International Legal Policy and Efficient Resource Allocation
| Published date | 01 July 1990 |
| DOI | 10.1177/019251219001100304 |
| Author | Scott Mckinney |
| Date | 01 July 1990 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
335
International
Legal
Policy
and
Efficient
Resource
Allocation
SCOTT
MCKINNEY
ABSTRACT.
The
impact
of
international
interactions
on
the
level
and
allocation
of
a
nation’s
expenditures
for
police
protection
and
law
enforcement
are
discussed:
A
model
is
developed
and
used
to
analyze
various
types
of
international
interactions
such
as
crime
spillovers
from
one
nation
to
another,
effective
police
action
in
one
country
against
a
crime
organization
active
in
a
number
of
countries,
and
the
assistance
that
one
country
offers
another
in
the
securing
of
information
and
evidence.
The
impacts
of
these
interactions
are
then
evaluated
in
terms
of
the
concept
of
Pareto-optimality.
International
cooperation
through
police
and
legal
institutions
is
discussed
as
a
way
of
narrowing
the
gap
between
actual
and
optimal
expenditures,
and
an
international
body
is
proposed
to
deal
with
criteria,
coordination,
and
compensation
for
international
discovery
orders.
In
the
final
section
the
results
of
a
number
of
studies
are
presented
that
suggest
the
importance
of
interjurisdictional
interactions
and
cooperation.
These
results
are
used
to
evaluate
the
possible
impacts
of
international
interactions
in
crime,
police
protection
and
law
enforcement.
I.
Theoretical
Discussion
From
this
economist’s
point
of view,
the
interesting
question
about
international
legal
relations
is
the
impact
that
they
have
on
the
resources
individual
nations
allocate
to
police
and
law
enforcement
activities.
How
do
these
relations
affect
the
overall
level
of
expenditure
for
these
activities?
How
do
they
influence
the
way
these
expenditures
are
used?
How
do
the
level
chosen
and
the
uses
decided
upon
compare
to
the
optimal
level
and
the
optimal
uses?
These
and
related
questions
are
explored
in
this
paper
using
a
general
model
developed
to
analyze
the
influence
of
interjurisdictional
interactions
on
resource
allocation.
The
model
takes
into
account
both
direct
interactions
between
the
police
and
legal
institutions
of
one
nation
and
those
of
another,
and
indirect
interactions
that
take
place
through
the
impact
these
institutions
have
on
criminal
activity
and
its
distribution
across
nations.
I
begin
by
developing
the
model
and
making
clear
the
assumptions
on
which
it
rests.
The
model
is
then
used
to
analyze
the
impact
of
various
types
of
international
interactions
and
to
compare
these
impacts
to
a
concept
of
optimality
widely
used
in
the
economic
literature.
This
analysis
facilitates
the
discussion
of
the
influence
of
cooperation
and
its
evaluation.
In
the
second
section
of
the
paper
the
results
of
some
To continue reading
Request your trial