Interrogating the links between dynasties and development in the Philippines
| Published date | 01 September 2023 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/20578911231182490 |
| Author | Ronald U Mendoza,Gabrielle Ann S Mendoza,Julio C Teehankee,Philip Arnold P Tuaño,Jurel K Yap |
| Date | 01 September 2023 |
| Subject Matter | Special Issue: Political Dynasties in Asia |
Interrogating the links between
dynasties and development in
the Philippines
Ronald U Mendoza
School of Government, Ateneo de Manila University, Philippines
Gabrielle Ann S Mendoza
School of Government, Ateneo de Manila University, Philippines
Julio C Teehankee
De La Salle University, Manila, Philippines
Philip Arnold P Tuaño
School of Government, Ateneo de Manila University, Philippines
Jurel K Yap
School of Government, Ateneo de Manila University, Philippines
Abstract
This article nuances the poverty-inducing effect of political dynasties. We argue that local dynasties
in the Philippines can pursue different development trajectories based on their ownership of local
businesses and their province’s initial state capacity. Adapting a framework developed by
Bourguignon and Verdier, we develop a typology of political dynasties that acknowledges hetero-
geneity in their motivations as well as in the political opportunity structures that they work in. This
outlines a theory of change that fosters the necessary conditions for political and economi c com-
petition over time, even in areas ruled by political dynasties. While the focus is on the Philippines,
research on the nexus between political and economic competition provides insight into issues of
political dynasties, competition policy, governance, and accountability faced by a broader set of
countries.
Corresponding author:
Gabrielle Ann S Mendoza, School of Government, Ateneo de Manila University, Quezon City, Philippines.
Email: gabrielleannsm@gmail.com
Original Research Article
Asian Journal of Comparative Politics
2023, Vol. 8(3) 765–786
© The Author(s) 2023
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/20578911231182490
journals.sagepub.com/home/acp
Keywords
political dynasty, development, Philippines, elite behavior, rational choice
Introduction
Many democracies over time tend to concentrate and perpetuate political power in the hands of a
few well-connected families. Political connections, expensive electoral exercises and a rent- and
connections-linked wealth base for the political elite could all contribute to this trend even under
a democratic façade. They are “political dynasties”—elected officials who have relatives in
elected office in the past or the present government. Members of the same family occupy elected
positions either sequentially in the same political jurisdiction or simultaneously across different
positions. Sequential linkages are sometimes described as “thin”dynasties, while simultaneous lin-
kages of family members serving in different positions within a particular jurisdiction are consid-
ered a “fat”dynasty. Fat dynasties are a concern in countries like the Philippines, as
checks-and-balances are eroded when many key positions, notably in the local government, are
occupied by members of one or several political clans (Mendoza et al., 2019).
Political dynasties are a sign of political power concentration in the hands of a few powerful
clans. Hence, the prevalence of dynasties is seen in the literature as a deterioration in political com-
petition, in turn increasing the risk of weaker political accountability and reform prospects, and
ultimately poorer socioeconomic outcomes. Dynastic politics is a widespread phenomenon
across democracies in Asia with a growing body of literature analyzing their economic and political
implications (Asako et al., 2015; Delsya and Permana, 2022; George and Ponattu, 2018).
Political dynasties are associated with more traditional political practices, including nepotism,
vote-buying and partisan violence. The absence of true political competition may lead to impunity,
as electoral replacement becomes difficult and dynastic incumbents successfully retain power while
shunning deep reforms which may alter the status quo (Hutchcroft and Rocamore, 2003; McCoy,
2009; Teehankee, 2001). The negative development implications of dynastic power concentration
in the Philippines, which we regard as the dynasty–poverty link, is well documented in the literature
(Hutchcroft and Rocamore, 2003; McCoy, 2009; Mendoza et al., 2012, 2016, 2019; Rivera, 1994;
Sidel, 1997).
Yet the extended time horizons of political dynasties enable a longer runway for more effective
reform continuity, especially in local and highly decentralized governments. Philippine political
dynasties can “bring home the bacon”by securing resources for their local provinces (Serrano,
2020; Tusalem and Pe-Aguirre, 2013). In the same way these conditions are exploited for personal
gain, these also enable dynasties to deliver public services—albeit linked to the family in power and
allies for the purpose of legacy-building and preservation. Ownership in local businesses can also
curb rent-seeking in favor of attracting investments, building necessary infrastructure and encour-
aging economic growth for their own profit (Mendoza et al., 2022a, 2022b). Despite a concentration
of political power, there seems to be a pathway toward development, albeit skewed and heavily
compromised, for some provinces when dynasts have reputational or business stakes in the local
economy.
Thus, this article nuances the dynasty–poverty link by outlining a theory of change that analyzes
welfare outcomes as a result of political and economic competition over time even in areas ruled by
political dynasties. There is a group of political dynasties associated with business ownership who
766 Asian Journal of Comparative Politics 8(3)
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