Lampitt v Poole Borough Council (Taylor, Third Party)

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
Judgment Date14 May 1990
Date14 May 1990
CourtCourt of Appeal (Civil Division)
[COURT OF APPEAL] LAMPITT and Another v. POOLE BOROUGH COUNCIL TAYLOR and Another (THIRD PARTIES) 1990 May 3; 14 Lord Donaldson of Lymington M.R., Russell and Farquharson L.JJ.

Joint Tortfeasors - Contribution - New rights - Breach of duty of care arising prior to new provision - Damage occurring after repeal of previous provision - Whether “any obligation assumed” referring to negligence claim - Whether excluding right to claim contribution - Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 (c. 47), s. 7(2)

The plaintiffs were the owners of a house and extension constructed in 1968 and 1969 under the supervision and inspection of the defendants and to the design of the first third party, an architect. In 1981 cracking due to subsidence first appeared rendering the premises dangerous to the health and safety of the plaintiffs. In proceedings for negligence brought by the plaintiffs, the defendants claimed contribution from the first third party, who resisted the claim on the ground that the defendants' liability rested on breaches of “an obligation assumed by them” before the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 came into force on 1 January 1979, so that the claim against him was excluded by section 7(2)F1 of the Act, and since the resulting damage occurred only after that date, any claim under section 6 of the Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act 1935 which had by then been repealed, was precluded. On a preliminary issue, on facts agreed for the purpose, the judge held that, notwithstanding the repeal of section 6 of the Act of 1935, a right to contribution had been preserved by section 16 of the Interpretation Act 1978.

On appeal by the third party:—

Held, dismissing the appeal, that since the defendants had no acquired or accrued right under the Act of 1935 when it was repealed, section 16 of the Interpretation Act 1978 was inapplicable; that since the purpose of the Act of 1978 was to make new provision for contribution rather than to extinguish existing rights and while section 7(2) was designed to prevent retrospectivity in respect of such new rights, the words “any obligation assumed” were not apt to apply to a duty of care arising out of a particular relationship and imposed by law; and that, accordingly, the defendants were not thereby excluded from claiming contribution under the Act of 1978 (post, pp. 553F–G, 554C, E–555A, D–E).

The following cases are referred to in the judgment of Lord Donaldson of Lymington M.R.:

George Wimpey & Co. Ltd. v. British Overseas Airways Corporation [1955] A.C. 169; [1954] 3 W.L.R. 932; [1954] 3 All E.R. 661, H.L.(E.)

Stott v. West Yorkshire Road Car Co. Ltd. [1971] 2 Q.B. 651; [1971] 3 W.L.R. 282; [1971] 3 All E.R. 534, C.A.

The following additional cases were cited in argument:

Abbott v. Minister for Lands [1895] A.C. 425, P.C.

Falcon v. Famous Players Film Co. Ltd. [1926] 1 K.B. 393

Hamilton Gell v. White [1922] 2 K.B. 422, C.A.

Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock and Engineering Co. Ltd. (The Wagon Mound) [1961] A.C. 388; [1961] 2 W.L.R. 126; [1961] 1 All E.R. 404, P.C.

Reg. v. West London Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex parte Simeon [1983] 1 A.C. 234; [1982] 3 W.L.R. 289; [1982] 2 All E.R. 813, H.L.(E.)

Watkinson v. Hollington [1944] K.B. 16; [1943] 2 All E.R. 573, C.A.

APPEAL from Judge Young Q.C. sitting on official referee's business.

By a third party notice dated 16 December 1988 the defendants, Poole Borough Council, claimed under the Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act 1935 indemnity or contribution against the first third party, Eric Taylor, to the extent of the claim against them by the plaintiffs, Colin Lampitt and Angela Lampitt, and damages for negligence in respect of the first third party's design and supervision of the construction in 1968 and 1969 of the plaintiffs' house and extension.

On 18 May 1989 Judge John Davies Q.C., sitting on official referee's business, ordered a trial of a preliminary issue as between, inter alios, the defendants and the first third party whether the defendants were entitled to claim contribution from the first third party under the Act of 1935. On 14 December 1989 Judge Young Q.C., sitting on official referee's business, held that the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 did not deprive the defendants of the right to contribution under the Act of 1935, and that such rights were preserved by section 16 of the Interpretation Act 1978.

By a notice of appeal dated 3 January 1990 the third party appealed with leave of the judge on the grounds that (1) the judge was wrong in law in holding that the defendants were entitled to claim contribution under the Act of 1935; (2) the judge was wrong in law in holding that the provisions of section 7 of the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 did not restrict the right of the defendants to claim contribution under the Act of 1935 and (3) that the judge was wrong in law in holding that the defendants had an accrued right to contribution against the third party prior to 1 January 1979.

By a respondent's notice dated 19 January 1990 the defendants contended that the judge's decision be affirmed on the additional grounds that the judge ought to have directed himself that the defendants were entitled to claim contribution from the third party under the Act of 1935 because (1) the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 simply substituted provision for the Act of 1935 in a modified form and (2) by reason of section 17 of the Interpretation Act 1978 or otherwise the Act of 1935 remained in force in respect of the defendants' claim.

On the hearing of the appeal the Court of Appeal granted the defendants leave to withdraw their concession made to the judge that they could not claim contribution under the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 and to amend their third party notice and respondent's notice accordingly.

The facts are stated in the judgment of Lord Donaldson of Lymington M.R.

Augustus Ullstein for the first third party. There was no right of contribution between joint tortfeasors prior to the Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act 1935. Section 6(1)(c) of the Act conferred that right until its repeal by section 9 of, and Schedule 2 to, the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978, which came into effect on 1 January 1979. Unless saved by section 16 of the Interpretation Act 1978, no right under the Act of 1935 survives after that date.

The defendants did not have an accrued right to contribution prior to 1 January 1979. The claim in the plaintiffs' action is in negligence and the plaintiffs had no cause of action against either the defendants or the third party until 1981, when the damage to the property occurred: see Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock and Engineering Co. Ltd. (The Wagon Mound) [1961] A.C. 388. Since the third party was not under any duty to make contribution to the defendants prior to 1981, he was not until then a “tortfeasor liable in respect of that damage” within the meaning of section 6(1)(c) of the Act of 1935. Further, the right to take advantage of a statutory provision is not a “right accrued” within the meaning of the Interpretation Act 1978: see Abbott v. Minister for Lands [1895] A.C. 425 and Hamilton Gell v. White [1922] 2 K.B. 422. On 1 January 1979 the defendants had therefore no more than an expectation that if damage occurred to the property they might be sued by the plaintiffs, and if damage occurred and the plaintiffs sued them and not the third party they would have a right to recover contribution from, inter alios, the third party. There is no contingent right to recover contribution under the Act of 1935 and, in the circumstances, there can be no accrued right either.

The defendants' right to contribution under the Act of 1935 is not therefore saved by section 16 of the Interpretation Act 1978. In any event, the judge was wrong to find that section 16 was capable of covering contingent rights. Further, the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 expresses a contrary intention ousting the provisions of section 16 of the Interpretation Act 1978. The words of section 7 of the former Act are clear and unambiguous. If they cause injustice it is for Parliament, not the courts, to remedy it. In the absence of ambiguity there can be no application of the “mischief rule.” The provisions of section 7(2) and (3) are back-to-back provisions, so that if a defendant can recover contribution under section 1 of the Act of 1978, that is his only right to...

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