Jason Nicholas Juul v Chief Constable of Dyfed-Powys Police
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Mrs Justice Farbey |
| Judgment Date | 07 February 2024 |
| Neutral Citation | [2024] EWHC 193 (Admin) |
| Court | King's Bench Division (Administrative Court) |
| Year | 2024 |
| Docket Number | Case No: AC-2023-CDF-000025 CO/33/2023 |
[2024] EWHC 193 (Admin)
THE HONOURABLE Mrs Justice Farbey
Case No: AC-2023-CDF-000025 CO/33/2023
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
CARDIFF DISTRICT REGISTRY
Cardiff Civil and Family Justice Centre
2 Park Street
Cardiff
CF10 1ET
The Claimant appeared in person by video link
David Messling (instructed by Dyfed-Powys Police Legal Services) for the First Defendant
Connor Evans (instructed by Crown Prosecution Service) for the Second Defendant
Hearing date: 19 January 2024
Approved Judgment
This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 7 February 2024 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.
Introduction
The claimant (who is now aged 54) applies under section 18 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 and CPR Part 8 for an order discharging a Serious Crime Prevention Order (“SCPO”) made by HHJ Richards in the Crown Court at Swansea on 17 May 2022. The order replaced a previous SCPO imposed in the Crown Court at Inner London on 15 June 2016. The history before then is not easy to ascertain but the documents show that the claimant has been subject to SCPOs in one form or another since 8 June 2012.
At a case management hearing before Lane J on 16 October 2023, which all parties attended, the claimant appeared in person by video link from Russia. Lane J granted permission to the claimant to attend the substantive hearing before me by video from Russia where he says that he now lives. Before me, the claimant appeared remotely pursuant to Lane J's directions; Mr David Messling (for the first defendant) and Mr Connor Evans (for the second defendant) appeared in court.
Legal framework
The imposition, variation and discharge of SCPOs is governed by Part 1 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 (“the Act”). The Crown Court has jurisdiction to impose a SCPO in relation to a person who has been convicted of having committed a serious offence (section 19(1)). The test to be applied is whether the court has “reasonable grounds to believe that the order would protect the public by preventing, restricting or disrupting involvement by the person in serious crime in England and Wales” (section 19(2)).
By virtue of section 19(5), the Crown Court may impose:
“(a) such prohibitions, restrictions or requirements; and
(b) such other terms;
as the court considers appropriate for the purpose of protecting the public by preventing, restricting or disrupting involvement by the person concerned in serious crime in England and Wales.”
It is plain from the statutory language that a SCPO is a preventive order whose purpose is public protection. It is not a punishment for past criminal conduct. Given its protective function, the court will undertake a prospective analysis of the risk of future crime albeit that past conduct may inform the court's consideration of future risk.
Section 16 of the Act makes provision for the duration of orders:
“(1) A serious crime prevention order must specify when it is to come into force and when it is to cease to be in force.
(2) An order is not to be in force for more than 5 years beginning with the coming into force of the order.”
If a person breaches its terms, the Crown Court has the power to vary or replace a SCPO (section 21(1)). The test to be applied on variation or replacement involves the same considerations as on imposition (see section 21(2)).
Section 24(1) of the Act provides a right of appeal from the Crown Court to the Court of Appeal in the following wide terms:
“An appeal against a decision of the Crown Court in relation to a serious crime prevention order may be made to the Court of Appeal by–
(a) the person who is the subject of the order; or
(b) the relevant applicant authority.”
The powers of the Court of Appeal are contained in secondary legislation. Article 5 of the Serious Crime Act 2007 (Appeals under Section 24) Order 2008/1863 provides:
“(1) The Court of Appeal has all the powers of the Crown Court.
(2) The Court of Appeal may—
(a) make a serious crime prevention order;
(b) affirm, set aside or vary any order or judgment made or given by the Crown Court;
(c) refer any issue for determination by the Crown Court;
(d) order a new hearing in the Crown Court;
(e) make an order for costs in accordance with Part 3;
(f) make an order for the payment of interest on those costs.
(3) The Court of Appeal may exercise its powers in relation to the whole or part of an order of the Crown Court.”
The width of the language both in primary and secondary legislation is apt to include an appeal not only against the making of an order but also against the requirements of an order and its duration.
