International Organizations and Transnational Corporations at a World Court of Human Rights
| Date | 01 November 2012 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1758-5899.2012.00204.x |
| Author | Martin Scheinin |
| Published date | 01 November 2012 |
International Organizations and
Transnational Corporations at a
World Court of Human Rights
Martin Scheinin
European University Institute, Florence
Abstract
This article is based on the author’s involvement in preparing a Draft Statute for a future World Court of Human
Rights. The proposal seeks to modify the traditional vertical structure of human rights norms by introducing a
mechanism for adjudicating claims about human rights violations by actors other than states, including by
international organizations (IO) or transnational corporations (TNC). The jurisdiction of the World Court would require
acceptance by the IO or TNC, making the mechanism similar to the effects of an international treaty, i.e. being legally
binding but at the same time based on consent to be bound. When accepting the jurisdiction of the World Court,
each IO or TNC could also specify under what substantive human rights norms the right of complaint will apply, and
what internal procedures need to be exhausted before an alleged victim can have resort to it.
The problem
Human rights law has traditionally focused on vertical
relationships, i.e. the obligations of the state in relation
to the individual, or groups of individuals. This structural
feature of human rights norms is reflected in the frame-
work of international human rights treaties that proclaim
rights to the individual and establish a range of monitor-
ing mechanisms, such as periodic reporting or individual
complaints, through which a regional human rights court
or international expert body examines whether the
states that have ratified the treaty in question are com-
plying with their human rights obligations. Human rights
law addresses relationships between two private parties
only indirectly, through the prism of so-called positive
obligations of the state to ensure people’s enjoyment
of human rights also in relation to attacks from third
parties.
In the age of globalization this exclusively vertical nat-
ure of human rights norms appears inadequate. Actors
other than states, including international financial institu-
tions, other international organizations and transnational
corporations, exercise powers that affect the enjoyment
of human rights by individuals, both within a given
country and across borders. In part, states have dele-
gated their powers to other actors, or deregulated areas
where they used to legislate, so that regulation may
now take new forms, including private or semi-private
ones. If human rights law fails to address new structures
of power, it fails to deliver. Clearly, there is a need to
rethink how to secure the enjoyment of human rights in
relation to attacks or interferences coming from actors
other than states, as states may be unable or unwilling
to protect everyone’s human rights in relation to power-
ful actors such as international organizations (IOs) or
transnational corporations (TNCs). The United Nations,
for instance, can subject individuals to a travel ban, or
even to detention. In times when states deregulate in
order to make themselves more attractive to investors,
corporations can engage in practices that interfere with
the privacy rights of workers, the environmental rights of
the local population, or the health rights of consumers.
The vertical nature of human rights is not inherent in
the substance of human rights themselves. As moral
rights they pertain also to interpersonal relations. In the
legal sphere, national constitutions with their chapters
on fundamental rights emerged as a self-limitation to
the powers of the state, and therefore constitutional
rights were written to focus on the vertical relationship
between the state and the individual. Human rights trea-
ties followed the same tradition by being open for ratifi-
cation by states only and by focusing all their
international monitoring mechanisms on the state.
However, it would be conceptually possible to extend
their binding effect also to other actors, including IOs
and TNCs. In fact, the first step has been taken: the
Global Policy Volume 3 . Issue 4 . November 2012
ª2012 London School of Economics and Political Science and John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Global Policy (2012) 3:4 doi: 10.1111/j.1758-5899.2012.00204.x
Special Section Article
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