International support networks and the calculus of uprising
| Published date | 01 September 2020 |
| Author | Belgin San-Akca,Zeev Maoz,Jaime A Jackson |
| Date | 01 September 2020 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343319885181 |
| Subject Matter | Regular Articles |
International support networks
and the calculus of uprising
Jaime A Jackson
Department of Political Science, University of California Davis
Belgin San-Akca
Department of International Relations, Koç University
Zeev Maoz
Department of Political Science, University of California Davis
Abstract
How does the anticipation of external support for both opposition groups and governments affect the likelihood and
form (violent vs. nonviolent) of uprising within states? We develop a novel approach to address these issues, building
on a network perspective. Our model suggests that both opposition groups and governments’ strategies are affected
by an anticipation of the degree and nature of expected support by external parties (states and non-state actors).
Using a set of indicators – including cultural affinity, strategic factors, and normative values – we develop a unique
measure of anticipated support based on the potential support networks of target states and their opposition in order
to evaluate our hypotheses. We argue that the anticipated balance of support for opposition and governments affects:
(a) the likelihood of uprising and (b) the principal – violent or nonviolent – strategy used by the opposition group.
We analyze data on violent and nonviolent civil conflicts over the period 1946–2010. We find that when the balance
of anticipated support favors the opposition over their target government, the onset of an uprising is more likely.
Specifically, the type of anticipated support has implications for whether a violent or nonviolent uprising occurs.
These findings provide new insights into the role external support can play even before conflict occurs.
Keywords
civil conflict, external support, networks, nonviolence
Introduction
The Syrian civil war has lasted eight years now, resulting
in over 450,000 fatalities so far. The lethality of this war
and its duration are due to the use of sustained violence
on the part of all groups involved in this war. However,
the lethality and duration of the war are due to its com-
plexity measured by the number of internal factions, by
the number of external – state and non-state – actors that
are involved in this conflict, and by the depth of their
involvement. The civil conflict started as a popular non-
violent uprising against the Assad regime, with two
opposing groups – a diffuse opposition against the gov-
ernment. But the conflict quickly evolved into a multi-
actor, high-intensity and high-lethality conflict, which
continued to expand over time. Figure 1 displays two
stages in this war.
As this figure suggests, even in its first year, the con-
flict involved multiple opposition groups with both com-
mon and conflicting goals. All of these groups sought to
overthrow the Assad regime. However, conflict broke
out among opposition groups such as FSA and ISIS.
Moreover, a network of ties between external actors and
internal groups compounded the complexity of the con-
flict. The networks of internal groups and the interna-
tional support networks – external state and non-state
Corresponding author:
jajack@ucdavis.edu
Journal of Peace Research
2020, Vol. 57(5) 632–647
ªThe Author(s) 2020
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DOI: 10.1177/0022343319885181
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actors involved in the conflict – have become exponen-
tially denser and more complex.
The complexity of this conflict is not all that excep-
tional. Civil conflicts have often expanded due to the
proliferation of rebel groups and due to foreign interven-
tion on competing sides of the conflict. The Lebanese
civil war of 1974–88 involved a Hobbesian ‘state of
nature’ type of internal conflict with Christians, Sunni
and Shi’a Muslims, Palestinians, and Druze engaged in
alternating alliances and conflict with each other. Inter-
vention by Syria, Israel, and (for a short time) the USA
and France complicated this conflict further. The Rus-
sian Civil War of 1918–22, the Spanish Civil War of
1936–39, and multiple modern examples drive this
point home.
Research on the characteristics of civil wars sug-
gests that external actors’ involvement tends to com-
pound the duration and lethality of such conflicts
(Balch-Lindsay & Enterline, 2000; Regan, 2002;
Akcinaroglu & Radziszewski, 2005; Cunningham,
2010). Likewise, the duration and lethality of civil
conflicts increase with the number of groups involved
in the fighting (Elbadawi, 1999; Elbadawi & Samba-
nis, 2000; Regan, 2000; Lacina, 2006). Moreover,
civil uprisings that break out as nonviolent protests
may also involve some external support, but we do
notknowwhetherthetypeofexternalsupportthat
characterizes such uprisings is different from the kind
of external support that takes place before and during
violent uprisings. Therefore, our focus is on the stra-
tegic anticipation of opposition groups regarding
external support, prior to the outbreak of uprisings.
A study of social media usage in the early stages of the
Syrian uprising suggests that:
Syrian activists began trying to mobilize international
and domestic support for prote sts against the regime
of Bashar al-Assad even before the outbreak of serious
Figure 1. External and internal networks in Syria, 2011–15
Rectangles represent network layers. Blue rectangle is an international network of interstate cooperation/conflict. Orange lower rectangle
represents internal network. Blue squares represent external actors. Green circles are non-governmental actors. Yellow diamonds are gov-
ernments facing internal insurgency. Circle/square sizes indicate actors’capabilities. Lines indicate relations between actors. Red lines indicate
conflict/opposition ties; blue lines indicate cooperative/coordination ties.
Key to actors:SYR – govt./Syrian Military, IRN – Islamic Rep. of Iran, HZB – Hezbollah, PARM – Paramilitary groups supporting the regime,
ISFR – Islamic Front, JABN – Jabhat al Nusra, ISIL – Islamic State, FSA – Free Syrian Army, PPU – Popular Prot. Units (Kurdish Militia),
USA – United States, RUS – Russia, FRN – France, SAU – Saudi Arabia, QAT – Qatar, TUR – Turkey, IRQ – Iraq, JOR – Jordan (Israel not
included).
Source: Dangerous Companions Project (San-Akca, 2016).
Jackson et al. 633
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