Joint Participation in Criminal Activity
| Author | Alan Reed |
| Published date | 01 August 1996 |
| Date | 01 August 1996 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/002201839606000307 |
| Subject Matter | Article |
JOINT
PARTICIPATION
IN
CRIMINAL
ACTIVITY
A/an Reed"
The doctrine of joint enterprise has developed in a haphazard manner
and, as this article will demonstrate, recent case law developments have
only exacerbated the ambits of uncertainty.' As the Law Commission/ has
stressed the principles have only been subjected to close analysis in
comparatively recent times,' though its point
of
origin is to be found in
the early case of Macklin:"
It
is a principle of law that if several persons act together in pursuance of a
common intent, every act in furtherance of such intent by each of them is, in
law, done by all.
In joint enterprise the allegation is that one defendant participated in
the criminal act of another.
It
renders each of the parties to a joint
enterprise criminally liable for the acts done in the course of carrying out
that joint enterprise. The essence of the activity is that P and D embark
on a planned criminal offence and in the course
of
that enterprise a
'collateral' crime is committed by P; commonly murder during the course
of a robbery or burglary. At issue will be whether D can be inculpated
with the murder (not simply burglary) committed by P. Where the
criminal liability
of
any given defendant depends upon the further proof
that he had a certain state of mind, that state of mind must be proved
against that defendant. Even though several defendants may, as a result
of having engaged in a joint enterprise, be each criminally responsible for
the criminal act of one of those defendants done in the course of carrying
out the joint enterprise, their individual criminal responsibility will, in
such a case, depend upon what individual state of mind or intention has
been proved against them. The central issue concerns the state of the
defendant's mind at the time of his participation in the joint enterprise,
but substantial uncertainty still exists over the definition
of
mens rea
required to secure conviction.'
The key feature of joint enterprise is thus that D is unculpated in
respect of P's crime even though he does not committ its actus reus.
For
instance a planned burglary is thwarted by the householder who is
• MA (Cantab), LLM (University of Virginia), Solicitor and Lecturer in Law, Leeds
University.
ISee R v O'Brien (\995) The Times. 14 April; R v Stewart and Schofield
[1995]
1 Cr App
R 441; R v Wan and Chan
[1995]
Crim LR 296; R v Rook [1993]2 All ER 955.
2Law Commission No
131
(\993) Assisting and EncouragingCrime, at p 7 (hereafter Law
Com No 131).
JSee KJM Smith, A Modern Treatise on the Law
of
Criminal Complicity (\991).
4
(\
838) 2 Law CC225, per Alderson B.
5In this regard note GR Sullivan
[1988]
Crim LR 641; Professor RA
Duff
[1990]
LS 165;
Professor Glanville Williams
[1990]
Crim LR 4 and 98.
310
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