Legislating Ideologies of Motherhood

Published date01 December 1993
DOI10.1177/096466399300200406
Date01 December 1993
AuthorAlison Diduck
Subject MatterArticles
461
LEGISLATING
IDEOLOGIES
OF
MOTHERHOOD
ALISON
DIDUCK
Brunel
University,
UK
.
,~ -
>
INTRODUCTION
N
THE
AFTERNOON
of
20
May
1987,
P.R.
was
admitted,
at
her
request,
to
hospital
in
Vancouver,
to
give
birth.
Approximately
three
hours
later
she
was
seen
by
Dr
Z.,
the
obstetrician
on
call,
who
determined
that
because
of
the
likely
danger
of
death
or
injury
to
the foetus
from
a
vaginal
birth,
a
caesarian
section
was
necessary.
At
first
P.R.
declined
to
consent
to
a
caesarian
section.
Dr
Z.
became
worried,
telephoned
the
Family
and
Child
Services
Department,
and
explained
the
situation.
After
some
consultation,
and
a
review
of
P.R.’s
history
with
the
department
(four
children
had
been
removed from
her
care
on
the
basis
of
neglect)
the
department
social
worker
informed
Dr
Z.
that
the
Superintendent
of
Family
and
Child
Services
was
apprehending
the
child
under
the
authority
of
the
British
Columbia
Family
and
Child
Services
Act
(S.B.C.
1980
c.199).
Dr
Z.
was
told
he
was
authorized
to
do
whatever
was
medically
necessary
for
the
’child’
but
that
there
was
no
consent
to
perform
any
medical
procedure
on
the
’mother’.
The
social
worker
then
went
to
the
hospital,
accompanied
by
three
police
officers
and
two
other
social
workers,
in
order
to
carry
out
the
’apprehension’.
Meanwhile,
P.R.
before
being
notified
of
the
apprehension,
verbally
consented
to
the
surgical
procedure
and
gave
birth
to
a
healthy
child,
who
was
immediately
taken
into
the
custody
of
the
superintendent
and
placed
in
a
foster
home.
One
of
the
fascinating
yet
utterly
perplexing
aspects
of
this
scenario
is
the
apparent
unquestioning
acceptance
by
all
concerned
(except,
perhaps
P.R.)
of
the
authorization
of
medical
treatment
for
the
’child’,
but
not
for
its
’mother’.
The
SOCIAL
&
LEGAL
STUDIES
(SAGE,
London,
Newbury
Park and
New
Delhi),
Vol.
2
(1993), 461-485
.
, _, , .
<
«
462
medical
and
social
service
professionals
clearly
saw
’mother’
and
’child’
as
two
separate
patients.
Additionally,
as
soon
as
P.R.
the
patient
changed
from
being
’woman’
to
being
’mother’
in
the
minds
of
those
professionals,
their
views
(both
individually
and
their
view
collectively)
of
her
body
changed
accordingly.
It
seems
that
decisions
about
lifestyle
which
may
be
acceptable
for
a
woman
to
make
are
not
always
acceptable
ones
for
a
mother.
The
reasons
for
this
divergence
may
include
how
we
perceive
motherhood:
how
we
legislate
it,
how
we
medicalize
it
and
how
it
fits
generally
within
a
social
structure
that
is
layered
and
laced
with
competing
ideological
discourses
about
race,
gender,
class,
religion,
morality
and
modern
rationality.
Ideologies
of
motherhood,
and
indeed
of
fatherhood,
childhood
and
family,
are
a
reflection
of
both
the
ideological
effect
of
many
discourses
(Purvis
and
Hunt,
1993)
and
the
interaction
of
these
different,
sometimes
competing
discourses,
whereby
certain
of
them
emerge
as
dominant
in
any
given
place
and
time
in
a
kind
of
shifting
hierarchy.
In
as
much
as
power
can
be
located
within
these
discursive
sites,
the
dynamics
of
the
interaction
often
include
both
domination
and
resistance,
so
that
discourses
such
as
feminism,
modern
rationality,
science,
social
work
and
psychology
are
imbued
with
such
factors
as
race,
class
and
sexuality.
The
ultimate
tapestry
which
emerges
is
a
law
infused
with
constructs
of
motherhood
interwoven
with
many
different
strands.
The
ideological
significance
of
these
dominant
constructs
and
the
law
which
supports
them
is
that
they
then
appear
to
be
natural,
normal
and
legitimate
(Kline,
1992).
Kline
and
others
(Kline,
1992;
Boyd,
1989a,
1989b,
1991)
argue,
for
example,
that
particularly
dominant
in
the
construct
of
motherhood
is
the
gendered
requirement
of
female
self-sacrifice.
In
the
P.R.
case,
if
P.R.
the
’Mother’
would
not
risk
her
own
physical
well-being
for
her
’Child’,
she
must
be
a
bad
mother,
and
therefore
the
best
interests
of
her
child
dictated
that
he
or
she
be
taken
from
her.
Notwithstanding,
therefore,
that
the
caesarian
section
resulted
in
the
uneventful
delivery
of
a
healthy
child,
P.R.’s
earlier
’selfish’
behaviour,
in
resisting
the
surgery
among
other
things,
precluded
her
from
meeting
a
prevailing,
self-sacrificial
standard
of
motherhood.
In
thousands
of
cases
per
year
in
Canada
a
particular
construction
of
mother
and
child
is
reflected
through
and
often
required
by
child
protection
and
child
custody
laws.
Law’s
power
in
the
hierarchy
of
discourses
has
assumed
great
significance
despite
some
feminists’
and
others’
attempts
to
marginalize
it
(Smart,
1989).
I
will
attempt
to
show
how
these
laws
can
be
interpreted
and
often
manipulated
in
a
manner
consistent
with
a
dominant
ideology,
but
that
this
is
a
process
which
involves
challenge
and
resistance
by
other,
potentially
liberating
discourses.
It
is,
in
fact,
the
dynamics
of
resistance
in
which
I
am
interested,
including
the
discursive
and
temporal
sites
in
which
it
takes
place.
Particular
constructs
of
motherhood
and
of
child
protection
have
survived
in
somewhat
shifting
forms
for
many
decades.
In
the
last
hundred
years
or
so,
they
have
been
the
site
of
the
meeting
of discourses
of
law,
birthing,
medicine,
sociology,
social
work,
race
and
gender
relations.
Their
resolution
in
the
contemporary
Canadian
context
is
the
subject
of
this
enquiry.

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT