Is the NPT unraveling? Evidence from text analysis of review conference statements
| Date | 01 November 2020 |
| Author | James Lo,Miriam Barnum |
| Published date | 01 November 2020 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0022343320960523 |
| Subject Matter | Regular Article |
Is the NPT unraveling? Evidence from text
analysis of review conference statements
Miriam Barnum & James Lo
University of Southern California
Abstract
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is a landmark international treaty that is widely
regarded as a cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. However, pessimists point to a growing
divergence of preferences between nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states as a precursor to the
impending ‘unraveling of this vital piece of international law’. In this article, we test for evidence of preference
divergence using statements from NPT review conferences, which are manifestos presenting each country’s position
on the NPT. We measure preferences on the NPT using Wordfish, a method that is frequently used to estimate
ideological preferences from election manifestos. Our measure estimates the latent positions of state actors along a
‘non-proliferation vs. disarmament’ dimension, and shows little evidence of growing preference divergence between
the nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapons states. Thus, a significant premise underlying more pessimistic
assessments of the NPT appears to be in doubt.
Keywords
latent variable estimation, nuclear weapons, Nonproliferation Treaty, text-as-data
Introduction
In 1960, John F. Kennedy famously predicted ‘that
10, 15, or 20 nations will have a nuclear [weapons]
capacity [ ...] by the end of the Presidential office in
1964’ (Kennedy, 1960). The Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) emerged
in 1970 from a context where such ominous predic-
tions of rapid nuclear proliferation were widespread.
Its success relied on a ‘grand bargain’: the non-
nuclear-weapons states (NNWS) agreed not to pursue
nuclear weapons and to accept safeguards on their
peaceful nuclear energy programs, in exchange for
commitments on the part of the nuclear-weapons
states (NWS) to share the benefits of peaceful nuclear
technology and pursue negotiations with the aim of
disarmament (Weiss, 2003). Today, the NPT has
nearly global membership, and is widely regarded as
the cornerstone of the international non-proliferation
regime.
By recognizing the five countries that had tested
nuclear weapons by 1967 (United States, Soviet Union,
United Kingdom, France, and China) as legitimate
NWS, but barring NNWS signatories from pursuing
nuclear weapons, the NPT created an inherently divided
system.
1
The obligation of the NWS to pursue nuclear
disarmament reflected a widespread understanding at the
time that NNWS were unlikely to eschew the acquisi-
tion of nuclear weapons indefinitely while still accepting
their continued possession by a select group of NWS.
Thus, it was necessary to pair the ideal of non-
proliferation with a commitment to disarmament as
joint goals of the NPT. However, since the signing of
the treaty, relatively little progress has been made on the
disarmament side of the bargain, prompting speculation
on the unraveling of the NPT. Horovitz (2015) provides
an overview of this viewpoint, noting that ‘remarkably,
Corresponding author:
mbarnum@usc.edu
1
Currently, there are four non-member states that possess nuclear
weapons: India, Israel, and Pakistan never joined; North Korea
withdrew in 2003.
Journal of Peace Research
2020, Vol. 57(6) 740–751
ªThe Author(s) 2020
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DOI: 10.1177/0022343320960523
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