Is Missile Defence Moral?
| Date | 01 June 2005 |
| DOI | 10.1177/002070200506000223 |
| Published date | 01 June 2005 |
| Author | Frederic Labarre |
| Subject Matter | Coming Attractions |
COMING
ATTRACTIONS
Frederic
Labarre
moral?
INTRODUCTION
On
17
December 2002, President George W. Bush announced his intention
to deploy a missile defence system capable of destroying incoming ballistic
weapons of mass destruction
(WMDs),
thereby sparking in Canada anoth-
er
agonizing debate about our role in this initiative.
This
debate culminated in Prime Minister Martin's March 2005 deci-
sion
to have Canada not participate in missile defence. There is no need to
reflect
on the domestic reasons that are the source of this refusal; our
American
neighbours understand that Martin's administration had been
moving towards a rapprochement with Washington since Chretien's depar-
ture, and that his decision is not based on any animosity.
Martin's decision is grounded in the logic of political survival, not on
the merits or demerits of missile defence per se. Those who lament his
decision
will say that Canada is losing a "seat at the table," although the
value and the weight of our sitting anywhere can be debated. Others, such
as
officials
in the Department of Foreign Affairs, may regret not being able
to consolidate claims for more open access to American government
defence
and research contracts for Canadian firms (as per NAFTA rules),
Frederic Labarre
is
currently
at the NATO
Defense College.
He
previously
worked
as
international liaison
for RMC and was a
defence advisor
to
Estonia.
The
opin-
ions contained
in
this
paper
are
those
of
the author alone
and in no way
reflect
the
position
of the
Royal
Military
College
of
Canada,
the
Department
of
National
Defence
of
Canada,
or the NATO
Defense College.
I International
Journal
|
Spring
2005
| 553 |
Frederic
Labarre
|
although there is no guarantee that participation in missile defence would
help our bargaining position on any trade issue with the US. Yet others may
be
relieved that Canada's reputation will not be soiled by participation in
what they see as a dangerous scheme, although our continued role in
NORAD
amounts to de facto participation.
But
what the latter may not realize is that not being at the table hinders
Canada in pressing for its underlying interests to be recognized, namely,
comprehensive nuclear disarmament and the non-weaponization of space.
Should
another opportunity to retake our seat occur, perhaps the domestic
realities
of Canadian politics could be reconciled with the new strategic real-
ities
and the opportunities they
offer
as expressed in the following argu-
ment. This is an attempt to demonstrate the conditions
under
which a
defensive
transition through missile defence deployment can trigger a
reduction in nuclear stockpiles. It is an essay about strategic philosophy and
morality, a mental experience whose hypothesis is difficult to verify. The
hypothesis is that BMD can reconcile a defensive transition with disarma-
ment, making such systems "moral" weapons.
This
article is not about the history
of
nuclear strategy. It is about strate-
gic
thinking as it is modified by the double impact of defensive systems and
the application of a positivist praxis in international relations. The demon-
stration proceeds with a definition of "morality" or ethics in relation to
nuclear weapons. The notion of morality, as defined, is set against a
brief
survey of the positions that emerged for and against missile defence in the
two periods identified below (1983-86 and 1998-2002).
The
sources used for this paper were
drawn
from a thorough analysis
of
the literature. This revealed that the most sustained debate about BMD
for
both periods was articulated by Keith Payne and Colin Gray in
Comparative
Strategy.
Other views on the subject were also commonplace
in earlier issues of the
CIIA's
International
Journal
and in the Council on
Foreign
Relations'
Foreign
Affairs.
The predominance of those sources
reflects
the direction of
a
debate that has yet to be concluded, and its impact
on Canada's strategic position vis-à-vis the US.
The
point of
departure
for this article is that the conditions that lead to
a
positivist or constructivist assessment of national security are borne out
of
the collapse of the superpower confrontation, and that this development
can
more easily bring about the deployment of missile defence, which, to
be
effective,
must take into account new threats and a reasonable chance of
success
of defeating them.
I 554 I International
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2005
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