International Political Theory after Hobbes
| DOI | 10.3366/jipt.2011.0015 |
| Published date | 01 October 2011 |
| Author | Richard E. Flathman |
| Date | 01 October 2011 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL THEORY AFTER HOBBES
RICHARD E. FLATHMAN
Raia Prokhovnik and Gabriella Slomp (eds), International Political Theory
after Hobbes: Analysis, Interpretation and Orientation (Basingstoke: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2010), 232 pp., £57.50/$85.00 cloth.
This volume is an excellent gathering of recent thinking concerning international
relations (IR) and its indebtedness, or lack thereof, to the theorizing of Thomas
Hobbes. Following a helpful Introduction by the editors, which sketches the
arguments and interpretations of the several contributors, the book presents a
diversity of sometimes complementary,sometimes conflicting, views concerning
Hobbes, the relevance or irrelevance of his reflections concerning IR and more
generally political theorizing. It also offers thoughtful suggestions as to the
directions in which both such theorizings should now continue.
The arguments and interpretations of the several contributors can be partly
organized in terms of the answers they giveto the following questions: 1) In what
ways, in what respects, should and should not Hobbes be classified as a member
of the school of thought commonly called realism in IR theory? (I for the most
part leave aside variations of this theory, e.g. ‘neorealism’); 2) In what respects
and for what reasons do the several authors agree or disagree with the view
that Hobbes does, or should, recognize similarities and continuities between the
state of nature, civil societies and international relations; in particular, in what
respects does Hobbes, and should we, allow that there is either constant and
mutually destructive conflict in these latter domains or, rather, the possibility
and reality of agreement and mutually advantageous cooperation in all or any of
them?; 3) Should we interpret Hobbes’ sovereign as ‘absolute’, and should we
or should we not think of sovereignty in this way? In what ways and for what
reasons does Hobbes allow of justified disobedience and/or rebellion against the
sovereign and what limitations or moral or prudent guidance does Hobbes place
upon or give to the sovereign regarding conduct in the realm of international
Journal of International Political Theory, 7(2) 2011, 212–218
DOI: 10.3366/jipt.2011.0015
© Edinburgh University Press 2011
www.eupjournals.com/jipt
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