Jean Patricia Gibbs v Charles Ronald Gibbs
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Mrs Justice Lieven,Mrs Justice Lieven DBE |
| Judgment Date | 05 August 2020 |
| Neutral Citation | [2020] EWHC 2134 (Fam) |
| Year | 2020 |
| Date | 05 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No: ZC17P0062Y |
| Court | Family Division |
[2020] EWHC 2134 (Fam)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
FAMILY DIVISION
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Mrs Justice Lieven
Case No: ZC17P0062Y
The Applicant represented herself
Ms Katherine Illsley (instructed by Metcalfe Copeman & Pettefar LLP) for the Respondent
Hearing dates: 22 July 2020
Approved Judgment
I direct that pursuant to CPR PD 39A para 6.1 no official shorthand note shall be taken of this Judgment and that copies of this version as handed down may be treated as authentic.
This judgment concerns the latest stage in a long running saga concerning Reverend Charles Gibbs and Mrs Jean Gibbs. I will refer to them throughout as H and W although their roles in the history and the litigation change over time and they have been divorced for many years. I have before me four applications: an application by H to commit W for breach of a non-molestation order; a further application to commit for breach of an order made on 5 October 2017; an application by H for an order for sale of W's house; and an application by W to discharge the orders made against her. There is a preliminary issue as to the anonymisation of this judgment which I will deal with at the start of this judgment.
I will produce a short summary of this judgment that can be used by H to explain why I have reached the very clear conclusion that the W's allegations against him are without foundation and that she has been pursuing a cruel and destructive campaign against him.
The underlying facts concern W's absolute conviction that H has sexually abused their son, J, who is now aged 33. When the matter first came before me, I determined that I could not fairly determine the applications, and in particular W's argument that she had a reasonable excuse for breaching the orders and her application to discharge those orders, without my considering something of the background facts. However, those facts go back to 2000 and involve enormous quantities of documentation from that period. In those circumstances I sought to take a proportionate approach and had before me the earlier judgments and some, but by no means all, of the primary material. Where appropriate I will refer to that below.
Anonymisation
Mr Farmer of the Press Association has attended two of the hearings, all of which have been in open court. He raised a concern as to the extent that he could report proceedings in the light of the Sexual Offences Amendment Act 1992. As relevant this states as follows:
section 1 Anonymity of victims of certain offences
(1) Where an allegation has been made that an offence to which this Act applies has been committed against a person, no matter relating to that person shall during that person's lifetime be included in any publication, if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify that person as the person against whom the offence is alleged to have been committed.
…
(3) This section—
(a) does not apply in relation to a person by virtue of subsection (1) at any time after a person has been accused of the offence, and
(b) in its application in relation to a person by virtue of subsection (2), has effect subject to any direction given under section 3.
(3A) The matters relating to a person in relation to which the restrictions imposed by subsection ( 1) or (2) apply (if their inclusion in any publication is likely to have the result mentioned in that subsection) include in particular—
(a) the person's name,
…
There is a power to dispense with restriction in section 1 in section 3, which states:
section 3 Power to displace section 1
(1) If, before the commencement of a trial at which a person is charged with an offence to which this Act applies, he or another person against whom the complainant may be expected to give evidence at the trial, applies to the judge for a direction under this subsection and satisfies the judge—
(a) that the direction is required for the purpose of inducing persons who are likely to be needed as witnesses at the trial to come forward; and
(b) that the conduct of the applicant's defence at the trial is likely to be substantially prejudiced if the direction is not given, the judge shall direct that section 1 shall not, by virtue of the accusation alleging the offence in question, apply in relation to the complainant.
(2) If at a trial the judge is satisfied—
(a) that the effect of section 1 is to impose a substantial and unreasonable restriction upon the reporting of proceedings at the trial, and
(b) that it is in the public interest to remove or relax the restriction, he shall direct that that section shall not apply to such matter as is specified in the direction.
(3) A direction shall not be given under subsection (2) by reason only of the outcome of the trial.
(4)…
(5) A direction given under any provision of this section does not affect the operation of section 1 at any time before the direction is given.
(6) In subsections (1) and (2), “judge” means—
(a) in the case of an offence which is to be tried summarily or for which the mode of trial has not been determined, any justice of the peace; and
(b) in any other case, any judge of the Crown Court.
Section 1 appears to be an absolute prohibition on publishing information which could lead to the identification of the complainant. Section 3 allows for a judge to give a direction, but the wording of section 3 would appear to only apply to criminal proceedings and not to give a power in civil proceedings to dispense with the requirement for anonymisation in section 1. J is a complainant who falls within the terms of section 1 and, as such, in principle the prohibition in section 1 applies.
The issue in the present case is that W has chosen to seek the maximum publicity for her allegations against H and by doing so has put the identity of the alleged victim (J) into the public domain. In order for me to explain my reasons for rejecting W's case, but also to achieve justice for H in clearing his name, I cannot avoid referring to names and facts which will make it relatively easy to identify the alleged victim.
The application of s.1 of the 1992 Act to a civil case was considered by Soole J in the EAT in A v X and Times Newspapers [2019] UKEAT/0113/18/JOJ. The Judge and the parties all proceeded on the basis that the 1992 Act applied in those proceedings and a Reporting Restriction Order was made. There is no discussion of what happens if anonymity has already effectively been removed.
In my view, the only way to make sense of s.1 in the present context is to assume that if either anonymity has already been waived, or wholly undermined, then the prohibition in section 1 has to be read in the light of the facts of the case. The prohibition in section 1 can only take effect therefore to the degree it has any operative effect. Otherwise the statutory provision becomes a nonsense where the judgment has to be wholly anonymised even though the facts are already fully in the public domain. Therefore, I will anonymise this judgment to the extent of calling the parties' children J and B but I will not make any further anonymisation. B has not made any allegations and therefore does not herself fall within section 1 but to restrict the identification of J it seems proportionate to anonymise B.
In my view this is applying a proportionate balancing exercise between J's rights not to be identified, further than he has already been, and H's rights to have a judgment which explains in detail my factual findings so that his article 8 rights can be protected. Fundamental to this balance is that W has already publicised J's allegations to the widest possible audience and I have not the slightest doubt that she will continue to do so whatever order I make.
The Facts
There is a long and dis-spiriting history to this matter dating back to 2000. H is now 70 and W is 60. They were married in 1985. There are two children, J (a boy) born in 1987, who is now 33, and B (a girl) born 1992, now 27. The parties separated in 1999. H applied for contact in 2000 and the decree absolute was granted in 2001.
H's application for contact with the children came before District Judge Hayes in Norwich County Court on 13 March 2001. Contact was strenuously resisted by W who at that stage was alleging emotional abuse against her and the children by H. DJ Hayes had statements from both parties and heard oral evidence. W argued that H had had a terrible temper and had exercised coercive control over her. She said that children were terrified of him. W said J had told her that H had squeezed his wrists and had started to say his father had physically abused him. H denied these allegations and said that W was dominant and tried to control him.
DJ Hayes came to very clear conclusions:
“I have no doubt the evidence I prefer is that of the applicant. I simply cannot recognise and reconcile the demeanour of Mr Gibbs and what I saw, with what he is alleged to have done. On conflicts of evidence I prefer Mr Gibbs, I am satisfied he is doing his best to tell the truth, although he says he is not perfect, if I have a Minister saying not perfect I do not know if that is the normal standard or something deeper. He refers to frailties and not having acted perfectly but who could say they have. I have to decide on the balance of probabilities, whose favour, in the scales, which way do they tip, in Mrs Gibbs' favour, to acknowledge there has been emotional abuse or in his favour. They tip in his...
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