Interventions and repression following civil conflict
| Author | Amanda Murdie,Naji Bsisu |
| Published date | 01 March 2022 |
| Date | 01 March 2022 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/00223433211010857 |
| Subject Matter | Regular Articles |
Interventions and repression following
civil conflict
Naji Bsisu
Division of Social Sciences, Maryville College
Amanda Murdie
School of Public and International Affairs, University of Georgia
Abstract
Civil conflicts inevitably have negative consequences with regards to respect for human rights within affected states.
Unfortunately, the violation of human rights often does not end with the conflict. What factors explain variation in
state repression in post-civil conflict societies? Can international interventions, both civilian and military, improve
human rights in states with a history of conflict? Does the size of the intervention matter? We argue that international
interventions, including peacekeeping missions and officially directed foreign aid, can reduce physical integrity
abuses. This process occurs by simultaneously increasing protections for civilians while also raising the costs of
repression to both government leaders and their agents. Human rights abuses will also decrease when there are legal
remedies available to vulnerable populations which are bolstered by a strong judicial system. A robust civil society can
also discourage human rights abuses by shedding light on these events and providing human rights education. In line
with our theoretical argument, we focus on UN peacekeeping missions, especially those with human rights teams,
and officially directed foreign aid for legal and security sector reform and NGOs. Using both a treatment effects
approach and a continuous dose–response model, we find much support for the implications of our argument.
Keywords
civil conflict, human rights abuses, interventions, repression
Civil conflicts are extremely detrimental to human
rights.
1
Governments are more likely to respond with
repression when they are violently threatened (Daven-
port, 2007). Civil conflicts, by their very nature, are
direct violent challenges to the state.
2
As rebels take up
arms, governments frequently ratchet up their use of
physical integrity rights abuses, like torture or political
killings. This is hardly remarkable; as Hill & Jones
(2014: 662) comment, ‘civil conflict is the best predictor
of most indicators of state repression’.
Surprisingly, however, repression often sticks around
even after civil conflict is over.
3
For post-civil conflict
states, repression can be a tempting option. The threat of
violence against the state was recently extremely high,
and the legitimacy of the ruling regime may still be in
question, either as a result of the previous revolt against it
or as a result of the regime’s newness after the conflict. A
Corresponding author:
naji.bsisu@maryvillecollege.edu
1
Our focus is on the subco mponent of physical int egrity rights,
categorized as freedoms from torture, political killing,
disappearances, and polit ical imprisonment (Cingrane lli, Richards
& Clay, 2014).
2
We define civil conflict as armed conflict between two parties over
territory or representation, where one party is the state, with at least
25 battle deaths per year (Pettersson & Wallensteen, 2015). Civil
conflicts are usually costlier to civilians than international conflict.
3
Countries with a history of civil conflict have a statistically
significant lower mean respect for physical integrity rights than
countries without a history of civil conflict. See our Online appendix.
Journal of Peace Research
2022, Vol. 59(2) 213–228
ªThe Author(s) 2021
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/00223433211010857
journals.sagepub.com/home/jpr
post-conflict government may continue or heighten their
use of human rights violations in an attempt to limit
violent dissent and war recurrence. However, the use
of repression could backfire, mobilizing the population
and even contributing to a re-emergence of civil conflict
(Hegre & Nygård, 2015; Keels & Nichols, 2018). Many
post-conflict states do not stay peaceful for long (Fortna,
2004).
Scholars are just beginning to understand what limits
repression after civil conflict.
4
However, the interna-
tional policy community has long attempted many types
of ‘interventions’, often with the goals of improving
human rights and influencing peace. For the purposes
of this article, we use a broad definition of international
intervention. In addition to the commonly accepted def-
inition of international intervention as military and
peacekeeping missions, we expand the concept to
include foreign aid with the express purpose of altering
the status quo in the targeted state. In the aftermath of
the Cold War, peacekeeping interventions have
increased. Foreign aid to post-conflict countries is now
the norm, with billions of dollars flowing to post-conflict
situations. Does the presence and nature of these inter-
ventions improve human rights? Although much scho-
larship has focused on how interventions affect the
likelihood of conflict re-emergence, there has been lim-
ited examination of how interventions affect the use of
human rights abuses in the aftermath of conflict.
This work examines the nature of repression in coun-
tries with a history of civil conflict, focusing specifically
on how various types of international interventions could
influence repression in the years following a conflict. Not
all international inventions have human rights goals;
many may sidestep human rights altogether. When
interventions help with the protection of civilians,
increase monitoring of security agents, and raise the
potential costs of repression to government principals
and agents, human rights abuses decrease in the after-
math of civil conflict. Similarly, when interventions sup-
port institutional reform and increase the likelihood that
civilians use institutionalized or nonviolent avenues to
make demands, human rights abuses decrease.
Based on this logic, we argue that there are four dif-
ferent types of international interventions that are likely
contenders to improved human rights in the aftermath of
civil conflict: United Nations (UN) mandated
peacekeeping interventions, foreign aid directed at judi-
cial reform, foreign aid directed at security sector reform,
and foreign aid directed at civil society. We examine the
efficacy of each of these interventions using a treatment
effects approach and a continuous dose–response model.
By using these approaches in tandem, we are able to both
examine the efficacy of a dichotomous presence or
absence of a particular type of intervention and whether
the ‘dose’ or size of the intervention matters. Although
we find robust evidence that these interventions are asso-
ciated with improvements in human rights in post-
conflict countries, we find little evidence that the size
of the intervention corresponds with an increased
response. Future work is needed to understand how best
to structure interventions for human rights goals.
A review of the logic of repression
Repression is often the result of a calculated decision-
making process by the ruling authority or their agents. It
is seldom carried out purely for the sake of wanton vio-
lence. Physical integrity rights abuses are one of a host of
actions that governments can take to deter actions or
beliefs that the leadership views as threatening to their
longevity and hold on power (Davenport, 2007). Instead
of abuses, governments could provide concessions, buy-
off key constituents, limit citizen association, engage in
negotiations, or a host of other actions. Abuses may
appear to be the most cost-effective response to demands
in certain institutional and information environments
(Ritter, 2014). Abuses may also be used pre-emptively
to deter citizen demands (Ritter & Conrad, 2016).
Of course, not all human rights abuses are the result
of active policy decisions by regime leaders. Abuses often
occur when government agents act on their own, perhaps
torturing to try to extract information from a suspect. In
this regard, some abuses are the result of agent discretion
or shirking; even though their government principals do
not condone the agents’ actions, unmonitored agents
may still carry out physical integrity abuses (Englehart,
2009).
By their very nature, governments are thought of as
the monopolist coercive force within a state (Weber,
2009). Their use of violence when threatened is not
surprising, especially if that use of force quells the threat.
To stop repression, much research has argued that the
cost-benefit calculations concerning repression versus
other policy orbehavior choices must change (Davenport,
2007; DeMeritt, 2015; Conrad, Hill & Moore, 2018).
Under certain conditions, repression may no longer seem
to be the most cost-effective, appropriate, and beneficial
4
Notable recent exceptions include Keels & Nichols (2018); Carey
& Gonza
´lez (2021); Karreth, Sullivan & Dezfuli (2020); Sullivan,
Blanken & Rice (2020).
214 journal of PEACE RESEARCH 59(2)
To continue reading
Request your trial