Juries: Scrutiny of Deliberations
| Author | Christopher Gale |
| DOI | 10.1350/jcla.2005.69.5.397 |
| Published date | 01 October 2005 |
| Date | 01 October 2005 |
| Subject Matter | House of Lords |
House of Lords
Juries: Scrutiny of Deliberations
R vSmith and Another [2005] UKHL 12, [2005] All ER (D) 237 (Feb)
The defendants were convicted at a retrial on four counts: conspiracy to
cause grievous bodily harm, false imprisonment, kidnapping and mur-
der. After the jury had been deliberating for some time, the judge
received a letter from one of the jurors, stating that a certain group of
jurors had been badgering, coercing and intimidating other jurors into
changing their verdicts. The judge showed the letter to counsel and
invited submissions from them. Counsel for the Crown suggested that
the judge should give the jury a ‘powerful direction’ to act on his
instructions on the law and remind them of their duty to follow their
own beliefs in the light of the oath they had sworn. The judge indicated
that this was also his view. Counsel for the first defendant, having
consulted his client, agreed to that course for tactical reasons, since it
appeared from the juror’s letter that it was likely that the jury might
convict on the first two counts, and either acquit or disagree on the third
and fourth counts which were the more serious. Counsel for the second
defendant also agreed. The judge gave the jury the further direction. The
next day, the jury returned majority verdicts of guilty on all counts
against each defendant. The defendants appealed and the Court of
Appeal dismissed these appeals holding, following the views expressed
in R vYoung [1995] QB 324, that the judge had been precluded by s. 8(1)
of the Contempt of Court Act 1981 from carrying out an investigation
into irregularities alleged to have occurred in the jury room. He had
been faced with the alternatives of discharging the jury or giving a
further direction, and could not be criticised for having chosen the latter
course. After the decision of the Court of Appeal, the House of Lords
gave judgment in R v O’Connor; R v Mirza [2004] 1 All ER 925, (2004) 68
JCL 290, in which it was held, disapproving the observations in Young,
that s. 8(1) did not prevent the judge from conducting an investigation
into the events which had taken place in the jury room. The Court of
Appeal subsequently certified that points of law of general public im-
portance were involved in its decision in the instant case, and the
defendants appealed.
The points of law were:
(i) whether, when a member of the jury sent to the trial judge in the
course of a trial a letter criticising the conduct of other members
of the jury in terms that suggested, or might arguably suggest,
bias on their part, and it was accepted that the letter had been
written in good faith, the judge was obliged as a matter of law
(whether on the application of O’Connor and Mirza or otherwise)
to question the members of the jury about the criticisms before
deciding that the delivery of lawful and unbiased verdicts by the
397
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