Limitation Periods and the Theory of Unjust Enrichment
| Date | 01 September 2005 |
| Author | James Edelman |
| Published date | 01 September 2005 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.2005.00563_2.x |
CASES
The Admissibilityof a Confession against a Co-defendant:
RvHayter
Deirdre M. Dwyer
n
It has become something of a commonplace to observe that the Anglo^American
method of establishing facts in adjudication is distinctive. . . A few of [its ‘native
£owers’], most notably the hearsay rule, are regarded as so bizarre that they occupy
one of the most forbidding cornersof the entire Anglo^American legal structure.
1
INTRODUCTION
The central question considered by the House of Lords in Hayter was whether, in
a joint trial of two or more defendants for a jointo¡ence, a jury is entitled to con-
sider ¢rst the case in respect of defendant A, which is solely based on his own out
of court admissions, and then to use their ¢ndings of A’s guilt, and the role A
played, as a fact to be used evidentially in respect of co-defendant B.
2
Although
out of court statements are generally inadmissible as evidence under the rule
against hearsay, the question in Hayter fell outside the boundaries of two clear
exceptions to that rule. The ¢rst exception is that an out of court confession can
be used as evidence against its maker.
3
A‘confession’is broadly de¢ned by PACEas
‘any statement whollyor partly adverse to the personwho made it, whethermade
to a perso n in authori ty or not, and whethe r made in words or otherwi se.’
4
The
second exception is that a previous verdict can be used as evidence in a subsequent
trial involving di¡erent parties.
5
This reverses the previous position at common
law that a trial court’s ¢ndings were mere opinion that did not bind subsequent
proceedings involvingdi¡erent parties.
6
A subsidiaryquestion was also addressed,
of whetherthere is a case to answeragainst B at the close of the prosecutioncase if
proof of A’s guilt is necessary for there to be a case to answer against B, and the
only evidence of A’s guilt is his own out of court admissions, which are inadmis-
sible against B.
The facts of the case are relatively straightforward. Angela Bristow, Paul Hay-
ter, and Raymond Ryan were indicted as principals in the murder of Bristow’s
n
PembrokeCollege, Oxford.
1 M.R.Damas
›ka, EvidenceLawAdrift (New Haven, CT:YaleUniversity Press, 1997), 1.
2RvHayter [2005] UKHL 6.
3 Police and Crimi nal Evidence Act 1984(PACE), s 76(1).
4 PACE, s 82(1).
5 PACE, s 74(1).
6Hollington vHewthorn [1943] KB 587.
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husband, Mario Commatteo.
7
The Crown’s case was that Bristow had employed
Hayter to recruit and pay Ryan to kill Commatteo. The case against Hayter
depended upon proving both that Bristow was the procurer and that Ryan was
the killer.The case against Ryan depended solely upon out of court confessions
said to have been made by him to his then girlfriend,Vanessa Salter. Other than
circumstantial evidence,which the Crownconceded was not su⁄cient to provide
a case to answer,
8
the case against Hayter turned on the convictionof Ryan, which
turned on his outof court confessionwhich wasitself inadmissible againstHayter.
The trial judge, the late Hyam J, directed the jury that only if they found both
Ryan and Bristow guilty would it be open to them to take into account those
¢ndings of guilt, together with other evidence, to convict Hayter. All three were
convicted, and Hayter appealed against that conviction.
The majority of the House of Lords gave an a⁄rmative answer to both ques-
tions, and rejected the appeal. They held that an existing exception to the rule
against hearsay should be extended, although they were divided on which excep-
tion to extend. Lord Brown, with Lord Bingham concurring, favoured extend -
ing the exception that allowed for the admission of out of court confessions, to
include co-defendants in certain circumstances. Lord Steyn, while allowing for
the possibilityof such an approach, preferred to answer the ¢rst question by say-
ing that a ¢nding of guilt against a defendant should be admissible against a co-
defendant in ajoint trial in the same way as it is against adefendant in the second
of two separate trials, while leaving the evidence of the confession itself inadmis-
sible. Lords Rodger and Carswell dissented.
AN OUT OF COURT CONFESSION AS EVIDENCE AGAINSTA THIRD
PA RT Y
Lord Brown proposed, with Lord Bingham concurri ng, a new, limited exception
to the rule against hearsay in English law: an out of court statementbyA is admis-
sible against Bprovided that (1) the jury are su⁄ciently sure of its truthfulness to
decide that on that basis alone they can safely convict A, and (2) the jury are
expressly directed that when deciding the case against B they must disregard
entirely everything said out of court by A that might otherwise be thought to
incriminate B.
9
Lord Brown’s starting point in formulating this rule is that A’s
voluntary admission against himself is only admissible because an exception has
been made to the rule against hearsay. Subject to safeguards against oppression in
the obtainingof this confession,
10
the policy reaso n foradmi tting such evidence is
for‘the obvious reason’that Awould be unlikely tohave made a statement adverse
to himself unless it were true.
11
WhereA has intended to implicate B directly, that
evidence should be inadmissible, as there are very good reasons whyA may have
motives other than telling thetruth for making such statements.The advantage of
7 n 2 above, at [3].
8n2above,at[10].
9 n 2 above, at [86].
10 In particular,PACE,s 76(2).
11 n 2 a bove, at [82].
Co-defendant Confessions
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