Leow Peng Yam v Kang Jia Dian Aryall
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Woo Bih Li JAD,Kannan Ramesh J,Hoo Sheau Peng J |
| Judgment Date | 15 June 2022 |
| Court | High Court |
| Docket Number | Civil Appeal No 111 of 2021 |
[2022] SGHC(A) 25
Woo Bih Li JAD, Kannan Ramesh J and Hoo Sheau Peng J
Civil Appeal No 111 of 2021
Appellate Division of the High Court
Civil Procedure — Appeals — Leave — Case transferred from High Court (General Division) to District Court at first instance — Appeal to High Court (General Division) — Further appeal to High Court (Appellate Division) against appeal decided by High Court (General Division) — Whether leave to appeal required — Supreme Court of Judicature (Transfer of Specified Proceedings to District Court) Order 2016
Civil Procedure — Limitation — Whether claim filed out of time — Respondent bringing action more than three years after accident — Whether cause of action accrued from date of accident
Limitation of Actions — Particular causes of action — Tort — Respondent suffering personal injury from collision with bus driven by defendant — Three-year limitation period applicable — Section 24A(2)(b) Limitation Act (Cap 163, 1996 Rev Ed)
Limitation of Actions — When time begins to run — Knowledge required for bringing action for damages in respect of personal injuries — Respondent suffering cognitive difficulties after accident — Whether respondent could reasonably have obtained requisite knowledge to bring action against appellant only at least eight weeks after accident — Sections 24A(4)(b) and 24A(6)(a) Limitation Act (Cap 163, 1996 Rev Ed)
Held, dismissing the oral application for an extension of time to apply for leave to appeal and dismissing the appeal:
(1) The present case was transferred at first instance to the District Court pursuant to para 2(a) of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Transfer of Specified Proceedings to District Court) Order 2016 (the “Transfer Order”), as originally made on 3 November 2016 (the “2016 Version”): at [18] and [21].
(2) In light of the establishment of the AD and the renaming of the High Court as the GD, amendments were made to the 2016 Version and came into operation on 2 January 2021 (the “2021 Version”). Paragraph 5(1) of the 2021 Version allowed an appeal from the District Court to the GD. However, pursuant to paras 5(2) and 5(2A) of the 2021 Version read with s 29C of the Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed) (“SCJA”), leave from the AD was required before a further appeal could be brought against a decision of the GD to the AD, regardless of the amount in dispute or the value of the subject matter. Hence, for the present appeal, it appeared that leave to appeal was required from the AD but was not sought: at [19] to [22].
(3) Paragraph 5(2) of the 2021 Version applied because the appeal from the District Court was heard by the GD. Furthermore, as seen from para 1 of the 2021 Version, the reference to “this Order” within the Transfer Order had to be to all versions of the Order from the 2016 Version up to the present version at hand (ie, the 2021 Version). The 2016 Version was not deleted, but merely amended by the 2021 Version. Moreover, the amendments to the 2016 Version did not introduce any new step in substance: even under the 2016 Version, the appellant was required to obtain leave to appeal: at [24] to [26].
(4) The appellant's suggestion that neither the 2016 Version nor the 2021 Version applied was disingenuous and lacked merit. It could not be that the case was in some limbo between the two versions: at [27].
(5) In the circumstances, a further appeal to the AD was possible if leave to appeal was obtained from the AD: at [28].
(6) By the date of the hearing, the appellant was out of time to seek leave to appeal and counsel for the appellant made an oral application for an extension of time to seek leave. In support, the appellant strove to show that there was merit in the appeal: at [29] and [30].
(7) The appellant submitted that the Judge had erred in law because she should have applied the objective test in Adams v Bracknell Forest Borough Council[2005] 1 AC 76 in determining whether a plaintiff had constructive knowledge under s 24A(2)(b) read with ss 24A(4)(b) and 24A(6)(a) of the Limitation Act. This question was academic because the Judge had in fact applied this objective test. Thus, the issue of the applicable test did not arise for the court's consideration: at [31] to [36].
(8) The second part of the appellant's case pertained to the application of the law to the facts and there was no suggestion that the Judge had erred in law for those parts of the Judge's grounds referred to by the appellant. It therefore would not have supported an application for leave to appeal: at [37].
[Observation: There was no hard and fast rule as to whether, under the objective approach, the effects of an injury were merely factors the court would take into account or would be determinative of the outcome of the case: at [54].
If an injured person experienced a permanent loss of cognitive function, it was likely that s 24 of the Limitation Act would apply: at [55].]
