Junior Partner Canada
| Date | 01 September 2008 |
| Author | Stormy-Annika Mildner |
| Published date | 01 September 2008 |
| DOI | 10.1177/002070200806300314 |
| Subject Matter | Canada-Germany RelationEssays in Honour of Robert Spencer |
Stormy-Annika Mildner
Junior partner
Canada
Transatlantic trade relations under Germany’s EU presidency
| 646 | International Journal | Summer 2008 |
We know that the friendly ties between Europe and the United
States and Canada are unique and without alternative. There is no
lack of shared challenge. I believe they are more likely to increase
than decrease. But we know together as partners we are strong.1
During the course of Germany’s EU council presidency in 2007, Canada
was mentioned often in official speeches, government documents, and peti-
tions. Nonetheless, EU-Canadian economic integration was not a serious
priority for Germany—or for that matter the European Union. The EU-
Canada economic partnership project remained vague in design and scope;
there was no mention of free trade or a transatlantic marketplace. Instead,
Chancellor Angela Merkel concentrated on an EU-US-centred transatlantic
Stormy-Annika Mildner is the global and US economic developmentanalyst at the German
Institute for International and Security Affairs in Berlin. She has published widely on transat-
lantic economic relations, US and EU trade policy, US domestic economic policy, and inter-
national organizations.
1 Speech by Federal Chancellor Angela Merkel at the American Academy celebrations
marking the 60th anniversary of the Marshall plan, 19 November 2007, www.bun-
desregierung.de.
| International Journal | Summer 2008 | 647 |
| Junior partner Canada |
marketplace. This article outlines and explains the dominance of the United
States in Merkel’s transatlantic market place initiative. The first part analyses
official documents and speeches from Germany’s EU council presidency to
show how and when Canada appears on Merkel’s transatlantic agenda. The
second part of the article explains Canada’s role in transatlantic economic
relations by evaluating commercial ties, interests, and strategies. The article
concludes that the fate of the EU-Canada economic partnership project de-
pends very much on high-level support on both sides of the Atlantic, as well
as the development of a clear vision. Otherwise the initiative is destined to
fail, as have many of its predecessors.
GERMANY’S EU PRESIDENCY: A PUSH FOR DEEPER TRANSATLANTIC INTEGRATION?
EU-US ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND THE TRANSATLANTIC MARKETPLACE
On 1 January 2007, Germany took over the six-month rotating presidency
of the European Union. During its tenure, Germany proved to be a strong
strategic leader with regard to transatlantic economic integration. The initia-
tive for a transatlantic marketplace came directly from the chancellery and
was driven at the highest political level from fall 2006. In contrast to other
trade issues on the presidency’s agenda, the chancellery was in charge of
Merkel’s transatlantic initiative, with the groundwork being carried out by
the federal ministry of economics and technology (BMWi) and the federal
foreign ministry, via their respective country desks.
The chancellor announced her idea to create a transatlantic free trade
area in September 2006, reacting to the lack of progress in the WTO Doha
round of negotiations and rising global competition due to the economic
emergence of China and India. At first Merkel’s initiative, which was at the
time still vague, caused reactions in Berlin and Brussels that ranged from the
reserved to the outright critical. It was not clear what she had in mind, a free
trade area along the lines of previous proposals or deeper internal market
integration. The idea of using a European-US free trade area as a bulwark
against the leading emerging economies was particularly strongly criticized.
Bernd Pfaffenbach, state secretary in the BMWi, described the initiative as
the “deathblow” of the Doha round. EU Commissioner Peter Mandelson
warned that the rest of the world would react with dismay if the two largest
economic powers agreed to exclusive trade preferences.2
2 Peter Mandelson, “EU-Handelskommissar lehnt Freihandelszone ab,”
Manager-
Magazin
, 3 October 2006.
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