Labour Input Logic of Street-Level Bureaucrats: Evidence from Chinese Market Supervision Commission
| Author | Chunna Li,Jun Yang |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/14789299211021511 |
| Published date | 01 August 2022 |
| Date | 01 August 2022 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/14789299211021511
Political Studies Review
2022, Vol. 20(3) 475 –492
© The Author(s) 2021
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DOI: 10.1177/14789299211021511
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Labour Input Logic of
Street-Level Bureaucrats:
Evidence from Chinese
Market Supervision
Commission
Chunna Li and Jun Yang
Abstract
The theory of street-level bureaucracy and its relevant data have proven the expected duties of
the frontline staff of local government may be excessive but their time spent working remains
quite low. Using data from participatory observations of street-level officials in a Chinese city,
this study reveals the logic of this labour input paradox. Organizational climate incentive and
promotional incentive jointly influence the time allocation of street-level bureaucrats. The
organizational climate incentive reflects the weak incentive characteristic of the maintenance
function of labour; promotional incentives have a strong impact on motivation, which is
characteristic of the promotional function of labour. These findings reveal the costs of the New
Public Management movement in an organization lacking an effective promotion mechanism and a
positive organizational climate incentive. This is a snapshot of the dilemma faced by China’s public
organization reforms, but it is also a problem other country must solve.
Keywords
street-level bureaucrats, labour input, organizational climate incentive, promotional incentive
Accepted: 9 May 2021
Introduction
According to traditional bureaucratic system theory, the pre-set and default work scene is
the ‘office’, whereas the theory of street-level bureaucracy transforms the traditional
work scene to a more complicated and non-standardized scene (Lipsky, 1969). The trans-
formation of the work scene demands greater discretionary rights be bestowed upon
street-level bureaucrats to help them successfully finish various kinds of complicated and
non-standardized on-site tasks. These issues may involve public safety, protection of
School of Public Administration and Emergency Management, Jinan University, Guangzhou, China
Corresponding author:
Jun Yang, Jinan University, Room 827, Second Building of liberal arts. No. 601, Huangpu Avenue (West),
Tianhe District, Guangzhou 510632, China.
Email: junyang1992@163.com
1021511PSW0010.1177/14789299211021511Political Studies ReviewLi and Yang
research-article2021
Article
476 Political Studies Review 20(3)
property, food safety, or environmental pollution, but each solution requires street-level
bureaucrats to fulfil their responsibilities. However, street-level bureaucrats must perform
their tasks despite their limited resources (Lipsky, 1969; Nielsen, 2006) and high uncer-
tainty, such as the urgency of decision-making (Murphy and Skillen, 2015), asymmetric
information (Østergaard Møller and Sommer Harrits, 2013), insufficient human resources
(Ding and Bu, 2018) and a lack of funds (Peeters et al., 2018). However, the New Public
Management (NPM) movement has broken through traditional bureaucracy with strict
hierarchy and clear responsibilities (Weber, 1995), and granted more discretion to offi-
cials (Dunleavy and Hood, 1994). This is particularly true for street-level bureaucrats1
who were no longer responsible for merely executing their superiors’ orders and instruc-
tions but had greater discretionary power under their given performance goals. Lipsky’s
(1980) theory of street bureaucrats holds, because they are at the end of the bureaucracy
and deal with the people directly, they are forced to develop a series of coping models.
For example, they usually reserve some loose time and other organizational resources to
meet any sudden demands for services. David H. Rosenbloom (2002: 386) argues that
grassroots administrative staff might serve the public interest from a more egoistic per-
spective rather than an activist one; they may be occupied with ‘superficial affairs’ and
strive to complete easy assignments that make their performance look better. In a similar
vein, Christopher Hood (2004: 33) suggested the term ‘front-line abandonment’ for when
street-level bureaucrats ‘choose tasks that can bring benefits to individuals or institutions,
avoid and resist to implementing policies that are not profitable or dangerous, even within
the scope of responsibility’. In China, the long, top-down management chain reaching
from the central government to the local street level further complicates the situation (Mei
and Pearson, 2017). Due to the information asymmetry and the inconsistency between the
individual interests of the street bureaucrats as agents and the objectives of their superi-
ors, there may be evasion of responsibility and other situations (Lin, 2016). Furthermore,
vertical collusion among subordinate levels can be used to hide information or even fab-
ricate performance data (Li, 2015; Zhou, 2014). Han (2017) found frontline abandonment
allowed street-level bureaucrats to use their right to improve their own working situations
and employ strategies such as formalism, uninterest, and avoidance of duty to make their
difficult work comfortable and safe. This reveals a paradox. Although street-level bureau-
crats undertake many grass-root tasks, they seldom work excessively. Instead, by making
full use of their discretion and the bureaucracy’s information asymmetries, street-level
bureaucrats maintain relatively loose and favourable working conditions.
Why do grassroots bureaucrats keep a low work engagement with a heavy workload
rather than fully devote themselves to work? The discussion of this labour input paradox
will help us to further understand the theory of street-level bureaucracy. There are two
competing hypotheses that may help to explain this paradox. One hypothesis emphasizes
the influence of promotion incentive on members’ behaviours and the other hypothesis
emphasizes the influence of organizational climate incentive on members’ behaviours.
Rational bureaucratic hypothesis analyses officials’ behaviours from the perspective of
the rational economic man. In NPM, Management for Result (MFR)2 promotes the com-
pletion of tasks by setting clear goals for bureaucrats and providing rewards for complet-
ing them (Mei and Pearson, 2017). Downs and Rand Corporation (1967: 264) believes
that power, money and reputation attract bureaucrats. Bureaucracy provides these rewards
for officials through promotion channels; however, the distribution of these rewards in a
vertical, hierarchical organization is relatively imbalanced, as they tend to concentrate in
those in superior positions. These rewards only encourage officials close to those in
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