Kok Hoong v Leong Cheong Kweng Mines Ltd

JurisdictionUK Non-devolved
CourtPrivy Council
Judgment Date1964
Year1964
Date1964
[PRIVY COUNCIL.] KOK HOONG APPELLANT; AND LEONG CHEONG KWENG MINES LTD. RESPONDENTS. ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE FEDERATION OF MALAYA. 1963 Dec. 10. VISCOUNT RADCLIFFE, LORD MORRIS OF BORTH-Y-GEST and LORD GUEST.

Estoppel - Per rem judicatam - Judgment by default - How far effective to estop - Only for what must “necessarily and with complete precision” have been determined - No estoppel in face of statute - Not confined to transactions made the subject of legislation. - Estoppel - Per rem judicatam - Statute, in face of - Which statutes preclude estoppels - Moneylending - Social policy - Application of principle to common law. - Malaya - Estoppel - Per rem judicatam - Default judgment - How far effective to estop.

In 1954 the appellant, alleging that under an agreement made in June, 1952, he had let certain machinery on hire to the respondent company for 12 months at an agreed monthly rent, and that, on the expiry of the 12 months, the respondent had continued the hiring on the same terms, brought an action against the respondent claiming arrears of rent from September 20, 1953, and for subsequent months. He obtained judgment by default in November, 1954. Thereafter, in June, 1957, in an action between the same parties, the appellant, after pleading, inter alia, the agreement of June, 1952, and that by arrangement with the respondent company he had retaken possession of two items of the machinery in 1955, and that the hiring of the remainder was to continue on the terms and conditions of the agreement of June, 1952, subject to the variation that the hiring was to commence from April 20, 1955, claimed, inter alia, arrears of rent from April 20, 1955, and for subsequent months.

The respondents pleaded, inter alia, that the appellant was a moneylender within the meaning of section 3 of the Moneylenders Ordinance, 1951; that the transaction was a moneylending transaction and that, the appellant not having complied with the provisions of the Ordinance, the loans were not recoverable. They further pleaded that the agreement of hire was complementary to a written agreement of even date under which they purported to sell the machinery to the appellant; that the two agreements were to be read together and that the agreement of hire was, on its true construction and having regard to all the surrounding circumstances (including the agreement of sale), a bill of sale which, not being in the form required by, nor registered under, the Bills of Sale Ordinance, 1950, was void and unenforceable. They alleged that the ownership of the machinery had always remained in them, and that the hire charges were really charges by way of interest

By way of reply the appellant alleged, inter alia, that the respondents were estopped by the judgment by default of November, 1954, from contending either that the appellant was a moneylender or that the transaction was a moneylending transaction or that the documents were other than what they purported to be or that he was not entitled to the relief claimed. On the question of the validity of the plea of estoppel:—

Held (1), that, while there was no doubt that by the law of England, which was the law applicable for this purpose, a default judgment was capable of giving rise to an estoppel per rem judicatam, the question was what the judgment prayed in aid should be treated as concluding and for what conclusion it was to stand. Default judgments, though capable of giving rise to estoppels, must always be scrutinised with extreme particularity for the purpose of ascertaining the bare essence of what they must necessarily have decided and they could estop only for what must “necessarily and with complete precision” have been thereby determined (post, p. 158).

Reinterpretation of the principle of Howlett v. Tarte (1861) 10 C.B.(N.S.) 813 in New Brunswick Railway Co. v. British and french Trust Corpn. [1939] A.C. 1; 55 T.L.R. 260; [1938] 4 All E.R. 747, H.L.(E.) applied.

Hoystead v. Commissioner of Taxation [1926] A.C. 155; 42 T.L.R. 207, P.C. considered.

The respondents' defence maintaining that the obligation to pay the moneys claimed was part of a transaction, the real nature of which was the borrowing of money on the security of goods was not an issue which was raised at all by the plaint in the first action, and it was impossible to say that there was anything in the first judgment which “necessarily and with complete precision” decided that issue against the respondents, and consequently the estoppel claimed could not be maintained against it.

(2) The principle that a party cannot set up an estoppel in the face of a statute was not confined to transactions that had been made the subject of legislation (post, pp. 160, 161), and statutes do not necessarily preclude estoppels. A test to apply, where the laws of moneylending or monetary security are involved, is to ask whether the law that confronts the estoppel can be seen to represent a social policy to which the court must give effect in the interests of the public generally or some section of it (post, p. 161). While the judgment by default in the first action was not incapable of giving rise to an estoppel, there was nothing in the attendant circumstances which would permit an estoppel based on it, whatever its range, to exclude a plea based on the invocation of statutes of such a nature as the Moneylenders Ordinance and the Bills of Sale Ordinance (post, pp. 163, 164).

Roe v. Mutual Loan Association Fund Ltd. (1887) 19 Q.B.D. 347; 3 T.L.R. 755, C.A., could not now be relied on for any general principle governing estoppel in the face of a statute.

