Jury Secrecy: R v Mirza; R v Connor and Rollock
| Author | Gillian Daly |
| DOI | 10.1350/ijep.8.3.186.40868 |
| Published date | 01 July 2004 |
| Date | 01 July 2004 |
| Subject Matter | Case Note |
186 THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF EVIDENCE & PROOF
CASE NOTES
Jury secrecy:
R
v
Mirza
;
R
v
Connor and
Rollock
By Gillian Daly
University of East Anglia
he jury secrecy rule prohibits the court from receiving evidence from a juror
after verdict has been given about anything said in the course of the jury’s
deliberations. The rationale for the rule includes: (1) ensuring finality of
T
verdict and (2) protecting the jury from pressure or inducement to explain or alter
their views.1 The rule has attracted criticism, particularly in light of the Human
Rights Act 1998. It is questionable whether a rule that significantly curtails the
ability of the court to consider on appeal allegations of impropriety on the part of
the jury is compatible with the right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the European
Convention on Human Rights. The Court of Appeal has held that it is.2 The House of
Lords has recently had the opportunity to consider the matter in the conjoined
appeals of R v Mirza and R v Connor and Rollock.3
The facts of
Mirza
and
Connor
In both cases, the appellants were convicted following a majority verdict. After
the trial, a member of the jury sent a letter to defence counsel (Mirza) and the
trial judge (Connor) alleging impropriety on the part of the jury. The defendant in
Mirza was a Pakistani man who had resided in the United Kingdom for 13 years.
He used an interpreter at the trial, and following queries from the jury, the judge
gave a direction that no adverse inference should be drawn from this. The letter
sent by the juror suggested a failure to follow this direction (the jury believing
the use of the interpreter to be a ‘devious ploy’) and racial bias. In Connor, the
defendants were convicted following a joint trial. The letter suggested that the
jury had failed to consider the evidence properly (they were looking for a ‘quick
verdict’) and had convicted both defendants when they were uncertain which of
them was guilty. The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, holding itself unable
to admit into evidence the terms of the jurors’ letters, in accordance with its
earlier decision in R v Qureshi.4
1Ellis v Deheer [1922] 2 KB 113; Boston v W. S. Bagshaw & Sons [1966] 1 WLR 1135.
2R v Qureshi [2002] 1 WLR 518.
3R v Mirza; R v Connor and Rollock [2004] UKHL 2, [2004] 2 WLR 201.
4R v Qureshi [2002] 1 WLR 518.
THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF EVIDENCE & PROOF (2004) 8 E&P 186–190
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