Kingdom of Spain and Jose Ignacio de Juana Chaos

JurisdictionNorthern Ireland
JudgeBurgess J
Judgment Date26 February 2010
Neutral Citation[2010] NICty 1
CourtCounty Court (Northern Ireland)
Year2010
Date26 February 2010
1
Neutral Citation No. [2010] NICty 1
Ref:
22020 0 C
Judgment: approved by the Court for handing down
Delivered:
26/2/10
(subject to editorial corrections)*
IN THE MATTER OF THE EXTRADITION ACT 2003
(“The 2003 Act”)
BETWEEN: KINGDOM OF SPAIN REQUESTING STATE
AND
JOSE IGNACIO DE JUANA CHAOS REQUESTED PERSON
[1] The Requesting State issued a European Arrest Warrant on 11 November 2008,
seeking the extradition of the Requested Person (Mr De Juana) for the offence of
public justification of terrorists acts (his own and that of others), which caused
humiliation and intensified the grief of both the victims and their relatives”.
[2] The Kingdom of Spain is a Category I Territory for the purposes of the 2003 Act, and
on 12 November 2008 the Serious Organised Crime Agency certified that the Warrant
issued by Magistrate/Judge Eloy Velasco Nunez, Central Examining Magistrate’s
Court No 6, High Court, Madrid, Spain was issued by a “judicial authority” of a
Category I Territory which has the function of issuing Arrest Warrants. The Secretary
of State by virtue of an Order made under Section 1 of the 2003 Act has designated
Spain for the purposes of Part I of the 2003 Act.
[3] This Ruling is supplemental to a previous Ruling by the court which confirmed:
(a) That Mr De Juana is an accused personfor the purposes of Section 2(2) of the
2003 Act; and
(b) That the offence with which he is accused is an extraditable offence for the
purposes of Section 10(2) of the 2003 Act.
[4] I will return to the background to my determination of Mr De Juana as an “accused
person” in a moment.
2
[5] The 2003 Act gives effect in domestic law to the provisions of the European Council
Framework Decision dated 13 June 2002, an instrument of EU Law governing the
extradition of individuals from one Member State to another. The objectives of this
measure are set out in the fifth recital which states:
“The objectives set for the Union to become an area of freedom, security and
justice leads to abolishing extradition between Member States and replacing it
by a system of surrender between judicial authorities. Further, the introduction
of a new simplified system of surrender of sentenced or suspected persons for
the purposes of execution or prosecution of criminal sentences makes it
possible to remove the complexity and potential for delay inherent in the
present extradition procedures. Traditional co-operation relations which have
prevailed up to now between Member States should be replaced by a system of
free movement of judicial decisions in criminal matters, covering both pre-
sentence and final decisions, within an area of freedom, security and justice”.
[6] The European Arrest Warrant is described in the sixth recital of the Framework
Decision as the first concrete measure in the field of criminal law implementing the
principle of mutual recognition which the European Council referred to as the
“cornerstone of judicial co-operation”.
[7] At recital 10 the mechanism of a European Arrest Warrant is stated to be based on a
“high level of confidence between Member States …”
[8] Article 6 of the Framework Decision provides:
“The issuing judicial authority shall be the judicial authority of the issuing
Member State which is competent to issue a European Arrest Warrant by
virtue of the law of that State.”
[9] The 2003 Act, giving effect to the provisions of the Framework Decision,
comprehensively reformed the law relating to extradition. Its main features include
a regime whereby each of the United Kingdom’s Extradition partners belongs to one
of two categories designated by order of the Secretary of State, and the adoption of
the Framework Decision, which is widely acknowledged as creating “fast track”
extradition arrangements amongst the EU Member States:
simplification of the procedures for authentication of foreign documents;
the abolition of the requirement for prima facie evidence in certain cases; and
a simplified single avenue of appeal for all cases.
The reference to the abolition of the requirement of prima facie evidence in certain cases
applies to extradition between Category I countries, in this instance as between the
United Kingdom and the Kingdom of Spain.
[10] Sections 8-19 of the 2003 Act contain a number of provisions arranged under the
general heading “Bars to Extradition”. These include matters some of which will be
relevant to my determination in this particular matter, but I note at this stage the

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT