Liberal Equality, Exploitation, and the Case for an Unconditional Basic Income

Published date01 June 1997
DOI10.1111/1467-9248.00083
AuthorStuart White
Date01 June 1997
Subject MatterArticle
Liberal Equality, Exploitation, and the Case
for an Unconditional Basic Income
STUART WHITE1
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
This paper considers whether arguments presented in Philippe Van Parijs' Real
Freedom for All: What (if Anything) Can Justify Capitalism? succeed in rebutting the
objection that the introduction of a substantial unconditional basic income (UBI)
would allow non-working citizens to free-ride on the eorts of, and so exploit,
working citizens. It considers Van Parjis' `external assets argument' for UBI, and
®nds that this argument does not succeed in reconciling payment of a substantial UBI
with the reciprocity principle which underpins this `exploitation objection'. It
considers and rejects Van Parijs' implicit claim that the exploitation objection must
be grounded in a distributive principle which contradictsthe egalitarian commitment
to prevent brute luck inequality. It concludes that Van Parjis has failed, thus far, to
articulate a convincing response to the exploitation objection.
`. .. property is moral and healthy only when it is used as a condition, not of
idleness, but of activity, and when it involves the discharge of de®nite
personal obligations'. R. H. Tawney, The Acquisitive Society (London, Bell,
(1921) 1933), p. 95.
In a number of advanced capitalist countries, there is currently a growing
interest in the idea of unconditional basic income: an income paid to each
citizen (a) on an individual basis, (b) irrespective of income from other sources,
and (c) without regard to past or present work performance or willingness to
accept a job if oered. Introduction of an unconditional basic income (UBI
hereafter) is variously seen as an eective, incentives-friendly means of
preventing poverty; as a way of redressing the inequalities, and reversing the
social exclusion, produced by mass unemployment; and, by some, as a way of
fostering the development of a freer, less alienated society. Supporters disagree
as to the size of the UBI which should be aimed at, but many argue that the
long-term goal should be an UBI set at or close to a level sucient to cover a
standard set of basic needs, or what we may call a `substantial' UBI.
The UBI proposal is apparently vulnerable, however, to at least one serious
ethical objection. Payment of a substantial UBI, it is objected, will lead to the
exploitation of productive, tax-paying citizens by those who, while capable of
working, instead choose to live o their UBI. If a compelling case for the
introduction of a substantial UBI is to be made, supporters of the proposal
#Political Studies Association 1997. Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108 CowleyRoad, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main
Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
1I would especially like to thank Brian Barry, Amy Gutmann, DavidMiller, Debra Satz, Philippe
Van Parijs, Albert Weale, Andrew Williams, an anonymous referee, and members of the Nueld
College Political Theory Workshop, for their comments on various earlier draftsof this paper.
Political Studies (1997), XLV, 312±326

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