Adams v Bracknell Forest Borough Council [2005] 1 AC 76 (refd)
Aryall Kang Jia Dian v Leow Peng Yam [2021] SGDC 91 (refd)
Lee Kuan Yew v Tang Liang Hong [1997] 2 SLR(R) 862; [1997] 3 SLR 489 (folld)
On 14 May 2016, an SMRT Corp Ltd (“SMRT”) bus driven by the appellant collided with the respondent. The respondent was conveyed to Khoo Teck Puat Hospital (“KTPH”) by ambulance and was found to have, among other injuries, severe head and brain injuries as well as psychological conditions and symptoms.
On 23 May 2016, the respondent was discharged and given hospitalisation leave until 23 August 2016. On the day of her discharge, the respondent filed a police report regarding the accident with the traffic police at a neighbourhood police centre. She claimed that because she had no recollection of the accident at the time, her father helped her with this task and she simply signed the report. Despite her memory loss, she was able to provide the traffic police with details of the accident location, time and date, because she had previously been given a “green card” either by a nurse or the traffic police at the hospital. Also, the respondent had asked the traffic police for the bus driver's name, but was told that this information was confidential.
The respondent met with lawyers on 11 October 2016 and subsequently discovered the appellant's identity.
From at least February 2017, the respondent was treated by, among other people, Dr Eugene Yang (“Dr Yang”), a senior consultant and the Head of the Division of Neurosurgery in the Department of Surgery at KTPH.
The respondent filed the writ of summons against the appellant on 18 June 2019, which was three years, one month and four days after the accident. The case was then transferred at first instance from the General Division of the High Court (the “GD”) to the District Court.
At first instance, the appellant accepted that he was negligent. The sole issue concerned whether the respondent's claim was time-barred. The appellant submitted that the action was brought out of time under s 24A(2)(a) of the Limitation Act (Cap 163, 1996 Rev Ed) (the “Limitation Act”) because more than three years from the date on which her cause of action accrued had elapsed. The respondent relied on s 24A(2)(b) of the Limitation Act, which allowed her three years from the earliest date on which she had the knowledge required for bringing an action for damages in respect of her injuries. The knowledge required meant knowledge of the identity of the bus driver, ie, the appellant. The respondent submitted that a period of eight weeks should be included in calculating the limitation period in view of her cognitive impairment caused by the accident, so her action was not time-barred. Having regard to Dr Yang's evidence on the respondent's medical condition, the District Court held that the action was not time-barred. The appellant appealed.
On 16 September 2021, the appellant's appeal was dismissed by a judge of the GD (the “Judge”). The Judge agreed that the action was not time-barred. The Judge held that a fact-specific approach was to be taken to ascertain the requisite knowledge under s 24A(2)(b) read with ss 24A(4)(b) and 24A(6)(a) of the Limitation Act. The Judge also dismissed the appellant's challenge against Dr Yang's evidence and his contention that the respondent should have reasonably acquired knowledge of his identity by 23 May 2016.
On 15 October 2021, the appellant filed an appeal to the Appellate Division of the High Court (the “AD”), arguing that the Judge had erred in: (a) applying a fact-specific approach in determining whether the respondent had the requisite knowledge under the Limitation Act; (b) according Dr Yang's evidence substantial weight; and (c) finding that that it was irrelevant that the respondent had applied her mind to the question of the appellant's identity on 23 May 2016. The appellant applied unsuccessfully to transfer the appeal from the AD to the Court of Appeal and the present appeal was then fixed for hearing before the AD. At the hearing, the appellant learnt from the court that leave to appeal was required and made an oral application for an extension of time to seek leave.
Limitation Act (Cap 163, 1996 Rev Ed) ss 24A(2)(b), 24A(4)(b), 24A(6)(a) (consd);
ss 24, 24A(2)(a), 24A(7)
Supreme Court of Judicature Act (Cap 322, 2007 Rev Ed) s 29C (consd);
s 28A
Supreme Court of Judicature (Amendment) Act 2019 (Act 40 of 2019)
Supreme Court of Judicature (Transfer of Specified Proceedings to District Court) Order 2016 para 1, para 2, para 2(a), para 5(1), para 5(2), para 5(2A) (consd)
Supreme Court of Judicature (Transfer of Specified Proceedings to District Court) (Amendment) Order 2020
Limitation Act 1980 (c 58) (UK) s 14(3)
Gregory Vijayendran SC, Evelyn Chua Zhi HueiandTomoyuki Lewis Ban (Rajah & Tann Singapore LLP)...
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