Ladislav Bartos v District Court of Levice (Slovakia)
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Mr Justice Fordham |
| Judgment Date | 08 October 2020 |
| Neutral Citation | [2020] EWHC 2692 (Admin) |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court) |
| Date | 08 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No: CO/472/2020 |
[2020] EWHC 2692 (Admin)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
Mr Justice Fordham
Case No: CO/472/2020
Graeme Hall (instructed by McMillan Williams Solicitors Ltd) for the Appellant
The Respondent did not appear and was not represented
Hearing date: 8 th October 2020
Judgment as delivered in open court at the hearing
Approved Judgment
I direct that no official shorthand note shall be taken of this Judgment and that copies of this version as handed down may be treated as authentic.
THE HON. Mr Justice Fordham
Note: This judgment was produced for the parties, approved by the Judge, after using voice-recognition software during an ex tempore judgment in a Coronavirus remote hearing.
Introduction
The appellant is aged 55 and is wanted for extradition to Slovakia in conjunction with a conviction EAW relating to child neglect between 2002 and 2007. A custodial sentence of 2 years and 2 months stands unserved. At the heart of this renewed application for permission to appeal is the relevant trial at which the appellant was convicted on 17 May 2012, and the question of ‘deliberate absence’ from that trial. I have seen from the respondent's submissions that it is common ground that that is the correct focus. Mr Hall for the appellant relies on Stryjecki [2016] EWHC 3309 (Admin) at paragraph 50(ii) in relation to the importance of focusing on ‘the specific trial event with its scheduled time and venue specific trial event with its scheduled time and venue’. District Judge Goldspring ordered extradition on 3 February 2020. He rejected a section 20 Extradition Act 2003 ground of resistance and found as a fact that the appellant had been ‘deliberately absent’ from his trial. Mr Hall says that conclusion was wrong in law being treated as flowing automatically from a finding of fugitivity. He says on the correct legal analysis the appellant could not be found to have been ‘deliberately absent’. If, but only if, Mr Hall is right about that a question arises as to ‘re-trial rights’. He reminds me that for the purposes of today all he needs is a reasonably arguable ground of appeal. Saini J thought there was none and refused permission on the papers.
Mode of hearing
The mode of this hearing was a BT conference call. The appellant's representatives were satisfied, as am I, that this mode did not prejudice the appellant's interests. So far as open justice is concerned I am satisfied that it has been secured. This is a public hearing. The case and its start time were published in the cause list where an email address was given for any member of the press or public to seek to observe this hearing. All they needed was to send an email and subsequently make a telephone call. By having a remote hearing we eliminated any risk to any person of having to travel to a court room or be present in a court room. I am satisfied that the mode of hearing was appropriate and proportionate.
Analysis
I turn to the central issue which is said to constitute a reasonably arguable ground of appeal. In doing so it is worth setting out central facts of this case which are not now in dispute. The appellant had appeared at a preliminary hearing on 13 December 2007 in Slovakia having been summonsed directly. He then appeared at a main hearing on 24 January 2008 having again been summonsed, this time orally. He was told at that hearing about the next hearing on 4 March 2008. He was absent from the hearing on 4 March 2008. Mr Hall concedes that that constituted ‘deliberate absence’. He was absent again at the next hearing on 10 April 2008. He came to the United Kingdom. The Slovakian authorities reported that, following investigations, it had been confirmed that the appellant was no longer at the address that he had previously given. Everybody agrees that that is correct. He had left the country. Those investigation reports were dated: 14 January 2009; 19 January 2009; 14 August 2009; 22 December 2009 and 7 May 2010.
The further information before the District Judge and before me confirms that, in those circumstances, no summons in relation to the trial on 17 May 2012 was sent to the appellant's previously given address. Mr Hall accepts that, had it been sent, then it would follow in law that the appellant was ‘deliberately absent’ from his trial. He accepts that because he accepts the proposition articulated by Kerr J in Bialkowski [2019] EWHC 1253 (Admin) at paragraph 27 where he said this:
“However evasive the accused's conduct, the requesting state must still prove that it took the steps that would acquaint a non-evasive accused with the time and place of trial”.
Mr Hall submits that sending the summons to the previous address would constitute such a step.
Continuing with the factual narrative, what happened was that the information was instead ‘posted on the board’. I had the opportunity of eliciting Mr Hall's assistance in relation to that. He accepts, but in any event I find that clear beyond any doubt, that the description (in the Respondent's ‘further information’) in this case of ‘posting the measure on the official board of the local court’ is directly linked to a relevant provision set out on the very next page which makes clear that what happens under domestic law in Slovakia, as an alternative to serving a summons, is: “the summons to the main trial and the public hearing is published in...
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