Last Word: Why Towns are at the Heart of Britain’s Political Future
| Author | Will Jennings |
| DOI | 10.1177/2041905818815198 |
| Published date | 01 December 2018 |
| Date | 01 December 2018 |
40 POLITICAL INSIGHT • DECEMBER 2018
Last Word
Why Towns are at the Heart
of Britain’s Political Future
The next election will be won or
lost in Britain’s towns. Some 36 out
of the closest 50 Conservative-
Labour marginals are in town
constituencies, whereas just ve are
in constituencies in ‘core cities’ such as
London, Manchester or Cardi. While Labour
continues to pile up votes in cities, the
Conservatives do the same in rural areas.
The Conservatives are so far behind in many
of these seats that targeting cities does not
appear to oer them a viable route to a
parliamentary majority. What remains is for
each party to slug it out for the support of
voters in towns.
Labour’s recent party broadcast, ‘Our Town’,
signalled that the party has recognised the
importance of reconnecting with its former
industrial heartlands. For the Conservatives
too, there are potential advances to be made
in those towns that backed Brexit.
This is because the Brexit vote and 2017
general election revealed a politics that is
geographically polarised. In the European
Union referendum, cities tended to vote to
Remain, while towns (with the exception
of university towns) tended to vote to
Leave. In 2017, Labour made large gains
in cities, picking up surprise wins in cities,
such as Kensington in London, while the
Conservatives experienced substantial swings
in towns, taking seats like Manseld and
Walsall North.
These divisions reect a fundamental
fracturing in the demography of towns and
cities – as cities become younger and more
diverse, and towns get older. On average, the
sorts of people who live in towns tend to be
more socially conservative, while city-dwellers
tend to be more socially liberal. A recent
report by Hope Not Hate with the Centre
for Towns (Fear Hope and Loss, Carter 2018)
mapped out some of these deep divides.
Concern or hostility towards immigration
was highest in the former industrial towns
and isolated coastal communities that have
experienced sustained economic decline.
Major cities and university towns were much
more welcoming and embracing of diversity.
These trends are inextricably connected to
the agglomeration-based model of economic
growth that has been pursued by successive
governments. London and city regions
have been prioritised as the engines of the
national economy. Higher education has
played a signicant role too, as large numbers
of young people have left their home town
rst to study at university and then to live
and work in cities, drawn in by cultural capital
and economic opportunities – leaving many
towns to lag behind in terms of skills and
qualications available to their local labour
market.
While agglomeration may be seen as
an inevitable fact of economic life, it is
undeniable that it is having profound
consequences in increasing geographical
inequality, with many ‘cold spots’ of social
mobility found in post-industrial and
coastal towns, high street closures often
concentrated in towns, and foreign direct
investment increasingly going to core
cities. These interrelated economic and
demographic processes are feeding the
divided politics we now face.
Should we care about this deepening
divide between towns and cities? Some
have framed this simply as a battle between
city and town – each locale lobbying for the
attention and resources of government. The
solutions surely require greater sensitivity to
the specic challenges and problems faced
by both cities and towns.
However, the gap between towns and
cities presents real challenges in terms of
politics and governing. This growing divide
between towns and cities has created space
for attacks on the ‘political establishment’ in
Westminster. A recent survey by the BBC and
YouGov developed with the Centre for Towns
found that disaection with Westminster
increased the further one gets from London.
This same pattern is evident in France with
the ‘halo eect’ emanating out from Paris.
While geographical polarisation makes it
increasingly dicult for any party to build
broad electoral appeals, the underlying
demographic fractures are also creating
divergent sets of policy problems. With
ageing populations, shortages in skills
and qualications, and poor transport
connections (especially in terms of train
services and cuts to local bus services),
towns face acute problems in terms of public
services, pressure on social and health care
and structural obstacles to economic growth.
Cities also face a distinct set of challenges
in terms of the cost of housing, congestion,
and sizeable localised inequalities. A more
balanced approach to economic growth
would lift some of the burden from cities and
re-invigorate the productivity of our towns.
Otherwise, we risk widening the political
divides; towns voting and behaving one way
whilst cities go another. The rise of towns on
the political agenda reects the increasing
importance of place to both electoral politics
and public policy. Both parties have an
electoral incentive to focus on the future of
our towns. More importantly, the future of
our towns may depend on the choices the
two main parties make.
Further reading:
Rosie Carter. (2018). Fear, Hope and Loss. London: Hope Note
Hate.
Centre for Towns. (2017). The Ageing of Our Towns. Bolton:
Centre for Towns.
Social Mobility Commission. (2017). State of the Nation
2017: Social Mobility in Great Britain. London: Social Mobility
Commission.
Will Jennings is Professor of Political
Science and Public Policy at the University
of Southampton, a Fellow of the Academy
of Social Sciences and Co-Founder of the
Centre for Towns.
Will Jennings reports on recent research into the UK’s geographically divided p olitics.
Political Insight December 2018.indd 40 01/11/2018 09:02
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