
International functionalism remains a frequently cited chapter in the intellectual history
of international integration but as a widely debated blueprint for the reorganization of the
international system its popularity peaked long ago. This decline in interest was in part
inspired by empirical developments such as the failure of the European integration pro-
ject and United Nations specialized agencies to evolve into what international function-
alists had advocated and to some extent predicted. Theoretically, meanwhile, the decline
of functionalism as a dominant analytical paradigm in sociology and anthropology from
the mid-1960s seemed to affect its international variant, too. Critics variously accused
international functionalism of being economically reductionist, apolitical, teleological
and technocratic (Long, 1993; for a classic overview see Pentland, 1973: Chapter 3).
Some deemed functionalism’s project of transferring powers from national governments
to international technocrats outright ‘impossible’ (McLaren, 1985: 140) as they thought
that it underestimated the resistance this would spark among national governments and
mass publics alike.
The past two decades have seen some resurgence of interest in international function-
alism and a re-evaluation of the work of David Mitrany as its ‘founder’ and most influ-
ential exponent (e.g. Ashworth, 2017; Hammarlund, 2005; Holthaus, 2018; Steffek,
2015). Much of this work is inspired by the same underlying concerns that also animated
Mitrany: a (qualified) scepticism of the state as a model of social and political organiza-
tion and – by implication – a leeriness of centralizing and territorial models of interna-
tional integration that seek (partially) to reproduce state-like structures at a supranational
scale.
This article seeks to contribute to the current revival of interest in Mitrany’s work by
examining its relationship with democracy. It focuses on two related criticisms that have
often been levelled against international functionalism from this perspective. A first criti-
cism highlights Mitrany’s failure to provide for democratic representation inside the
functional agencies he envisions. This lack of democratic provision reflects Mitrany’s
doctrine of ‘technical self-determination’, his claim that international technocrats could
uncontroversially ascertain, prioritize and satisfy needs. Yet according to this line of
criticism, Mitrany’s attempt to substitute democracy with ‘technical self-determination’
is illusionary since prioritizing and satisfying needs is inevitably contentious and thus
political. Rather than being accepted as ‘technically self-determined’ and thus beyond
rational contestation, policy outputs in non-democratic functional agencies would risk
being seen as illegitimate impositions by democratically unaccountable international
technocrats. The second criticism holds that even if functional agencies were furnished
with formally democratic institutions these could not operate effectively in practice since
functional polities would be too ‘thin’, fragmented and lacking in communal cohesion to
sustain democratic commitments among their members. In such a conception, democ-
racy could not be ‘unbundled’ and deterritorialized in parallel with an ‘unbundling’ and
deterritorialization of political power as advocated by Mitrany.
The article qualifies the first criticism and rejects the second. It accepts the first charge
to the extent that Mitrany is indeed naive in his assumption that prioritizing and satisfy-
ing needs could ever be ‘technically self-determined’, uncontested and in that
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