Liberal Multiculturalism Reconsidered1
| Published date | 01 September 2004 |
| Date | 01 September 2004 |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9256.2004.00219.x |
| Author | Carl Knight |
| Subject Matter | Article |
Liberal Multiculturalism Reconsidered1
Carl Knight
University of Manchester
This article starts by setting out the evaluative criteria provided by Will Kymlicka’s liberal account
of individual freedom and equality. Kymlicka’s theory of cultural minority rights is then analysed
using these criteria and found to be defective in two respects. First, his assignment of different
rights to national and ethnic groups is shown to be inegalitarian with regard to generations after
the first. Second, his recommendation of strong cultural protections is shown in some circum-
stances to undermine freedom and equality. Towards the end of the article a policy of gradual and
inclusive assimilation is described that may effectively promote the freedom and opportunities of
members of cultural minorities. In conclusion, group-specific rights may, as Kymlicka says, be jus-
tified in liberal terms, but only where they differ in content from those he proposes.
1 Introduction
Western societies traditionally limited the rights of cultural minorities to the indi-
vidual rights granted to all citizens. Multiculturalists claim that this fails to acknowl-
edge the special problems facing such groups. Strikingly, Will Kymlicka reaches this
conclusion from the perspective of a liberalism which places concern for the indi-
vidual at its centre. His alternative is a multicultural theory that accommodates cul-
tural diversity by means of group-differentiated rights.
Kymlicka’s account of liberalism is derived from the work of John Rawls and
Ronald Dworkin and, like these theorists’ liberalism, is concerned above all with
securing individual freedom and equality. Equality is invoked at various points of
Kymlicka’s argument and a conception of it is evident from these invocations. Most
importantly, in considering the argument that group-specific rights are required
to offset unfair disadvantages, Kymlicka writes that external protections ‘are
clearly justified, I believe, within a liberal egalitarian theory, such as Rawls’s and
Dworkin’s, which emphasizes the importance of rectifying unchosen inequalities’
(Kymlicka, 1995, p. 109; see also Kymlicka, 1989, ch. 9; cf. Rawls, 1999; Dworkin,
1981). As Kymlicka consistently accepts this as a justification for such protections
I think it is clear that his account of liberalism only permits inequalities between
individuals where those inequalities have arisen from those individuals’ choices.
According to Kymlicka’s liberalism there are two preconditions for freedom. First,
‘[i]ndividuals must ... have the resources and liberties needed to live their lives in
accordance with their beliefs about value’ (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 81; cf. Dworkin,
1989). This prohibits attempts by society to impose beliefs or ‘enforce morals’.
Second, individuals must be allowed to question their own beliefs and values. Curi-
ously, Kymlicka restricts this requirement such that we individuals are only able
‘to examine them [beliefs and values] in the light of whatever information, exam-
© Political Studies Association, 2004.
Published by Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA
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C A R L K N I G H T
ples, and arguments our culture can provide’ (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 81, emphasis
added). Note that this second precondition for freedom seems to be weaker on
Kymlicka’s construal than the demands made by Rawls and Dworkin that
Kymlicka cites in its support. Rawls, for example, says that ‘citizens ... are regarded
as, in general, capable of revising and changing’ their conceptions of the good ‘on
reasonable grounds’ – his restriction is one of reasonableness, not one of cultural
specificity (Rawls, 1980, p. 544; see also Dworkin, 1983). A full evaluation of one’s
values and beliefs is surely only possible where one is able to compare them with
those held by members of other cultures (see Waldron, 1995, p. 109; Parekh, 2000,
p. 226). In what follows I will evaluate Kymlicka’s theory on the basis of the
stronger construal of this precondition. This aspect alone of my critique of
Kymlicka is external – though still very much from a liberal perspective.
In the next few sections we shall see how well Kymlicka’s multicultural theory
satisfies the criteria set down by these liberal principles of freedom and equality.
Ultimately I will reject it and towards the end recommend a very different liberal
strategy.
2 National and ethnic group rights
Kymlicka draws a distinction between different types of minority group that he
says are due to different types of ‘group-differentiated rights’ (Kymlicka, 1995, ch.
2). The first are national minorities, who have traditional territorial claims and are
granted robust external protections (see section 3 below) as they should ‘have the
opportunity to maintain themselves as a distinct culture’ (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 113).
These groups have a right to maintain their own societal culture – that is, ‘a culture
that provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of
human activities’ (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 76). This right entails subsidiary rights to
self-government, language maintenance and a full set of social institutions. The
second group are ethnic groups, who are immigrants, have no territorial claims and
are not entitled to any such protection or political power. They merely receive
support to allow them to integrate without disadvantage. (Kymlicka identifies
political and economic refugees as further group types with distinct claims. I will
not discuss these here.)
Kymlicka offers three justifications for the inequality of rights between national
and ethnic groups. First, he claims that ethnic groups do not need stronger rights
as ‘their distinctiveness is manifested primarily in their family lives and in volun-
tary associations and is not inconsistent with their institutional integration’
(Kymlicka, 1995, p. 14). Second, he urges that granting ethnic groups stronger
rights is impractical as existing groups are too dispersed and assimilated to form
societal cultures (Kymlicka,...
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