International Surveillance Satellites - Open Skies for All?
| Published date | 01 September 1988 |
| Author | Johan Swahn |
| Date | 01 September 1988 |
| DOI | 10.1177/002234338802500303 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
International
Surveillance
Satellites
- Open
Skies
for
All?*
JOHAN
SWAHN
Technical
Peace
Research
Unit,
Chalmers
University
of
Technology
Since
the
early
1960s
the
US
and
the
USSR
have
had
a
monopoly
on
highly
detailed
surveillance
information
gathered
from
satellites
in
orbits
around
the
Earth.
The
information
available
from
these
satellites
has
created
a
situation
of
open
skies
between
the
superpowers.
Insight
into
the
other
side’s
military
activities
has
facilitated
limited
arms
control
results
and
stabilized
crises
While
there
are
confidence-building
advantages
in
this
situation
there
are
drawbacks
to
the
monopoly
Outside
parties
cannot
verify
one
superpower’s
accusations
of
military
supenonty
over
the
other
side.
Such
accusations
fuel
the
arms
race
and
have
often
been
found
to
be
incorrect.
This
has
led
to
calls
for
international
satellite
surveillance
to
allow
increased
insight
into
the
military
affairs
of
the
superpowers.
Initiatives
in
this
direction
have
been
thwarted
by
US
and
USSR
opposition
and
by
economic,
legal,
and
political
difficulties.
Civil
remote-sensing
satellites
are
now
being
launched
and
operated
by
several
countries
and
organizations.
There
is
an
increasing
interest
in
the
news
media
for
the
use
of
remote-sensing
satellite
pictures
to
illustrate
coverage
of
military-related
news
stones.
Academic
researchers
have
started
to
use
remote-sensing
satellite
pictures
for
analysis
of
the
arms
race.
These
developments,
although
resisted
by
military
circles,
can
help
the
realizations
of
proposals
for
international
surveillance
satellites
which
in
the
future
can
bring
open
skies
for
all
ISSN
0022-3433
Journal
of
Peace
Research,
vol.
25,
no.
3,
1988
1.
Introduction
The
USA
and
the
USSR
hold
a
near-mono-
poly
on
military
intelligence
collection
by
technical
means.
Surveillance
1
using
sat-
ellites
is
the
most
important
part
of
this
activity
and
the
superpower
monopoly
within
this
field
is
almost
total.2
Information
gathered
by
surveillance
satellites
can
be
used
for
war
preparations
and
force-
enhancement
during
conflict.
But
such
infor-
mation
is
also
useful
for
peaceful
purposes
by
facilitating
the
verification
of
bilateral
arms
control
and disarmament
treaties.
Surveil-
lance
satellites
are
confidence-building
and
can
also
help
control
crises
between
the
superpowers.
The
superpowers
have
had
difficulties
in
* The
author
wishes
to
thank
Karl-Erik
Eriksson,
Bhu-
pendra
Jasam,
and
Nils
Petter
Gleditsch
for
helpful
comments
during
the
preparation
of
this
paper.
The
paper
is
based
on
a
more
comprehensive
report
with
a
more
detailed
bibliography
(Swahn
1988).
Readers
who
are
mterested
m
receiving
a
copy
of
the
report
or
have
comments
to
this
paper
are
invited
to
get
in
touch
with
the
author
at
the
address
given
in
the
reference
or
via
Bitnet/EARN:
TFFJS
at
SECTHF51.
using
their
surveillance
satellites
in
a
way
that
promotes
peace
and
disarmament.
The
positive
possible
uses
of
satellite
surveillance
are
hindered
by
the
superpower
monopoly
on
surveillance
satellites.
Outside
parties
cannot
verify
one
superpower’s
accusations
of
military
superiority
over
the
other
side.
Accusations
of
arms
control
treaty
breaches
have
hindered
arms
control
negotiations
and
prompted
suggestions
that
the
available
veri-
fication
methods
are
insufficient.
Such
accu-
sations
fuel
the
arms
race
and
have
often
been
found
to
be
exaggerated
or
incorrect.
The
intelligence
gathering
community
in
each
superpower
is
very
large.3
Access
to
the
gathered
information,
however,
is
kept
within
a
small
group
of
persons,
mainly
within
intelligence
and
military
circles.
These
individuals
decide
what
and
how
much,
if
any,
information
is
to
be
released
to
poli-
ticians
as
a
basis
for
decision-making
or
to
journalists
and
the
general
public.
Because
such
decisions
can
be
influenced
by
vested
interests
and
prejudices
within
these
circles,
even
politicians
in
the
superpowers
cannot
be
sure
that
the
information
they
receive
is
accurate
or
relevant.