Subject to an irrelevant exception, an appeal under section 24(1) lies only with the leave of the Court of Appeal (section 24(3)).
A person who without “reasonable excuse” fails to comply with a SCPO commits an offence punishable by up to five years' imprisonment (section 25).
As for the jurisdiction of the High Court, section 18 of the Act provides in so far as relevant:
“(1) On an application under this section–
(a) the High Court in England and Wales may discharge a serious crime prevention order in England and Wales…
…
(2) An application for the discharge of an order may be made by–
…
(b) subject as follows–
(i) the person who is the subject of the order…
(3) The court must not entertain an application by the person who is the subject of the order unless it considers that there has been a change of circumstances affecting the order…” (emphasis added).
CPR PD 77 para 3.1 deals with applications to discharge a SCPO and provides in so far as relevant:
“The…claim form must contain—
(1) where the applicant is the person who is the subject of the SCPO, details of the change of circumstances affecting the SCPO…”
Proceedings before the High Court in relation to SCPOs are civil proceedings. The standard of proof to be applied by the court is the civil standard (section 35 of the Act). In considering the facts, I shall therefore apply the balance of probabilities.
Factual background
I did not hear oral evidence. I take the facts from the documents before me. The claimant has forty-two criminal convictions dating back to 1986. Of those convictions, twenty relate to offences of dishonesty such as fraud and theft.
On 24 February 2012, the claimant pleaded guilty in the Crown Court at Southwark to one count of conspiracy to defraud. He was sentenced to 81 months' imprisonment and made the subject of ancillary orders including a SCPO. The facts of the 2012 offence are summarised in R v Jason Place [2017] EWCA Crim 884 which (despite the use of an alias) relates to the claimant. The judgment conveniently describes the 2012 offence as follows:
“It was identity theft or fraud on what was described as an industrial scale between September 2003 and June 2009. The judge described him as the mastermind behind a scheme which used careful planning and sophisticated modern IT. The false documents were high quality, created and used to steal identities or create fictitious people. A package was sold to fraudsters who used them to support loan applications, for example” (emphasis added).
The claimant continued to offend. On 10 January 2013, in Westminster Magistrates' Court, he was convicted of fraud. On 15 December 2015, across two indictments, he was convicted of fraud, stalking and fifteen counts of failing to comply with his SCPO. The judgment in R v Jason Place describes the stalking offence as follows:
“7….On 2nd April 2014, [a barrister] told police of an internet harassment campaign by the use of two websites, cowboysolicitors.com and bentasianlawyers.com.au. Cowboysolicitors was registered in the name Gary Wilson, the applicant's brother. Bentasianlawyers was registered to Garyninjatech, an email address the applicant had used.
8. The attack began on 27th March 2014 with malicious and derogatory emails to lawyers and barristers, links to websites supplied. It was timed to coincide with an AGM of the Society of Asian Lawyers to which [the barrister] sought election as Chairman. The attacks suggested he was corrupt, had rewarded a solicitor for work supplied, a false petition sought his disbarment and a fake item in the format of Sky News appeared to report his arrest. He was accused of plagiarism.
9. The Crown's case was that the applicant was responsible for a course of conduct which amounted to stalking…The defence was that the applicant, who gave evidence, had nothing to do with the material, did not know [the barrister] and that his brother Gary Wilson was Garyninjatech. Wilson and Patrick Connor had access to the applicant's laptops…
12. The judge said this was a course of internet bullying and harassment. Considering R v Liddle and Hayes [1999] 3 All ER 816 CA he found the offence serious, the offending persistent, sophisticated and made up of malicious allegations designed to do damage and to hurt. [The barrister], worn down, hired private investigators. There was no remorse. The applicant denied responsibility and blamed his brother and another. He was intelligent and resourceful. Aggravating the matter were his previous convictions and that the offences were committed whilst he was on licence.”
The court made a five-year SCPO to start from the date of the claimant's release from the custodial part of his sentence. The claimant was released on 24 August 2018 so that the SCPO was due to expire on 23 August 2023.
The claimant's licence expiry date was 23 February 2021. On that date, he became free to leave the United Kingdom provided that he complied with his obligation under the SCPO to notify the...
To continue reading
Request your trial