In re a Bankruptcy Notice [1924] 2 Ch. 76, C.A. considered.

Order of the Court of Appeal of the Federation of Malaya affirmed.

APPEAL (No. 36 of 1962) from an order of the Supreme Court of the Federation of Malaya in the Court of Appeal at Kuala Lumpur (March 6, 1962) reversing an order of the High Court at Kuala Lumpur (September 6, 1961).

The following introductory statement is taken from the judgment of the Judicial Committee. The issue raised by this appeal involves a preliminary point of law taken by the appellant in an action pending between him and the respondent company in the High Court of the Federation of Malaya. In that action the appellant is suing the respondent for moneys alleged to be due to him and certain other relief, and he has objected to a defence, or set of defences, put in by the respondent, on the ground that the latter is estopped from raising them by virtue of a previous judgment given in an earlier action between the same parties. It is the validity of this objection that was argued and decided as a preliminary point. In the High Court Ong J. upheld it: his judgment was reversed in the Court of Appeal (Thomson C.J., Hill and Good JJ.A.), who decided that there was no estoppel.

The issue is one of law. The relevant facts embrace nothing more than the circumstances of the earlier action, in which was given the judgment that is said to have created the estoppel, and the pleadings in the present action which is now pending.

The former action was instituted as a civil suit in the High Court of the Federation on June 30, 1954. The appellant filed a plaint by way of summary procedure, alleging that under an agreement in writing dated June 20, 1952, he had let certain machinery and equipment on hire to the respondent for 12 months from the date of the agreement at an agreed monthly rent, and that on the expiry of the 12 months' period the respondent had continued the hiring on the same terms. The respondent was, he claimed, in arrears with the rental payments for the month commencing from September 20, 1953, and subsequent months, and he asked for judgment accordingly for a stated sum of dollars in respect of rent and a further sum in respect of interest on areas of rent, as provided in the agreement. Particulars showing the manner in which these sums were computed were annexed to the plaint.

On November 3, 1954, the appellant obtained a decree in his suit giving him judgment against the respondent for the sums of money claimed. This judgment was obtained on the respondent's default, the decree reciting that the respondent had not obtained leave to appear and defend.

The present action was begun on June 14, 1957. It also is a civil suit in the High Court and it is between the same parties as before. The appellant has filed a plaint in the suit, and in its amended form, paragraphs 2 to 10 inclusive of the plaint run as follows:

“2. That under an agreement in writing dated the 20th day of June, 1952 the plaintiff let certain machinery and equipment on hire to the defendant for the term of 12 months from the 20th day of June, 1952 at $2,500/-(dollars two thousand five hundred only) per month, the first of such payments to be made on the 19th July, 1952 and each subsequent payment on the 19th day of each succeeding month. A copy of the said agreement is attached hereto and marked ‘A.’ 3. That on the expiry of the term of 12 months aforesaid the defendant continued hiring the said machinery and equipment on the terms and conditions contained in the said agreement.

4. By arrangement with the defendant the plaintiff re-took possession of two items of the said machinery and equipment in May, 1955 and it was agreed between the plaintiff and the defendant that the defendant was to continue hiring the remainder of the said machinery and equipment, which are in the defendant's possession, on the terms and conditions contained in the said agreement subject to the following variations thereof, namely:-(a) The hiring to commence from the 20th day of April, 1955. (b) The rent for the hire to be $2,000/-(dollars two thousand only) with first payment on the 19th day of May and subsequent payments on the 19th day of each succeeding month. (c) That insurance to be in the sum of $80,000/-(dollars eighty thousand only). 5. The particulars of the two items hereinbefore...

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221 cases
2 firm's commentaries
2 books & journal articles
  • On Constitutive Formalities, Estoppel and Breaking the Rules
    • South Africa
    • Juta Stellenbosch Law Review No. , May 2019
    • 27 May 2019
    ...411H. See also H N R Pro perties CC v Stand ard Bank of SA Ltd 200 4 4 SA 471 (SCA) para 21.46 Kok Hoong v Leong Chon g Kweng Mines Ltd [1964] AC 993 1015 per Viscou nt Radcliffe; E Cooke (ed) “Estoppel” in H Halvey (ed) Hal sbury’s Laws of England X LVII 5 ed (2014) 241 249. In fact, the p......
  • ORAL GUARANTEES — ARE THEY WITHOUT EFFECT?
    • Singapore
    • Singapore Academy of Law Journal No. 2003, December 2003
    • 1 December 2003
    ...QB 133. 10 [1982] QB 84. 11 [1991] BCLC 244. 12 After referring to Viscount Radcliffe in Kok Hoong v Leong Cheong Kweng Mines Ltd[1964] AC 993 at 1015—8 and to Humphries v Humphries[1910] 2 KB 531. 13 Supra note 10 at 266. 14 Supra note 1 at para 50. 15 Supra note 1 at para 34. 16 Supra not......