Judging Nudging: Answering the Manipulation Objection
| DOI | 10.1177/0032321716629487 |
| Published date | 01 March 2017 |
| Date | 01 March 2017 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
629487PSX0010.1177/0032321716629487Political StudiesNys and Engelen
research-article2016
Article
Political Studies
2017, Vol. 65(1) 199 –214
Judging Nudging:
© The Author(s) 2016
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DOI: 10.1177/0032321716629487
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Objection
Thomas RV Nys1 and Bart Engelen2
Abstract
Is it ever justified to ‘nudge’ people towards their own health? In this article, we argue that it is.
We do so by arguing (1) that nudges are not necessarily – as is commonly thought – manipulative;
(2) that even those nudges that are manipulative can be justified, for instance, when they preserve
rather than violate people’s autonomy; and (3) that even if nudges can be said to violate some
people’s autonomy, they can still be the legitimate outcome of genuinely democratic procedures.
While we do not regard nudging as the solution to all or even most public health problems, we
argue for a piecemeal approach that carefully considers its benefits and downsides in light of the
various values involved and the alternatives at hand.
Keywords
autonomy, paternalism, nudge, public health, manipulation
Accepted: 2 December 2015
Introducing Nudging
The terms ‘nudging’ and ‘libertarian paternalism’ have been among us for more than a
decade now (Sunstein and Thaler, 2003). Since the publication of Richard Thaler and
Cass Sunstein’s (2008) bestselling book Nudge, they have spurred a normative and con-
ceptual debate within academia and have instructed real-life policies in, for example, the
United States and the United Kingdom (Department of Health, 2010). Recently, Sunstein
(2015) has rehearsed some of the original issues, and this will probably rekindle the
debate for years to come.
The subtitle of Thaler and Sunstein’s book is ‘Improving Decisions about Health,
Wealth and Happiness’. Despite this wide focus, a prominent strand of the discussion
focuses on how nudging can and should be made relevant to public health issues. Can and
1Department of Philosophy, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
2Department of Philosophy, Tilburg School of Humanities, Tilburg University, Tilburg, The Netherlands
Corresponding author:
Thomas RV Nys, Department of Philosophy, University of Amsterdam, Oude Turfmarkt 143, 1012 GC
Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
Email: t.r.v.nys@uva.nl
200
Political Studies 65 (1)
should policy-makers nudge people towards their own health? Given that paternalism in
public health is the topic of a long and fierce debate, one can interpret nudging either as a
suitable and soothing solution to the charges of paternalism or as an outright re-instalment
and justification of paternalist zeal in public health care (Ménard, 2010; Skipper, 2012).
An important objection against nudging – which often remains insufficiently spelled
out – is that it is problematic not because it is coercive (it is not) but because it is manipu-
lative. In this article, we critically analyse this argument and assess its implications for the
normative question whether nudging is a justified technique to improve public health.
First, we critically discuss the claims that nudges are inherently manipulative and there-
fore undermine people’s autonomy. Second, even if a nudge is manipulative, this in itself
does not necessarily undermine its legitimacy: nudges can be justified instances of
manipulation. In order to clarify when this is the case, we refer to a number of aspects that
are underdeveloped in the literature. In some cases, nudges can be understood as promot-
ing rather than undermining people’s autonomy. Also, and especially in public health
issues, nudging can be interpreted as democratic self-discipline, in which the ‘demos’
uses certain tactics to ‘bind itself’, that is, help itself make choices that are beneficial in
terms of both health and autonomy. We will conclude that even if some people reject such
strategies (nudging) and such goals (health), certain health-promoting nudges can be per-
fectly warranted in those circumstances where there are significant health benefits that
cannot be achieved with other strategies. While nudging is and should be the topic of
(democratic) controversy, we therefore reject the idea that nudging is always unjustified.
Nudges belong to the legitimate toolbox of democratic governments.
Before we go into the normative question when nudging is or is not permissible and
justified, we should clarify what nudging is exactly (section ‘Understanding Nudging’)
and when it can be called manipulative (sections ‘Nudging and Manipulation: Definition’,
‘Nudging and Manipulation: Success, Goals’ and ‘Nudging and Manipulation: Techniques,
Means, Choice Perversion’). Different elements in the definitions of manipulation will
allow us to consider and answer objections that centre around nudges being manipulative.
