International System Stability and American Decline
| Author | Davis B. Bobrow,Mark A. Boyer |
| Published date | 01 June 1998 |
| Date | 01 June 1998 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/002070209805300206 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
DAVIS
B.
BOBROW
&
MARK
A.
BOYER
International
system
stability
and
American
decline
A
case
for
muted
optimism
IN
THE
WORLD
OF
INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS
PUNDITRY,
it
is
both
fash-
ionable
and profitable
to
take
extreme
positions
about
the future
of
international
relations.
What
is
happening
and
what
will
happen
in
the
world,
however,
is
more complex
and
almost
always
less
extreme
than
the
predictions
that
catch
the
attention
of
the
popular
press
and
even
the
front-line
scholarly
journals.
Such
is
the
case
for
discussions
of
American
decline
and
the prospects
for
stability
in
the
international
system:
pessimists
predict
increasing
system-wide
conflict
while
opti-
mists
foresee
a
world
of
growing
interdependence
and transnational
co-operation. But when the
empirical
record
is
examined
in
three
pol-
icy areas
that
are
important
to
the
maintenance
of
international
system
stability
-
foreign
aid,
debt
relief,
and
international
peacekeeping
-
such
extreme
judgments
are
more
eye-catching
than
valid.
Davis
B.
Bobrow
is
Professor
in
the
Graduate
School
of
Pubfic
and
International
Affairs,
Uni-
versity
of
Pittsburgh.
Mark
A.
Boyer
is
Associate Professor
in
the
Department
of
Political
Science
and
Director
of
the
Connecticut
Project
in
International
Negotiation
(CPIN),
University
of
Connecticut.
The
authors
wish
to
thank
Mary
Caprioli,
Erin
Carrinre,
and
James
Na for
research
assistance
on
this
project;
and
Polly
Allen,
Larry
Bowman,
Elizabeth
Hanson,
John
Rourke,
Hennifer
Sterling-Folker,
and
Richard
Vengroff,
who
read
earlier
versions
of
this
article
and
provided
helpfulsuggestions,
as
did
two
reviewers fr
InternationalJournaL
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
Spring
1998
D.
Bobrow
&
M.
Boyer
Put
simply, the
relative
decline
of
American power
has
not
led
to
a
prolonged,
across-the-board
decrease
in
international
efforts
to
main-
tain the
stability
of
the
international
system.
If
anything,
such
efforts
increased
in
the
late
1980s
and
early 1990s,
only
to
turn
downward
after
the
1994
American
elections
swept
the
Republicans
into control
of
both
houses
of
Congress
for
the
first
time
since
the
1950s.
There-
after,
the
level
and intensity
of
efforts
did
not
return
to
the
modest
pre-
1980
policy approaches.
The
growth
of
international
commitments
to
maintaining
stability
and
the
partial
retrenchment
that
followed
make
a
case
for
muted
optimism about
the
future
of
a
stable
world
system
and
demonstrate
the
contributions
of
non-Americans
to
that
goal.
The
developments
in
the
Canadian-led
landmines
negotiations
in
1997
provide
one
example
in
which non-Americans
led
the
way
toward
resolving
an
issue
that
is
important
to
international
stability
and
peace.
Given
the
obvious
reluctance
of
the
United
States, Russia,
and
China
to
move
decisively
on
that
issue,
one
can
argue
that
progress
would
not
have
occurred
without
Canadian
leadership.
When
taken in
tandem
with
the
aid,
debt, and
peacekeeping
data
presented
below,
events
such
as
these
demonstrate
the
crucial
role
of
non-hegemons
to
the
success
of
international
initiatives
and
point
toward
an evolving,
more
special-
ized,
and
narrowly
focussed
United
States
activism
in
the
world.
PERSPECTIVES
One
fashionable
extreme
argues
pessimistically
that
the
stability
of
the
international
system
has
and
will
further
become
a
casualty
of
the
apparent
withdrawal
of
the
United
States
from
a
dominant,
activist
role
in
world
affairs.
In
this
view,
contributions
which
focus
on
main-
taining
and
enhancing
the stability
of
the
global
system will
decline
without
an
American
hegemon
to
serve
as
underwriter and dispropor-
tionately
large
contributor
to
the
goals
and
policy tools
of
stability.
The
assumption
is
that
a
United
States
faced
with domestic
preoccupa-
tions,
superpower
fatigue,
diminishing
relative
resources,
and
no
over-
arching
adversary
will
do
less
for
global
welfare.
Moreover,
others
have
not,
will
not,
and
possibly
cannot
do
more.
This
selfish,
neo-isolation-
ist
behaviour
will
harm
the
general
welfare
of
the
nations
and
popula-
tions
of
the world.
The
result:
apr~s
les
ltats
Unis,
le
d~luge.
1
i
The
variant of
pessimism
described
here has
most
notably
been
put
forward
by
hegemonic
stability
theorists
such
as
Robert
Gilpin
(The
Political
Economy
of
Inter-
national
Relations
[Princeton
Ni:
Princeton
University
Press
1987D.
Although
Charles
286
INTERNATIONAL
JOURNAL
Spring
1998
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