Justice as a secondary moral ideal: The British idealists and the personal ethics perspective in understanding social justice
| Date | 01 January 2011 |
| Author | Maria Dimova-Cookson |
| DOI | 10.1177/1474885110386005 |
| Published date | 01 January 2011 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
European Journal of Political Theory
10(1) 46–70
!The Author(s) 2011
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DOI: 10.1177/1474885110386005
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EJPT
Article
Justice as a secondary
moral ideal: The British
idealists and the personal
ethics perspective in
understanding social justice
Maria Dimova-Cookson
University of Durham
Abstract
This paper aims to show the advantages of the personal ethics perspective employed by
the British idealists in the analysis of justice. In the context of Green’s and Bosanquet’s
political theory, justice is a secondary moral ideal. Yet, it is argued here, their moral
philosophy leads us, through a longer path, to the philosophical grounds we already
occupy today: those of thinking about human rights as fundamental, not derivative, i.e.
thinking about justice as a primary, not secondary moral ideal. There are three related
yet distinct philosophical claims here. First, the British idealists saw clearly the stand-off
between justice and virtue. Second, the personal ethics of Green and Bosanquet, with
some reconstruction offered here, outlines the way in which this stand-off can be
resolved without undermining its significance. Third, the personal ethics perspective
is beneficial for resolving some of the difficulties surrounding the institutional approach
of implementing of social justice.
Keywords
Bosanquet, justice, moral action, recognition, rights, T. H. Green
The topic of social justice is not directly associated with the British idealists. Issues
about which we more habitually seek their wisdom include citizenship, the role of
the state, the common good, moral character or self-realization. With respect to the
post-Rawlsian dichotomy ‘justice versus virtue’ we tend to see the British idealists
as the philosophers who engage with virtue. However, they do have a distinctive
contribution on social justice. Certain aspects of this contribution are already well
recognized, while some still await recognition. David Boucher has emphasized the
Corresponding author:
Maria Dimova-Cookson, University of Durham
Email: maria.dimova-cookson@durham.ac.uk
difference between the post-Rawlsian approaches to justice which focus on fairness,
impartiality, mutual benefit, desert and entitlement, on the one hand, and the
British idealist understanding of justice as a theory that rests upon the metaphysics
of the person and a definite conception of the good, on the other.
1
With respect to
justice, the British idealists focus not so much on procedures and impartiality, but
on substantive visions of social and personal good. In addition to being different,
on Boucher’s account, the British idealists’ theory of justice overcomes certain
dualisms that seem to dominate contemporary analytical political theory, most
importantly, the ‘justice–virtue’ dualism.
2
Simhony has demonstrated the capacity
of Green’s rights theory to overcome the liberal anxieties about the British idealist
teleological conception of rights. If anything, she argues, Green’s theory has the
resources for a constructive critique of liberalism itself, challenging its assumption
that a teleological conception of rights subverts the primary normative role of
rights because teleological rights are supposed to be derivative, not fundamental.
3
In other words, Green’s theory of rights not only defies liberal anxieties but also
reveals the complex nature of liberalism. Gaus demonstrates a connection between
Green’s ‘rights recognition thesis’ and moral internalism.
4
This paper will seek to show the advantages of the personal ethics perspective
employed by the British idealist in the analysis of justice. From the personal ethics
point of view, there is a moral paradox at the heart of justice. This paradox,
implied by Green and clearly spelled out by Bosanquet, is to do with the observa-
tion that, from the standpoint of the moral agent, the claims for justice are coun-
terintuitive. Justice is what the state or society owes to the individual, but the
individual, as a moral agent, thinks of his duties first and of his entitlements
second. Justice is important but it is, in the philosophical analysis of Bosanquet,
even of Green, a secondary moral ideal.
5
Bosanquet explains why ‘it is in a sense,
the lowest of social claims’.
6
The paradox has a solution that is partly articulated
by Green and partly through some additional reconstruction of his moral theory.
We will see that Green’s and Bosanquet’s moral philosophy leads us, through a
longer path, to the philosophical grounds we already occupy today: those of think-
ing about human rights as fundamental, not derivative, i.e. thinking about justice
as a primary, not secondary moral ideal. The paper will recommend the advantages
of this longer path.
There are three related yet distinct philosophical claims here. First, the British
idealists saw very clearly the stand-off between justice and virtue. The moral
paradox implied in the claim for justice, as revealed by Bosanquet, is triggered
by articulating a stand-off between ‘simple individualistic justice’ and ‘the imper-
ative of public welfare’.
7
The significance of this can be appreciated against the fact
that Rawls’s articulation of the dilemma between the right and the good, strongly
related to that between justice and virtue, is considered one of the greatest achieve-
ments of 20th-century political philosophy.
8
Second, the personal ethics of Green and Bosanquet, underpinned by their
philosophy of moral action, with some reconstruction offered here, outlines the
way in which this stand-off can be resolved without undermining its significance.
Dimova-Cookson 47
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