This will finally lead us to analyse democratic and other reasons relevant to assessing the
legitimacy of nudges (sections ‘Nudging as Democratically Legitimate Manipulation’
and ‘Nudging as Legitimate Manipulation for Other Reasons’). For the sake of clarity and
focus, we will consistently use Thaler and Sunstein’s (2008) famous cafeteria example
(pp. 1–4) because it is paradigmatic of the entire project, it is clearly health related and it
is remarkably instructive for the issues at stake.1
Understanding Nudging
According to Thaler and Sunstein (2008), a nudge is ‘any aspect of the choice architecture
that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or sig-
nificantly changing their economic incentives’ (p. 6). This definition has five elements:
nudges are (1) interventions at the level of ‘choice architecture’ (2) in order to change
people’s behaviour (3) in a way that is predictable, (4) without eliminating options and (5)
without changing incentives.
In order to distinguish nudging from rational persuasion,2 we need to add a sixth ele-
ment, namely that (6) nudging makes use of psychological mechanisms, cognitive biases
and heuristics that cause people to make decisions that often go against their own interests
(Bovens, 2009: 208; Grill, 2013: 38; Reiss, 2013: 291). Thaler and Sunstein start from
behavioural research showing the predictable irrational responses caused by these
Nys and Engelen
201
mechanisms, biases and heuristics. Nudging strategies use these very same mechanisms
in order to secure better outcomes in terms of ‘health, wealth and happiness’. Changing
the ‘choice architecture’ – not the mechanisms! – is used to improve people’s decisions
and better serve the welfare or interests of the people who are being nudged (the ‘nudg-
ees’). In the field of public health, it is therefore hailed as ‘a new approach that empowers
individuals to make healthy choices’ (Department of Health, 2010: 2).
In his more fine-grained analysis of Thaler and Sunstein’s definition of nudges, Yashar
Saghai (2013) includes this sixth element: ‘A nudges B when A makes it more likely that
B will φ, by triggering B’s automatic cognitive processes, while preserving B’s freedom
of choice’ (p. 487). The key term here is ‘automatic’. Informing and persuading people do
not work in this automatic way: we need to process (e.g. read), consider and evaluate the
information in order to consciously change our behaviour. In contrast, nudges operate via
the unconscious, uncontrolled, fast and easy processes – commonly called System 1 or
the Automatic System – instead of the reflective, conscious, controlled, slow and more
demanding processes of System 2 or the Reflective System (Sunstein, 2015: 26–27;
Thaler and Sunstein, 2008: 19–22). It is exactly this aspect that makes nudges apt for
‘Humans’ like ourselves who are clearly no ‘Econs’ with ‘complete information, unlim-
ited cognitive capacities, and no lack of will power’ (Sunstein and Thaler, 2003: 173).
Conrad Heilmann (2014: 77–83) uses nifty abbreviations to describe what goes on in
nudging. In his view, (ideal) nudges are interventions aimed at people whose Reflective
Systems endorse a prudent option (Rp) but whose Automatic Systems endorse another
option (Aq). The nudge moves the nudgee’s Automatic System to endorse the prudent
option (Ap) – while still allowing her Reflective System to reflect on and correct for
this – ultimately leading to the nudgee voluntarily choosing the prudent option (so ulti-
mately, AqRp → ApRp).
The cafeteria example is clear in this regard. Putting apples (the prudent and healthy
option) and not Twinkies (the nonprudent and unhealthy option) at eye level increases the
probability that people will pick an apple, thereby increasing overall apple consumption
and contributing to public health. The process that leads people to do this is largely auto-
matic: they tend to take whatever is at eye level or what requires the least effort. It is the
same process that leads them to pick unhealthy items that also makes them pick the
healthy alternatives. We simply need to arrange things differently. It is not that we have
no other choice but to pick up the apple or that this choice is completely unconscious. It
is just that not much thought goes into the decision anyway. However, and this is crucial,
to the extent that people care about their health more than about the sheer satisfaction of
a momentary sugar boost, they have good reason to prefer the apple over the Twinkie. So,
their Reflective System endorses the apple as the...
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