International Politics and the Subnational Allocation of World Bank Development Projects
| Author | Matthew DiLorenzo |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/14789299231153821 |
| Published date | 01 May 2023 |
| Date | 01 May 2023 |
| Subject Matter | The Null Hypothesis |
https://doi.org/10.1177/14789299231153821
Political Studies Review
2023, Vol. 21(2) 400 –411
© The Author(s) 2023
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/14789299231153821
journals.sagepub.com/home/psrev
International Politics and the
Subnational Allocation of
World Bank Development
Projects
Matthew DiLorenzo
Abstract
Temporary United Nations Security Council (UNSC) members receive more World Bank
projects. I consider the potential for UNSC status to influence aid allocation within recipient
countries. While strategically important recipients might gain greater discretion over the internal
distribution of aid, no clear evidence establishes whether World Bank aid tends to succumb to
political pressures within countries. I examine whether political favoritism within countries varies
with UNSC status and find little evidence for a connection. While cross-national lending may
follow politics, subnational allocation seems to be unrelated to international politics, which has
important implications for the efficacy of Bank assistance.
Keywords
UNSC membership, subnational aid allocation, favoritism
Accepted: 25 March 2021
Strategic relationships between donors and recipient countries shape patterns of cross-
national aid allocation (Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Kuziemko and Werker, 2006). For
example, holding temporary membership on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC)
correlates positively with the number of World Bank projects a country receives (Dreher
et al., 2009) and with aid from the UN and the United States (Kuziemko and Werker,
2006). I ask whether UNSC membership affects the geographic patterns of World Bank
aid allocation within countries. The geographic location of aid projects is a dimension of
the project approval process that is largely driven by potential recipient governments
(Jablonski, 2014). If UNSC membership increases the willingness of the World Bank to
approve development projects, it may also plausibly affect internal aid allocation if recip-
ient leaders become emboldened to propose aid projects in sites that more directly advance
Department of Political Science & Geography, Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA, USA
Corresponding author:
Matthew DiLorenzo, Department of Political Science & Geography, Old Dominion University, 7000 Batten
Arts-Letters, Norfolk, VA 23529, USA.
Email: mdiloren@odu.edu
1153821PSW0010.1177/14789299231153821Political Studies ReviewDiLorenzo
research-article2023
The Null Hypothesis
To continue reading
Request your trial