Legal Issues in the Falkland Islands Confrontation 1982
| Date | 01 October 1983 |
| Published date | 01 October 1983 |
| DOI | 10.1177/004711788300700605 |
| Author | Hazel Fox |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
2454
LEGAL
ISSUES
IN
THE
FALKLAND
ISLANDS
CONFRONTATION
1982:
with
particular
reference
to
the
right
of
self
determination
HAZEL
Fox
THE
conflict
between
Argentina
and
the
United
Kingdom
concerned
a
group
of
islands,
some
7000
miles
distant
from
the
United
Kingdom,
350
miles
from
Argentina,
of
a
land
area
a
little
larger
than
Cyprus.
The
immediate
economic
value
of
the
islands
was
small
with
an
annual
public
revenue
in
the
years
1979-1981
of £2
million,
well
below
that
of
many
medium
sized
enterprises
in
the
United
Kingdom,
and
their
economic
potential
in
view
of
climate,
distance,
and
difficulty
of
communication,
was
also
highly
uncertain.
But
the
events
of
1982
showed
that
the
size
and
economic
proportions
of
the
dispute
were
deceptive,
hiding
a
large
number
of
unresolved
international
issues.
Historically,
the
claims
to
sovereignty
over
the
islands
had
shown
themselves
intransigent
to
settlement
and
productive
of
repeated
misunderstanding
and
high
feeling.
In
Argentina,
the
recovery
of
the
Malvinas
had
become
a
national
cause
overriding
changes
of
government
and
in
Britain
the
predicament
of
the
settlers
of
English
stock
far
from
their
homeland
roused
strong
parliamentary
backbench
support
whenever
any
government
proposed
a
move
towards
settlement,
and
strong
indignation
at
the
time
of
the
Argentine
invasion
in
1982.
This
high
feeling
led
to
the
use
of
force
by
both
sides
to
&dquo;settle&dquo;
their
international
dispute.
The
remoteness
of
the
Falkland
Islands
has
encouraged
resort
to
military
methods
to
solve
political
problems:
Spain
used
force
in
1770;
the
U.S.A.
in
1830;
the
United
Kingdom
in
1833;
Argentina
in
1982.
In
the
early
months
of 1982
force
may
well
have
seemed,
to
both
Argentina
and
Britain,
to
involve
no
more
than
a
limited
military
engagement,
practicable
in
the
sense
that
there
was no
serious
risk
of
global
war,
deployment
of
nuclear
weapons
or
loss
of
national
integrity.
For
both
disputants,
the
results
were
more
far
reaching
than
anticipated.
When
the
display
of
military
strength
of
the
Task
Force
failed
to
persuade
Argentina
to
withdraw,
Britain
found
herself
engaged
in
a
sharp
nasty
war
and
the
full
horrors
with
the
aid
of
radio,
satellite
and
TV
were
revealed
to
the
British
public.
The
conflict
gave
rise
to
a
bill-
recently
estimated
as
at
least
£4
million
per
head
of
the
1800
British
population
of
the
Falkland
Islands
and
still
increasing-
2455
for
replacement
of
naval
vessels
and
arms
and
maintenance
of
an
island
garrison.’
For
Argentina,
the
&dquo;materialisation
of
the
Argentine
people’s
legitimate
right
patiently
and
prudently
postponed
for
nearly
150
years&dquo;’
brought
military
defeat,
humiliation,
economic
crisis
and
political
shifts
in
power
which
have
not
yet
been
exhausted.
The
conflict
extended
more
widely
than
the
islands
and
the
immediate
disputants.
The
Falkland
Islands
are
located
in
the
American,
South
Atlantic
and
Antarctic
spheres
of
interest;
the
United
States,
along
with
other
Member
States
of the
Organisation
of
American
States,
is
concerned
with
the
American
sphere,
USSR,
NATO
Powers
and
South
Africa,
with
the
South
Atlantic;
the
Member
States
of
the
Antarctic
Treaty
regime,
and
other
States
represented
in
the
U.N.
South
Ocean
Fisheries
Programme,
in
the
Antarctic
regime.
With
the
depletion
of
international
fishing
stocks
and
the
search
for
new
sources
of
energy,
all
these
regional
systems
are
increasingly
aware
of
the
need
to
secure
the
resources,
living
and
mineral,
of
the
high
seas
of
the
South
Atlantic
and
ice-bound
areas
such
as
Antarctica.
The
strategic
value
of
these
remote
areas
in
a
global
confrontation
is
also
not
overlooked.
The
refusal
by
Britain
to
yield
up,
without
a
fight,
this
barren
scatter
of
islands
may
mark
the
end
of
the
period
of
the
voluntary
dismantling
of
colonial
empires
and
the
arrival
of
a
new
political
and
emotional
commitment,
in
a
time
of
scarce
resources,
to
the
retention
of
national
territory
wherever
it
may
be
located.
There
was
no
settlement
in
1982
of
the
Argentine/United
Kingdom
confrontation
over
the
Falkland
Islands
by
peaceful
means.
Nor,
as
unfolding
events
continue
to
reveal,
was
there
any
real
settlement
of
the
conflict
by
the
use
of force.
The
failure
of
all
methods
of
peaceful
settlement
and
the
persistence
of
the
underlying
issues
of
the
conflict
call
for
a
general
effort
of
understanding
and
conciliation:
of
understanding,
to
determine
why
Argentina
and
the
United
Kingdom,
with
a
history
of
commercial
co-operation,
engaged
in
war
and
why
the
international
I
machinery
of
peaceful
settlement
failed
so
totally
to
prevent
that
war;
of
conciliation,
to
discover
how
a
satisfactory
and
final
settlement
of
the
dispute
can
be
achieved.
1
The
cost
of
the
campaign
up
to
the
end
of
September,
1982
was
£700m:
the
defence
budget
estimates
are
£624
m.
for
1983/4,
£684
m.
for
1984/85
and
£522
m.
for
1985/86.
House
of
Commons,
Hansard
,
27
January
1983,
col.
1045.
On
the
Government’s
published
figures
the
cost
of
recovering
and
maintaining
the
Falklands
until
1985/6
will
be
£2.52
bn.
Financial
Times.
2
February
1983.
2
General
Galtieri’s
speech
to
the
Nation,
2
April
1982,
BBC,
Summary
of
World
Broadcasts,
(hereafter
SWB)
1982,
V
6996.
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