Liberty, Licence, and Not being Free
| Published date | 01 January 1956 |
| Date | 01 January 1956 |
| DOI | 10.1111/j.1467-9248.1956.tb00951.x |
| Author | K. J. Scott |
| Subject Matter | Article |
LIBERTY, LICENCE,
AND
NOT BEING
FREE
K.
J.
SCOTT
Victorin
Uniivrsit
y
Collcge.
Wellitigtoti
I.
LIBERTY AND
LICENCE
EVERY
DAY
usage of the word ‘free’ recognizes
no
distinction between
liberty and licence: as in ‘Young people have too much freedom today.’
But most social theorists who describe freedom do
so
in
such a way
as
to
exclude licence. This sophisticated usage becomes self-conscious
in
some
stipuhtive definitions of
the
word ‘freedom’, and
is
reflected in some lexical
definitions
of
the word.
I
have
no
criticism to offer
of
these definitions,
so
long
as
their lexical or stipulative nature is clear. But sometimes what
is
in
form a lexical or
a
stipulative detinition of the word ‘freedom’
is
in
effect
an
analysis of freedom, i.e.
;I
definition
of
the thing freedom.’ tFreedoni
the thing. though
I
so
describe
it
to distinguish
it
from ‘freedom’ the word,
is not an entity;
it
is a relation a relation between a desiring person and a
permitting social environment.) My purpose in this paper is
to
criticize
analyses of the thing freedom that exclude licence. whether the analyses
are couched as such or take the form of stipulative
or
lexical definitions
of
the word ‘freedom’. The writers who give these analyses begin by deciding
that freedom is something of which they approve, and then go
on
to analyse
it
in
such a way as
to
exclude the freedoms
of
which they disapprove. The
correct procedure for a writer who wants to express his disapproval
of
some freedoms is the reverse: he should first analyse freedom without moral
preconceptions
(and
I
hope to show that he would have to include licence).
and should then
go
on
to say that some freedoms should
not
be
allowed.
or that
some
freedoms should not be exercised. Statements of fact, such
as
that
I
am free to gamble, may be denied
on
factual grounds, but should
not be denied
on
moral grounds. The function of morals is to judge facts,
not
to
deny them.
To
make
a claim
of
pre-emptive right for everyday usage of the word
‘free’,
I
must establish, first, that the thing freedom
is
capable
of
analysis,
and, second, that everyday usage is the criterion
on
which we should base
*
The term
‘analysis’
seems preferable for the
reasons
given
by
Richard
Robinson
in
Polltlcal
Studles.
Vol.
IV,
No.
1
(1966,
176-185).
Definition
(Oxford,
1950),
pp.
177-8.
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