IV Political Process: Public Opinion, Attitudes, Parties, Forces, Groups and Elections / Vie Politique: Opinion Publique, Attitudes, Partis, Forces, Groupes et Élections
| Published date | 01 February 2019 |
| Date | 01 February 2019 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/002083451906900104 |
| Subject Matter | Abstracts |
IV
POLITICAL PROCESS : PUBLIC OPINION,
ATTITUDES, PARTIES, FORCES, GROUPS AND ELECTIONS
VIE POLITIQUE : OPINION PUBLIQUE,
ATTITUDES, PARTIS, FORCES, GROUPES ET ÉLECTIONS
69.461
AALDERING, Loes — The (ir)rationality of mediated
69.465
AHLER, Douglas J. ; BROOCKMAN, David E. — The dele-
leader effects. Electoral Studies 54, Aug. 2018 : 269-280.
gate paradox: why polarized politicians can represent cit-
There is a lively debate whether to consider vote decisions based on
izens best. Journal of Politics 80(4), Oct. 2018 : 1117-1133.
leader evaluations a threat to democracy, as this has long been as-
Many advocate for political reforms intended to resolve apparent disjunc-
sumed to constitute irrational decision-making behavior. Empirical evi-
tures between politicians’ ideologically polarized policy positions and
dence indicating that leader effects are not necessarily expressions of
citizens’ less polarized policy preferences. We show these apparent
irrationality has recently mounted up, though skepticism towards leader
disjunctures can arise even when politicians represent their constituen-
effects remains resilient especially when considering voters being influ-
cies well and that resolving them would likely degrade representation.
enced through media coverage of party leaders. This paper studies
These counterintuitive results arise from a paradox whereby polarized
some of the core assumptions of the ‘irrationality of leader effects’ thesis,
politicians can best represent constituencies composed of citizens with
by testing the conditionality of mediated leader effects based upon four
idiosyncratic preferences. We document this paradox among US House
voter characteristics: education, political interest, ideological distance to
members, often criticized for excessive polarization. We show that if
the leader's party and political cynicism. Two datasets are combined: a
House members represented their constituencies’ preferences as closely
manual content-analysis of leadership images in television coverage and
as possible, they would stil appear polarized. [R, abr.]
a five-wave panel-dataset in the four months preceding the 2012 Parlia-
mentary elections in the Netherlands. [R] [See Abstr. 69.553]
69.466
AIDT, Toke ; RAUH, Christopher — The Big Five personali-
ty traits and partisanship in England [UK]. Electoral Stud-
69.462
ABDULLAH, Walid Jumblatt — Inclusion-moderation or
ies 54, Aug. 2018 : 1-21.
political opportunity? Lessons from the case of Parti Is-
We propose a new framework for the study of the psychological founda-
lam Se-Malaysia (Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party, PAS).
tion of party identification. We draw a distinction between the part of an
Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 56(4), 2018 : 407-
individual's party preference that is stable throughout adult life and the
426.
dynamic part responding to lifecycle events and macro shocks. We
Much of the recent literature on the inclusion-moderation thesis revolves
theorize that the Big Five personality traits exert a causal effect on
around Islamist political parties. This paper contends that the case of
the stable part of an individual's party preference and provide evidence
Parti-Islam Se-Malaysia (Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party) is instructive in
from a large nationally representative English panel dataset in support of
this regard. I argue that political opportunity is what decides whether a
this theory. We find that supporters of the major parties (Labour, the
party would adopt more ‘moderate’ tendencies, not its mere inclusion in
Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats) have substantively different
the electoral system. PAS’ raison d’être was initial y based on campaign-
personality traits. Moreover, we show that those not identifying with any
ing for an Islamic State. Subsequently, when it was in a coalition with two
party, who are close to holding the majority, are similar to those identify-
other secular parties, it began espousing the concept of a 'Benevolent
ing with the Conservatives. [R, abr.]
State'. When the alliance eventually failed, PAS reverted to calls for an
Islamic polity. PAS’ ideological commitment to an 'Islamic state' was
69.467
AIMONE, Jason A. ; BUTERA, Luigi ; STRATMANN, Thomas
dependent on political opportunities. This study argues for a more nu-
— Altruistic punishment in elections. European Journal of
anced understanding of the trajectories of Islamist parties. [R]
Political Economy 53, July 2018 : 149-160.
