IV: Political Process: Public Opinion, Attitudes, Parties, Forces, Groups and Elections Vie Politique: Opinion Publique, Attitudes, Partis, Forces, Groupes et Élections

Published date01 February 2018
Date01 February 2018
DOI10.1177/002083451806800104
Subject MatterAbstracts
Chap.4
IV
POLITICAL PROCESS : PUBLIC OPINION,
ATTITUDES, PARTIES, FORCES, GROUPS AND ELECTIONS
VIE POLITIQUE : OPINION PUBLIQUE,
ATTITUDES, PARTIS, FORCES, GROUPES ET ÉLECTIONS


68.605
ACHILOV, Dilshod ; SEN, Sedat — Got political Islam? Are
Despite the existing research on how elected representatives use Twit-
politically moderate Muslims really different from radi-
ter, there are few comparative studies and none that considers Israel, a
cals? International Political Science Review 38(5), Nov.
country that differs from most democracies in its electoral system. This
2017 : 608-624.
study has two levels of analysis. The first is the country level, in which
Is making an explicit distinction between politically moderate devout
the author compares and explains how representatives in four countries
— the US, Canada, Australia and Israel — use the talk, listen and re-
Muslims and political radicals empirical y valid? If yes, in what ways do
spond model to achieve their goals. The second is the individual level, in
political moderates differ from political radicals? By systematically exam-
which the author analyses how personal characteristics such as gender
ining cross-national Muslim attitudes, this article scrutinizes the distinct-
iveness of politically moderate and politically radical Islam against the
and age, and political characteristics such as seniority and membership
in the opposition or coalition affect the frequency of use of Twitter. Using
weight of empirical evidence. By drawing from extant theoretical link-
quantitative data, it is demonstrated that representatives vary in the
ages, we conduct a confirmatory factor analysis of cross-national survey
frequency of their use of Twitter. [R, abr.]
data from 13 Muslim-majority states to test the fit of two widely theorized
factors — moderate and radical Islamism. The findings suggest that
support for politically moderate Islam is distinctively different from sup-
68.610
ALDRICH, John H., et al.Does the gift keep on giving?
port for politically radical Islam. [R]
[USA] House leadership PAC donations before and after
majority status. Journal of Politics 79(4), Oct. 2017 : 1449-
1453.
68.606
ACHIN, Catherine ; LÉVÈQUE, Sandrine — "Jupiter is
back": gender in the 2017 French presidential campaign.
Party leaders face a significant trade-off financing races when the party is
French Politics 15(3), Sept. 2017 : 279-289.
out of power: while they care about gaining control of the House, they do
Since 1958 and the beginning of the Fifth Republic, the French presi-
not know how wil ing a potential representative wil be to work with and for
the party once elected. Leadership political action committee (LPAC)
dency has been constructed and consolidated as a masculine institution.
contributions are a major mechanism of leadership control over the financ-
Furthermore, all presidential elections can be considered as a key
moment for politicizing issues relating to sex and gender. The 2017
ing of congressional campaigns, with the hope of influencing the future
behavior of candidates. We study differences between contributions of the
presidential campaign is more specific. Since 2000, the mechanisms
LPACs for leaders of both parties conditional on majority status. We find
designed to ensure gender equality have been strengthened, such that
that both majority and minority party leaders prioritize winning elections and
they are now an unavoidable norm in political competition. In a context of
dramatic political change, the hierarchy of political issues is affected.
ideological homogeneity in their donations, but that these trends are largely
contingent on overal electoral conditions. [R, abr.]
This article looks back over François Hollande’s 5-year term from this
perspective, before drawing on an analysis of campaign materials and
press coverage. The small proportion of women candidates and the
68.611
ALEMÁN, Eduardo ; RAMÍREZ, Margarita M. ; SLAPIN,
marginalization of gender issues in the programs testify to the fragile
Jonathan B. — Party strategies, constituency links, and
nature of "egalitarian good wil ." [R, abr.] [See Abstr. 68.854]
legislative speech. Legislative Studies Quarterly 42(4), Nov.
2017 : 637-659.
68.607
ACHURY, Susan ; RAMÍREZ, Margarita ; CANTÚ, Francisco
This article examines how parties organize legislative speech. Electoral
Endogenous ballot structures: the selection of open
incentives and legislative institutions affect speech participation. When
and closed lists in Colombia’s legislative elections. Elec-
