Liberal Justification: A Typology
| Author | Selina Chen |
| Date | 01 September 1998 |
| Published date | 01 September 1998 |
| DOI | 10.1111/1467-9256.00077 |
| Subject Matter | State of the Art |
of the
ART
State
Liberal Justi®cation: A
Typology
Selina Chen
Contemporary liberalism exhibits a broad
pologically-based teleology now seems unper-
agreement among its proponents as to its
suasive. This has prompted some, such as
content but widespread disagreement on
Alasdair Macintyre to argue that liberal beliefs
what fundamental values justify its princi-
are no longer coherent outside these tradi-
ples. This paper provides a typology of ways
tional, often theistic frameworks.
in which liberals approach the task of justify-
The search for foundations constitutes a
ing liberalism. It sets out a four-fold typology
signi®cant challenge for liberals in light of the
for categorising dierent liberal theories by
fact that liberals place great emphasis on
distinguishing between the various reasons
respecting persons' reason and rationality. To
why liberals reject or accept neutrality. Such
impose principles on people who do not, or
a typology is helpful in showing exactly how
are not capable of understanding or accept-
and where liberal theories dier in their
ing them is a particularly serious breach of
approaches to the issues of justi®cation, neu-
respect. A fundamental problem facing liber-
trality and pluralism, and in showing where
als is that the attempt to ensure that princi-
their strengths and weaknesses lie.
ples can be justi®ed to others might con¯ict
with the attempt to preserve the liberal con-
While contemporary liberalism exhibits a
tent of the principles themselves, especially
broad agreement among its proponents as to
when we consider the pluralistic and multi-
what its practices and content are, there is
cultural nature of many societies. The task of
increasingly widespread disagreement on how
justifying liberalism, especially to non-liberals
these practices are justi®ed. The values of
has probably never seemed more daunting.
freedom and equality underlying liberal prac-
In so far as the project of justifying liberal-
tices are open to an increasing variety of
ism is still considered valid, the debate in
competing interpretations. Moreover, the cri-
modern liberal philosophy tends now to
teria of what constitutes a satisfactory inter-
revolve around what systematic interpreta-
pretation of these principles has changed
tions of core liberal values best capture our
over time. The appeal, for example, to natural
intuitions about them. This paper addresses
law foundations or to some form of anthro-
the issue of liberal justi®cation by attempting
Selina Chen, University of Southamptom.
# Political Studies Association 1998. Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK
and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
189
Liberal Justi®cation . Chen
Politics (1998) 18(3) pp. 189±196
to clarify the dierent ways in which liberals
cive force and our relationship to it constitutes
try to furnish systematic justi®cations for lib-
a set of considerations which must be taken
eral practices. It identi®es these dierent
into account when we deliberate on what the
approaches through exploring two kinds of
role of the state is. As a result, anti-perfec-
distinctions commonly found in liberal
tionists tend to restrict the way that we appeal
theory: the distinction between perfectionist
to ideals of well-being in politics. They typi-
and anti-perfectionist sources of liberal prin-
cally utilise a distinct and more narrow
ciples, and the distinction between neutrality
account of persons' basic interests, such as
and non-neutrality. In exploring the relation-
that oered by Judith Shklar, in which the
ships that obtain when liberal theories are
importance of some `political' goods or values
categorised by these two distinctions, the
such as the legitimacy or accountability of the
paper provides a roadmap of several current
state outweighs the political pursuit of other,
liberal theories which highlights the weak-
non-political goods. (Shklar, 1989) This gives
nesses and shows what directions of argu-
rise to a distinct `political' morality for the
ment proponents of dierent approaches are
state in which a more stringent standard of
likely to pursue to further their appeal.
justi®cation for the state's actions than that we
The historical challenge to tyranny, patern-
would expect from a human moral agent is
alism and arbitrary rule which liberalism
required.
represented established the liberal doctrines
Clearly, what the two sources of values
of limited government, the rule of law and
have in common is a respect for individual
the protection of certain fundamental free-
freedom which rules out the imposition by
doms of the individual. The liberal convic-
the state of a particular religion or way of life.
tions that underlie our acceptance of these
However, those who view liberal practices as
practices can be thought of as having two
deriving from the ®rst source endorse a justi-
distinct sources of appeal, which are better
®cation which appears to be at odds with
thought of as constituting the ends of a spec-
those who see the same practices as stem-
trum rather than as mutually exclusive sour-
ming from more political sources of value.
ces of justi®cation. One source of liberal
Some liberal theories which make a strong
values justify liberal freedoms and practices
appeal to the value of legitimacy, such as
primarily in term of an ideal of the autono-
Rawls' political liberalism, explicitly rule out
mous and self-determining individual. It is an
any appeal to comprehensive values of the
instance of perfectionist justi®cations of the
good. Anti-perfectionists might therefore
state based upon comprehensive ideals of
dier in their policy recommendations with
individual well-being. From this ideal we can
liberals who want, for example, to implement
derive and justify certain political arrange-
an education system which encourages the
ments which secure the conditions such as
development of individual autonomy and
basic freedoms...
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