Law and Knowledge/Law as Knowledge
| DOI | 10.1177/0964663906069549 |
| Published date | 01 December 2006 |
| Author | David Nelken |
| Date | 01 December 2006 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
DIALOGUE AND DEBATE
LAW AND KNOWLEDGE/LAW
AS KNOWLEDGE
DAVID NELKEN
University of Macerata, Italy and Cardiff University, UK
KEY WORDS
common sense; expertise; law; science
THEARTICLESin this ‘Dialogue and Debate’ section of Social & Legal
Studies take a broad view of the topic of expertise and the law. They
were first presented by the authors at a panel session entitled ‘Law’s
Knowledge’ at the Law and Society Conference held in Chicago in June 2004,
and are published here in the hope that they may provide a stimulus to others
to contribute to the discussion.
A number of disparate areas of enquiry are potentially relevant to this topic,
including legal philosophy, legal scholarship on evidence and procedure, social
theory, and sociology of science, among others. The articles included here set
out to draw on writing in all of these branches of study so as to focus on the
question of what this relationship can tell us about law’s social role and
meaning. As will be seen, as compared to more practical forms of expertise,
for the sociology of law, the task of understanding law as a form of know-
ledge also involves understanding the limits faced by any ‘external’ form or
site of knowledge (including its own) in grasping law’s internal operations
(Nelken, 1998). Discussion of law as a form of knowledge also raises norma-
tive and policy questions (even if the articles presented here claim only to be
concerned with description and explanation). When expertise is sought or
imposed, who is appropriating whom? Should we be more worried by law
colonizing other disciplines or vice versa? Is our problem how to stop law
producing ‘junk science’ or is it how to ensure that it successfully plays a role
as a bulwark against all encompassing technical rationality?
SOCIAL & LEGAL STUDIES Copyright © 2006 SAGE Publications
London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi, www.sagepublications.com
0964 6639, Vol. 15(4), 570–573
DOI: 10.1177/0964663906069549
NELKEN: LAW AND KNOWLEDGE
571
For many legal philosophers the...
LAW AND KNOWLEDGE/LAW
AS KNOWLEDGE
DAVID NELKEN
University of Macerata, Italy and Cardiff University, UK
KEY WORDS
common sense; expertise; law; science
THEARTICLESin this ‘Dialogue and Debate’ section of Social & Legal
Studies take a broad view of the topic of expertise and the law. They
were first presented by the authors at a panel session entitled ‘Law’s
Knowledge’ at the Law and Society Conference held in Chicago in June 2004,
and are published here in the hope that they may provide a stimulus to others
to contribute to the discussion.
A number of disparate areas of enquiry are potentially relevant to this topic,
including legal philosophy, legal scholarship on evidence and procedure, social
theory, and sociology of science, among others. The articles included here set
out to draw on writing in all of these branches of study so as to focus on the
question of what this relationship can tell us about law’s social role and
meaning. As will be seen, as compared to more practical forms of expertise,
for the sociology of law, the task of understanding law as a form of know-
ledge also involves understanding the limits faced by any ‘external’ form or
site of knowledge (including its own) in grasping law’s internal operations
(Nelken, 1998). Discussion of law as a form of knowledge also raises norma-
tive and policy questions (even if the articles presented here claim only to be
concerned with description and explanation). When expertise is sought or
imposed, who is appropriating whom? Should we be more worried by law
colonizing other disciplines or vice versa? Is our problem how to stop law
producing ‘junk science’ or is it how to ensure that it successfully plays a role
as a bulwark against all encompassing technical rationality?
SOCIAL & LEGAL STUDIES Copyright © 2006 SAGE Publications
London, Thousand Oaks, CA and New Delhi, www.sagepublications.com
0964 6639, Vol. 15(4), 570–573
DOI: 10.1177/0964663906069549
NELKEN: LAW AND KNOWLEDGE
571
For many legal philosophers the...
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