electoral systems create personal vote-seeking incentives, parties are
toral Studies 49, Oct. 2017 : 136-154.
less concerned with screening speeches and more supportive of mem-
What are the incentives for parties to personalize electoral competition?
bers seeking to garner name recognition. But in many countries, legisla-
tive rules and norms constrain opportunities for individual position taking
This paper proposes that both open and closed lists give congruity,
during the lawmaking debates. We argue that parties resolve this di-
rather than tension, to the interests of party leaders and candidates.
However, the efficacy of each list type depends on the electoral returns
lemma by organizing speech participation into nonlegislative speeches
expected from promoting the partisan and personal vote. To test this
and lawmaking debates. In each instance, different types of legislators
are more likely to speak. We examine the case of Chile and test the
argument, we analyze the choices of parties over the ballot structure by
implications of our theory with data on congressional speeches. [R]
leveraging an unusual institutional feature of the Colombian legislative
elections, wherein parties are allowed to present either an open or a
closed list, varying their choices across electoral districts and contests.
68.612
ALLEN, Chris — Proscribing national action: considering
Our empirical analysis shows that parties are more likely to open their
the impact of banning the British far-right group. Political
lists in high-magnitude districts and wherever they have a strong, local
Quarterly 88(4), Oct.-Dec. 2017 : 652-659.
electoral organization. [R, abr.]
In December 2016, the British Government banned National Action for
being an extremist organisation. It was the first time in British history that
68.608
AGERBERG, Mattias — Failed expectations: quality of
membership of a far-right group was outlawed. While so, little is known
government and support for populist parties in Europe.
about the group. This article responds to this lack of knowledge by setting
European Journal of Political Research 56(3), Aug. 2017 :
out the origins of National Action and its leaders, its preference for a tradi-
578-600.
tionalist Nazi ideology, and its penchant for stunts and demonstrations to
gain media attention and publicity. The article concludes by considering
This article addresses an issue previously neglected in the research on
whether proscription was rather more symbolic than serious. [R]
support for populist parties: how do perceptions of the local quality of
government (QoG) and local service delivery affect voters’ propensity to
vote for a populist party? It argues that personal experience with poor QoG
68.613
ALLEN, Geoff — The resilience of ethnic minority parties
makes voters more likely to support populist parties. The argument high-
in the face of strategic voting incentives: a research
lights the interplay between supply and demand factors in explaining
note. Party Politics 23(5), Sept. 2017 : 560-565.
populist support and discusses why populist parties have been particularly
Recent research has indicated that social heterogeneity impacts party
successful in certain regions in Europe. A unique dataset from the Quality
system size, even in restrictive settings. This research as yet has not
of Government Institute that surveys citizens’ perception of QoG in their
established whether it is minority or majority voters who are behaving
area is used to estimate both individual- and regional-level models of the
outside Duvergerian expectations. This study argues that it is ethnic
link between perceived local QoG and populist support in Europe. [R, abr.]
voters that seem to defect from their parties at lower rates, which ex-
plains why small parties proliferate and persist in heterogeneous states.
68.609
AKIRAV, Osnat — The talk-listen-respond (TLR) model of
This hypothesis is tested on party-in-district-level election returns in the
representatives on Twitter. Journal of Legislative Studies
German Land Schleswig-Holstein. The results show that smal ethnic
23(3), 2017 : 392-418.
parties suffer notably less defection than small non-ethnic parties. The
62

Vie politique : opinion publique, attitudes, partis, forces, groupes et élections
study proposes a number of potential causal mechanisms that could be
interest in politics and subjective political efficacy. Using the Latin Ameri-
driving ethnic voters, as a group, to defect at lower rates than non-ethnic
can Public Opinion Project data, the hypothesis was tested that person-
voters. [R]
ality influences behaviour, since it favours the development of a number
of attitudes that function as basic factors conditioning civic engagement.
[R]
68.614
ALLEN, Nicholas ; BARA, Judith ; BARTLE, John — Finding
a...

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