James v The London and South-Western Railway Company
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judgment Date | 22 June 1872 |
| Date | 22 June 1872 |
| Court | Exchequer |
Exchequer Chamber
Willes, J., Byles, J., Blackburn, J., Lush, J. Brett, J.
James v. The South-Western Railway Company
Lloyd v. Guibert 2 Mar. Law Cas. O. S. 283 13 L. T. Rep. N. S. 602 L. Rep. 1. Q. B. 119
Hill v. AudusENR 1 K. & J. 263
The Northumbria 3 Mar. Law Cas. O. S. 316 21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 681 L. Rep. 3 Ad. & Ecc. 24
The NeptuneENR 3 Knapp, 97
Burton v. Snee 1 Ves. 154
Admiralty Court Act 1861 (24 Vict. c. 10, s. 13)
Merchant Shipping Act 1854 (17 & 18 Vict. c. 104)., s. 514
Admiralty Court Act 1861 (24 Vict. c. 10, s. 13) Merchant Shipping Act 1854 (17 & 18 Vict. c. 104)., s. 514 Jurisdiction of Admiralty Court
428 MARITIME LAW CASES. Ex. Ch.] James v. The South Western Railway Company. Ex. Ch. EXCHEQUER CHAMBER.. Reported by H. Leich and T. W. Sauhders, Esqrs., APPEALS FROM THE COURT OF EXCHEQUER. Saturday, June 22, 1872. Jamss v. The South-Western Railway Company. Admiralty Court Act 1861 (24 Vict. c. 10, s. 13) - Merchant Shipping Act 1854 (17 & 18 Vict. c. 104).,s. 514 - Jurisdication of Admiralty Court - Prohibition. The plaintiff, a passenger by (ho steamer N.,which, after negligently colliding with another ship, had been utterly lost at sea, brought an action in the Court of Exchequer against the defendants, owners of the N., for personal injuries and lose of baggage occasioned to him thereby. Cross causes of damage were also instituted by the owners of both vessels in the Court of Admiralty, and 5000l. paid in by the defendants in lieu of bail. The loiter then began a suit under 24 Vict. c. 16, s. 13, for limitation of their liability to the plaintiff and similar claimants. The Admiralty judge held that he had jurisdiction, entertained the suit, and ordered that the sum of 6376l, the amount of possible liability calculated at 152. per ton of the N., should be paid into court. The defendants, having accordingly paid in that sum, and admitted their liability, prayed for an injunction restraining the action of the plaintiff, who thereupon declared in prohibition: Held (affirming the judgment of the Court of Exchequer), that as the Admiralty Court, although in some respects a Superior Court, is one of limited jurisdiction, and, as it had not jurisdiction, because neither the ship nor " the proceeds thereof," were " under arrest" within the terms of 24 Vict. c, 10, $. 13, prohibition would lie, and might issue. Error from (he Court of Exchequer. The pleadings and points of argument are fully set out in the report of the case below (ante, p. 226), where judgment was given for the plaintiff on demurrer to a declaration in prohibition to the Court of Admiralty. Sir J. B. Karslake, Q.C. (C. W. Wood, Q.C. and Cohen with him) for the defendants. - 24 Vict. c. 10, s. 13 enacts that "Whenever any ship or vessel, or the proceeds thereof, are under arrest of the High Court of Admiralty, the said court shall have the same powers as are conferred upon the High Court of Chancery in England by the ninth part of the Merchant Shipping Act 1854." By sect. 514 of the last-mentioned Act power is given to the Court of Chancery to entertain proceedings at the suit of any shipowner who has incurred liability in respect of loss of life or goods, for the purpose of determining the amount of such liability and for the distribution of such amount, with power for such court to stop all actions and suits pending in any other court in relation to the same subject-matter. The present question, as to the jurisdiction depends upon the construction of the section first cited. Here the vessel, being lost, could not be "under arrest." She was, however, represented, as it were, by a sum paid into court instead of bail. In The Northumbria (3 Mar. Law Cas. O. S. 316; 21 L. T. Rep. N. S. 681; L. Rep. 3 Ad. & Ecc. 24), it was held that, where proceedings in rem have been insti-tnted in the Court of Admiralty against a vessel, and bail has been given for the vessel, the court has jurisdiction to entertain a suit instituted by the owners of the vessel for limitation of liability, although the vessel may not actually have been under arrest of the Court of Admiralty. Moreover the maximum amount of the owner a liability was paid into court previously to the injunction, and that is surely enough to give jurisdiction to stay the action. Under such circumstances, an order to stay all actions was granted by the Court of Admiralty in The Normandy (3 Mar. Law Cas. O. S. 519; 23 L. T. Rep. N. S. 631; L. Rep. 3 Ad. & Ecc. 152.) [Willes, J. - I have had to consider this matter at chambers, and there the plaintiff's counsel contended that the Admiralty Court bad no jurisdiction, summing up his argument thus: "The ship is gone. She is lost, and for all practical purposes, is nihil; but 'proceeds' most mean proceeds of something, and ex nihilo MARITIME LAW CASES. 