Jones v Jones
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Year | 1916 |
| Date | 1916 |
| Court | House of Lords |
Slander - Cause of Action - Words imputing Moral Misconduct - Schoolmaster - Absence of Special Damage - Words not spoken of Plaintiff in Relation to his Calling.
An action of slander will not lie for words imputing adultery to a schoolmaster, in the absence of proof of special damage, unless the words are spoken of him touching or in the way of his calling.
Ayre v. Craven (
Decision of the Court of Appeal [
APPEAL from an order of the Court of AppealF1 setting aside a verdict and judgment in favour of the plaintiff in an action of slander tried before Lush J. and a common jury and ordering judgment to be entered for the defendants.
The plaintiff (the appellant) was a certificated teacher and was headmaster of the Llidiardau Council School, Rhoshirwaen, Pwllheli, in the county of Carnarvon. The slander complained of was that one day in May, 1914, the female defendant, who was the wife of the male defendant (they being the respondents), falsely and maliciously spoke and published of and concerning the plaintiff in relation to his profession as certificated teacher and in relation to his office as headmaster of the said school words imputing that the plaintiff had been guilty of adultery with one Mrs. Roberts, a married woman, who was employed by the cleaner of the school.
The defendants by their defence said that the alleged words, if spoken (which was denied), did not relate to the plaintiff in his profession as certificated teacher, nor to him in his office as headmaster, and that such words were not actionable without proof of special damage, and none was alleged.
The action was tried at the Carnarvon Assizes. At the trial Elizabeth Jones, one of the persons to whom the words complained of were spoken, was called as a witness, and in cross-examination she stated that the words were not spoken at all in reference to the plaintiff as schoolmaster. Before the plaintiff's case was closed his counsel proposed to call the secretary to the education committee which had control of the elementary schools in Carnarvonshire to prove that the slander in question would tend to lose the plaintiff his employment. Lush J. asked if that was not obvious, and thereupon counsel for the defendants made the admission that the plaintiff would suffer to the same extent and no more than a man following any other occupation, and that a man who was a schoolmaster would probably be dismissed from his employment if he were leading an immoral life just as a man following any other occupation would be. The exact language of this admission will be found in the judgment of Lord Sumner.
The defendants adduced no evidence.
The questions left by the learned judge to the jury, with their answers thereto, were as follows:—
(1.) Were words spoken by the defendants of the plaintiff imputing moral misconduct between plaintiff and Mrs. Ellen Roberts? – Yes.
(2.) Were they spoken of him in the way of his calling, i,e., in such a way as to imperil the retention of his office? – Yes.
(3.) Did they impute that he was unfit to hold his office? – Yes.
And the jury fixed the damages at 10l.
The learned judge adjourned the case for further argument in London, and in the course of that argument counsel for the defendants again admitted that the county council would naturally not allow a master who was carrying on an immoral intercourse to stop in the school and teach children, but stated that this admission would be equally true of any other person occupying a public position. After hearing arguments on the law Lush J. entered judgment for the plaintiff in accordance with the verdict of the jury.
The Court of Appeal (Swinfen Eady L.J., Warrington L.J., and Bray J.) set aside this judgment on the ground that words imputing adultery or immoral conduct, even when spoken of a man holding an office or carrying on a profession or business, were not actionable without special damage unless the words related to his conduct in the office, profession, or business, or the imputation was connected with his professional duties, except in the case of a clergyman holding clerical preferment or employment, and that the imputation upon the plaintiff was not connected with his occupation or employment.
1916. May 29, 30; June 1. Sir Robert Finlay, K.C., and Mortimer Montgomery, K.C. (with them T. E. Morris and Arthur A. Thomas), for the appellant. The jury have found that the slander was spoken of the appellant in the way of his calling, and if there is any evidence fit to go to the jury, that is a question for them to decide. The cases in which an action for slander will lie without proof of special damage fall into three categories: (1.) where the words impute to the plaintiff a criminal offence; (2.) where they impute to him that he is suffering from a contagious disease such as would exclude him from society; (3.) where the words are spoken of the plaintiff in the way of his calling or office or tend to damage him in his calling or office. The true principle is that laid down by Bayley B. in delivering the judgment of the Court of Exchequer in Lumby v. AlldayF2, namely, that the words must impute the want of some general requisite, such as honesty, capacity, fidelity, &c., or must connect the imputation with the plaintiff's office, trade, or business. The words must impute to the plaintiff some special unfitness in relation to his calling or the want of some general quality which must necessarily affect him in his calling. In the case of a schoolmaster a charge that he is carrying on an immoral intercourse with a married woman, if substantiated, must necessarily affect him in his calling. Apart from the
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