Altruistic punishment is a fundamental driver for cooperation in human
69.463
ABOU-CHADI, Tarik — Electoral competition, political
interactions. We expand our understanding of this form of pro-social
risks, and parties' responsiveness to voters' issue priori-
behavior to help explain a puzzle of voting: why do individuals who are
ties. Electoral Studies 55, Oct. 2018 : 99-108.
indifferent between two potential policy outcomes of an election partici-
This article demonstrates how parties' issue-responsiveness depends on
pate when voting is costly? Using a simple voting experiment, we provide
robust evidence that many voters are wil ing to engage in voting as a
the degree of electoral competition that they are facing as well as the
form of punishment, even when voting is costly and the voter has no
salience of the issue on the party system agenda. While a growing
monetary stake in the election outcome. In our sample, and in a robust-
literature on issue-competition has presented empirical evidence on what
parties and when they choose riding the wave strategies, we stil lack an
ness check through Monte Carlo simulation, we show that at least four-
teen percent of individuals are willing to incur a cost to vote against
encompassing framework of why parties sometimes respond to voters'
candidates who broke their electoral promises, even when they have no
issue priorities and sometimes not. Taking into account the trade-offs
pecuniary interest in the election outcome. [R]
between party supporters' priorities and those of the electorate as a
whole this paper presents such a framework. It argues and demonstrates
that increasing levels of electoral competition as well as higher salience
69.468
AITCHISON, Guy — Domination and disobedience: pro-
of issues on the party system agenda make parties more responsive to
test, coercion and the limits of an appeal to justice. Per-
the priorities of the electorate as a whole at the cost of the priorities of
spectives on Politics 16(3), Sept. 2018 : 666-679.
their supporters. [R]
I offer a conceptual framework for assessing the normative legitimacy of
coercive disobedience — involving threats, disruption, force, and deceit
69.464
ADAM, Silke, et al. — News media’s position-taking re-
— by social movements. A standard liberal view is that while coercion
may be required to resist authoritarian regimes, it is illegitimate in a
garding the European Union: the synchronization of
democratic state since it conflicts with majority rule and mutual respect.
mass media’s reporting and commentating in the 2014
In restricting disobedience to a form of moral persuasion, this perspec-
European Parliament elections. Journal of European Public
Policy 26(1), 2019 : 44-62.
tive neglects how social power and material interests can distort the
conditions for open, fair deliberation. I offer a principled defense of
We analyse whether a newspaper’s editorial position regarding the EU is
coercive disobedience, not only in repressive states but in plausibly
related to its selection decisions in the news section. We ask whether
democratic societies. I argue that coercion can be justified on democratic
such a synchronization between news and editorials exists, whether it is
republican grounds as a means to col ectively contest objectionable
conditioned by the type of media system and under which conditions it
forms of political domination. [R, abr.] [See Abstr. 69.84]
also affects the selection of transnational voices. Our study is based on a
quantitative content analysis of the quality press in seven European
countries (Austria, France, Germany, Greece, The Netherlands, Portugal
69.469
AKSOY, Deniz — Electoral and partisan cycles in coun-
and the United Kingdom) in the run-up to the 2014 European Parliament
terterrorism. Journal of Politics 80(4), Oct. 2018 : 1239-
elections. Our results support a synchronization between editorials and
1253.
news, specifically with regard to the selection of national speakers. With
Most empirical work on terrorism examines terrorist groups’ actions, that
regard to transnational speakers, they are selectively chosen by a medi-
is, the volume or character of attacks, while relatively little work focuses
um if its editorial position is not supported at the national level. [R, abr.]
on states’ counterterrorism actions. I address this gap with a focus on the
49
Political process : public opinion, attitudes, parties, forces, groups and elections
electoral and partisan motivations of democratic states’ domestic coun-
tions. American Politics Research 46(6), Nov. 2018 : 1012-
terterrorism actions. Do electoral concerns give incumbent governments
1038.
incentives to increase the level of their counterterrorism activities? I show
that elections are an important determinant of governments’ actions
Although some research has looked at low-information voter decision-
against domestic...
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