Is the AIIB a China‐controlled Bank? China’s Evolving Multilateralism in Three Dimensions (3D)
| Date | 01 November 2019 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12763 |
| Author | Jiejin Zhu |
| Published date | 01 November 2019 |
Is the AIIB a China-controlled Bank? China’s
Evolving Multilateralism in Three Dimensions
(3D)
Jiejin Zhu
Fudan University
Abstract
Is the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank a China-controlled bank? This basic question highlights the issue of the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank’s (AIIB) international credibility, especially as a multilateral institution. AIIB president Jin Liqun
recognized the ‘multilateral challenge’for China from the outset of the planning to create the new Bank, and he understood
that the new Bank would only be a real success for China if the AIIB is truly a multilateral development bank –inside Beijing
circles, he added, ‘and only if the new Bank does better than the long-established counterpart MDBs’. These sentiments were
alluded to in Jin’s remarks in the Financial Times: ‘China benefited a lot from the existing international system. China needs to
do something which can help it be recognized as a responsible member and maybe a responsible leader in the future... if it
does well, that will enhance China’s credibility, but if this institution does not follow the international best practice, who will
believe in China in the future’. Skeptics, however, question whether it is ever possible that China will allow the AIIB to develop
into an actual multilateral bank.
Ever since China floated the AIIB proposal in 2013, the ques-
tion of the AIIB being ‘China-controlled or not’has emerged
as a key point of debate within international society. This
essay challenges the notion that the AIIB is a China-con-
trolled Bank. It does so by exploring the nature of the rela-
tionship between China and the AIIB. We examine whether,
or to what extent, China has supported multilateral engage-
ment and cooperation within the AIIB; and whether China
has only or mainly pursued its own national interests with
the AIIB, or whether it has, in key instances, sacrificed its
national interests in order to support the greater collective
good. We assess whether China is giving the AIIB the ‘space’
to develop as a multilateral development bank, rather than
treating it merely as a China-controlled Bank, or as some
disparage, the Bank for the Belt & Road Initiative (BRI).
Actions speak louder than words, and the method used
here is to examine China’s actions, its international behavior,
in creating the AIIB, and in managing its ongoing relations
with the AIIB. It is argued that China clearly played a strong
role in shaping the design and character of the AIIB at its
origins, and after the Bank opened, China’sinfluence has
remained significant, though somewhat obscured and diffi-
cult to trace. Moreover, it is further suggested that China
could dominate the AIIB, including through the use of its
veto power on major strategic decisions, if it were to choose
to use this power. China’s latent power or capacity to domi-
nate is strong, and only time will tell whether China will
choose to do so in the future. But so far, China has exer-
cised restraint in dealing with the AIIB, especially China’s
Ministry of Finance (MoF), the main Chinese government
interlocuter with the Bank. The main finding is that MoF has
provided the AIIB the ‘strategic space’it needs to foster its
multilateral character, and to sustain the growth of its multi-
lateral culture, and by extension, its international credibility
as a multilateral development bank.
1
It is argued that Beijing
is doing so along three dimensions. First, during the estab-
lishment phase for the AIIB, China’s Party and government
leaders supported the Chinese negotiators, and the AIIB
Multilateral Interim Secretariat (tasked with establishing the
AIIB, 2014–16) to enter into detailed multilateral negotia-
tions with the prospective members of the AIIB, from Asia,
and then also from Europe, Africa and Latin America, with
the goal of building new multilateral consensus and agree-
ment on the institutional design of the Bank. The multilat-
eral discussions led to changes in China’s original designs
for the new Bank, and equally important, Chinese authorities
also supported the legal codification of the arrangements
for the new multilateral bank.
Second, after the AIIB opened, and commenced with the
operational phase, China has further supported the develop-
ment of the multilateral character and culture of the AIIB by
supporting the Bank to work within the ‘family’of multilat-
eral development banks (MDBs), by partnering with the
established MDBs, including the World Bank (WB), Asian
Development Bank (ADB), the European Bank for Recon-
struction and Development, and other MDBs, to co-finance
projects, and conducting by human resources exchanges.
The preparatory discussions for these partnerships actually
started in 2015, before the official launch of the AIIB in Jan-
uary 2016. Third, from 2017 onwards, Beijing has supported
Global Policy (2019) 10:4 doi: 10.1111/1758-5899.12763 ©2019 University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Global Policy Volume 10 . Issue 4 . November 2019 653
Special Section Article
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