429 Ex. ch.] James v. The South Western Railway Company. [Ex. Ch. nihil fit."] The assumed value of the vessel may be regarded as the "proceeds" within the spirit of sect. 13, although, as the ship has perished, no " proceeds strictly speaking can issue from hor. [Brett, J. - The payment into court in the ??lision suit cannot in any possible way be reded as proceeds of the ship. The money was ought into court under the Admiralty Court Act 1861, sect. 34 as security in a cross cause where the defendant's ship could not be arrested within the meaning of that section, and not to prevent the arrest of the vessel, as in those cases where a pr - cipe for a caveat warrant is filed, and the defendant or his proctor undertakes to give bail in any suit that may be instituted against the ship; (Williams and Bruce's Admiralty Court Practice, pp. 189, 197.)] The money paid in to procure the release of a ship represents the ship; so also money paid in to prevent her arrest. Sect. 34 of the Admiralty Court Act shows that the legislature intended to give jurisdiction in all cases, even where the snip could not be arrested, and that the security given under that section is substituted for the money paid into court or bail given to prevent the arrest of the ship. Although there must be an admission of liability, as stated by Wood, V.C. in Hill v. Andus (1 Kay & J. 267), it is "not indispensably requisite that the owner of a ship preferring a claim in the Court of Admiralty under this statute, to limited liability should begin by acknowledging that his vessel is to blame:" (per Dr. Lushington in The Amalia (Bro & L. 156; 1 Mar. Law Gas. O. S. 359). The Court of Admiralty is a Superior Court, and therefore prohibition will not lie: (Place v. Polls, 5 H. L. Cas. 583). A distinction is drawn in The Mayor of London v. Cox (L. Rep. 2 H. L. Cas. at p. 259) by Willes, J., between the statutes affecting the Mayor's Court and the Admiralty Court, be says, " In this local Act (the Mayor's Court) there we neither express words nor necessary implication to produce the prerogative effect of creating a Superior Court .... Far different was the language used in the public Act of 20 Vict. c. 65, to put the Admiralty Court on the footing of the Superior Court." [Willes, J. - That point cannot be maintained. Some spiritual courts are superior, and yet prohibition lies to them if they exceed their jurisdiction. Ricketts v. Bodenham, 4 A. & E. 433.)] W. G. Harrison for the plaintiff. - There could be no proceeds of the ship, which, for all practical purposes, had ceased to exist. Money deposited in court instead of bail cannot be considered as proceeds. The purpose for which it was paid in, was to enable the defendants under the Admiralty Court Act 1861, s. 34, to further litigate their causa of damage, and had no reference to the suit for limitation of liability. [Stopped by the Court.] Sir J. B. Karslake replied. WILLES, J. - Speaking for myself, and apart from judicial duty, I am sorry the cause has arrived at its present stage, and that the plaintiff has not been persuaded to allow the sum which has been paid by the defendants into the Court of Admiralty to be distributed there. However, a judge is bound not to follow his own view as to what is a convenient course. He must measure the rights of the plaintiff not by "the crooked cord of private discretion, but by the golden metewand of the law;" and the question is whether the plaintiff, against his will, is to be compelled to submit to the jurisdiction of the court of Admiralty. In considering it we must remember that it is for the defendants to make out that there is some law which authorises the Court of Admiralty in preventing the plaintiff from pursuing bis ordinary remedy. Unless such a law exists, then, as the Admiralty is acting beyond its jurisdiction, prohibition will go, for the court is one of a limited jurisdiction. I do not call it an inferior court, but, treating it as a superior Court with a limited jurisdiction, it is subject to prohibition though superior in name; like many other courts, nominally superior but still liable to prohibition, their jurisdiction being limited. The defendants rely upon 24 Vict. c. 10, s. 13, giving to the Court of Admiralty, under certain conditions, the same jurisdiction as to limitation suits as is possessed by the Court of Chancery under sect. 514 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1854. This power of limiting liability dates from 53 Geo. 3, c. 159, by which, following a rule which is very general abroad, a shipowner can abandon his vessel, and only be answerable to the extent of the interest which he embarked in the voyage. The law of France upon this point is stated in Lloyd v. Guibert (2 Mar. Law Cas. O. S. 283; 13 L. T. Rep. N. S. 602: L. Rep. 1. Q. B. 119). And the rule has been embodied in the various Merchant Shipping Acts. With regard to the mode in which the Court of Chancery exercises its jurisdiction, I may note that in Hill v. Audits (1 K. & J. 263) the bill does not seem to have been actually dismissed, though the Vice-Chancellor seems to have been ready to dismiss it, because there was no admission of...
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