Lambert against Taylor and Another, Executors of George Renton, Deceased
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judgment Date | 01 January 1825 |
| Date | 01 January 1825 |
| Court | Court of the King's Bench |
English Reports Citation: 107 E.R. 1010
IN THE COURT OF KING'S BENCH.
[138] lambert against taylor and another, Executors of George Renton, Deceased. 1825. In assumpsit against executors, declaration stated that testator made his promissory note, and thereby promised to pay J. Y. on demand 2001., and delivered the note to him, whereby testator became liable to pay, but did not pay, and at the time of his death was indebted to J. Y. for the amount of the sum secured by the note, and interest. It then averred, that afterwards, and after the death of J. Y., the money specified in the note being and remaining wholly due and unsatisfied, to wit, on, &c., at, &c., before A. B., one of the coroners for the county of N., it was found, upon view of the body of J. Y., then and there lying dead, by the oaths of honest and lawful men, of, &c., that the said J. Y. feloniously did kill and murder himself, as by the inquisition before the coroner remaining of record more fully appeared, by reason of which said inquisition, and by force of the felony, the said J. Y. forfeited to the King the promissory note and the money due thereon. The declaration then set forth a grant under the King's sign manual to the plaintiff of the note and money due thereon, as mentioned in a certain other inquisition, and that His Majesty delivered the note to the plaintiff, of which the defendants, after the death of the (a) The first and second sections of this Act provide for the issuing and returning of writs of habeas corpus by and before any one of the Judges in vacation, in cases other than for criminal matter or for debt. The third section enacts, " That in all cases provided for by this Act, although the return to any writ of habeas corpus shall be good and sufficient in law, it shall be lawful for the justice or baron before whom such writ may be returnable, to proceed to examine into the truth of the facts set forth in such return by affidavit or affirmation, and to do therein as to justice shall appertain." The fourth section enacts, " That the like proceeding may be had in the Court for controverting the truth of the return to any such writ of habeas corpus awarded as aforesaid, although such writ shall be awarded by the Court itself, or be returnable therein." 4B.&C.139. LAMBERT. V. TAYLOR 1011 testator, had notice. Breach, non-payment by testator or the defendants since his death. Plea, first, non-assutnpsit testator. Secondly, that the note became due and payable to J. Y. in his lifetime, and that the causes of action did not accrue to him within six years before the exhibiting of the bill; upon which plea issue was taken and joined. Thirdly, nul tiel record of the inquisition taken before the coroner; upon which issue was taken. Fourthly, that there was no such grant as alleged in the declaration. The issue on the plea of the Statute of Limitations having been found for the defendants, and all the other issues for the plaintiff, it was held, on motion, to enter a nonsuit: First, that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to produce at the trial the inquisition mentioned in the King's grant, inasmuch as that was an office of instruction only, and not of entitling; the title of the Crown having accrued by the felony under the coroner's inquisition. Secondly, that the grant under the sign manual was sufficient to pass the property in the note. Held, thirdly, on motion in arrest of judgment, that inasmuch as the declaration alleged that the testator was, at the time of bis death, indebted to J. Y., the payee of the note, in the principal and interest due thereon, it sufficiently appeared that the note was a security for a debt, and that the debt and security having passed to the Crown by operation of law, were assignable by the Crown without indorsement. Held, fourthly, assuming it to be necessary, in order to vest the chattels of a felo de se in the Crown, that the coroner's inquest should be found by twelve men, that it must be taken after verdict that the inquest was so found. Held, sixthly, on motion by the plaintiff for judgment non obstante veredicto, that the plea of the Statute of Limitations, that the causes of action did not accrue to J. Y. within six years, was bad, inasmuch as it did not shew that J. Y. was barred by the statute at the time of his death; and if he was not, then the King, not being expressly mentioned in the statute, was not within the statute, and his rights were not barred. Held, seventhly, that the averment, that the note became due to J. Y. in his lifetime being an acknowledgment that he, at one time, had a good cause of action (which had passed to the Crown by forfeiture, and from the Crown to the plaintiff); a cause of action was thereby confessed by the plea, and the matter pleaded in avoidance being insufficient, the plaintiff was entitled to judgment non obstante veredicto. [S. C. 6 D. & E. 188; 3 L. J. K. B. 0. S. 160]. Declaration stated, that George Eenton, in his lifetime, theretofore and in the lifetime of John Younghusband, to wit, on the 12th day of May 1813, at, &c., [139] made his promissory note in writing, and delivered the same to J. Y., and thereby promised to pay on demand to J. Y., or his order, 2001., with legal interest, whereby Eenton became liable to pay to J. Y., in his lifetime, the sum of money in the note specified, according to the tenor and effect of the note ; and being so liable, promised the said J. Y., in his lifetime, to pay him the money in the note specified, according to the tenor and effect of the note. It then averred, that G. Eenton did not pay the sum of money in the note mentioned, or any part thereof, but that he, at the time of his death, was indebted to Younghusband in the sum of money secured by the promissory note, and all the interest due thereon, to wit, at, &c. The declaration then stated, that afterwards, and after the death of J. Younghusband, the sum of money in the note specified, being and remaining wholly due and unsatisfied, to wit, on the llth day of November 1818, at Alnwick, in the said county of Northumberland, before T. A. Eussell, then one of the coroners of our lord the King for the county of Northumberland, it was...
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