Information
from
230
satellite
surveillance
intended
for
groups
out-
side
the
inner
circles
is
carefully
filtered
and
perhaps
modified
to
fit
requirements
for
policy,
political
lobbying,
or
propaganda.
If
the
secrecy
and
monopoly
of
the
super-
powers
were
broken
by
independent
sources
of
surveillance
information,
new
possibilities
would
open.
The
allegations
and
accusations
mentioned
above
could
be
analysed
and
an
independent,
probably
more
reasonable,
view
would
be
the
result.
International
organizations,
politicians,
media,
the
aca-
demic
community
and
the
general
public
worldwide
would
have
a
more
independent
source
of
information
for
analysis
and
decision-making
and
as
a
knowledge
base.
The
importance
of
a
free
flow
of
surveil-
lance
information
as
a
confidence-
and
security-building
measure
should
not
be
underestimated.
Criticism
of
the
surveillance
monopoly
has
been
large,
especially
outside
the
US
and
USSR.
Many
proposals
for
the
establishing
of
an
international
organization
for
satellite
surveillance
have
been
made.
Such
proposals
were
on
the
UN
agenda
in
the
late
1970s
and
early
1980s but
they
were
blocked
by
both
superpowers.
Since
then
the
possibility
of
international
surveillance
satellites
has
been
debated
and
examined
by
different
organ-
izations
and
countries.
It
is
not
technical
problems
that
have
prevented
the
realization
of
the
proposals.
After
all,
the
US
and
the
USSR
have
already
proven
that
military
sur-
veillance
satellites
can
be
placed
in
orbit
and
operated.
Rather,
proposals
have
been
defeated
by
the
political,
legal,
and
econ-
omic
problems
of
establishing
international
surveillance
satellites
against
the
will
of
the
superpowers.
At
present
an
interesting
technical
devel-
opment
is
going
on,
which
may
show
ways
of
overcoming
these
problems.
While
the
USA
and
the
USSR
still
enjoy
a
monopoly
on
military
surveillance
satellite
data,
a
civ-
ilian
technology
for
remote
sensing
by
sat-
ellites
has
been
emerging.
The
civilian
equivalent
of
military
surveillance
satellites
is
primarily
used
for
the
study
of
earth
resources
from
space.
The
main
difference
is
that
military
surveillance
pictures
have
a
higher
resolution,
i.e.
show
finer
details.
Technological
developments
in
remote
sens-
ing
have
followed
closely
behind
military
developments,
especially
outside
the
super-
powers
where
use
of
the
technology
has
not
been
subject
to
military
restrictions.
This
has
reduced
the
difference
in
resolution
between
military
surveillance
and
remote-sensing
pic-
tures
and
this
difference
is
expected
to
decrease
even
further
in
the
future.
Journal-
ists
and
academic
researchers
have
already
started
to
use
remote-sensing
pictures
as
a
source
of
information.
Such
use
will
make
pictures
taken
from
space
more
familiar
to
political
leaders
and
to
the
general
public.
As
the
opportunities
of
satellite
surveillance
are
more
widely
demonstrated,
the
idea
of
a
system
of
international
surveillance
satellites
will
have
an
increased
chance
of
being
realized.
The
USSR
has
drawn
a
cloak
of
secrecy
around
all
its
military
activities.
Military
intelligence
gathering
is
also
among
the
most
secret
US
military
programmes.
Indeed,
the
very
existence
of
military
sur-
veillance
satellite
programmes
was
not
officially
acknowledged
until
1978.
Very
few
military
surveillance
satellite
pictures
have
been
published
in
the
open
literature.
The
US
military
argues
that
such
publication
would
reveal
the
capability
of
the
US
satellite
surveillance
systems.
It
believes
that
such
relevations
would
enable
powers
hostile
to
the
US
to
take
actions
to
prevent
detection
of
sensitive
military
activities.
Complete
secrecy
has
not
been
possible,
however.
Some
security
leaks
have
occurred
and
many
conclusions
can
be
drawn
from
open
sources
and
by
using
general
technical
knowledge.
This
article
is
based
on
such
sources.
2.
Background
With
the
escalating
cold
war
between
the
superpowers
in
the
late
1940s
and
early
1950s,
the
US
military
started
to
plan
for
strategic
nuclear
war
(Rosenberg
1983).
As
the
target
lists
and
the
US
nuclear
stockpile
grew,
there
developed
a
need
for
detailed
target
data
for
the
USSR.
Periphery
air
patrols
and
air
overflights
with
modified
bombers
were
used
in
the
early
1950s
in
cooperation
with
Great
Britain
(Campbell
1986,
pp.
127-129).
As
Soviet
air
defence
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