Limitations to the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in Africa: A Model for Balancing National Interest in Development with the Rights of Indigenous Peoples?

Date01 October 2012
Published date01 October 2012
AuthorAdem Kassie Abebe
DOI10.3366/ajicl.2012.0043
Pages407-422
INTRODUCTION

The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, which is the principal human rights instrument in Africa, was adopted on 27 June 1981 and entered into force in 1986.1

The Charter together with the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (adopted in July 1990, entered into force on 29 November 1999) and the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (adopted July 2003, entered into force 25 November 2005) constitute the African Bill of Rights.

The entry into force of the Charter marked Africa as the third regional human rights system and coincided with the ‘third wave’ of democratisation in the 1990s.2

S. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century, University of Oklahoma Press (1991).

In that sense, the Charter provided for the human rights composition of the democratisation process. The Charter was particularly hailed for explicitly recognising the intrinsic link of civil and political and economic, social and cultural rights and for guaranteeing all generations of rights, including group rights

The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, established under article 30 of the Charter with a view to ensuring the promotion and protection3

The analysis of periodic country reports, the activities, including country visits, of the Special Rapporteurs on several thematic issues, and the organisation of seminars, conferences and workshops constitute the major part of the Commission's promotional work. The communications procedure that allows individuals, non-governmental organisations and states to submit complaints to the Commission constitutes the major protection mandate. The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of the African Court (adopted in 1997, entered into force in 2004) established the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights to complement the protection mandate of the Commission. See also the new Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (adopted in 2008, not yet in force), merging the African Court of Justice with the African Court on Human and Peoples Rights.

of human rights, started operation in 1987. Despite compliance challenges,4

On the low level of compliance with the recommendations of the Commission, see Lirette Louw ‘An Analysis of State Compliance with the Recommendations of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (2005) (unpublished LLD dissertation, University of Pretoria; on file with Centre for Human Rights and O. R. Tambo Library, University of Pretoria). For a summarised version of the findings, see F. Viljoen and L. Louw, ‘State Compliance with the Recommendations of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: 1994–2004’, 101 The American Journal of International Law (2007): 1.

it has since then contributed towards a progressive understanding of the substantive requirements of the Charter. The Commission has, for instance, cured the challenge posed by the formulation of the claw-back clauses using its interpretative power to insulate the Charter from the clout of domestic laws.5

One of the major defects, it has been indicated, of the African Charter is its extensive inclusion of claw-back clauses. The fear was that the African Charter would simply subject the exercise of most of the rights to applicable domestic laws, thereby giving primacy to domestic laws over the Charter and effectively depriving the regional system any significance. Gittleman observed that the Charter does not provide ‘external control over State behaviour’ and is therefore, in relation to the right to liberty, ‘incapable of creating even a scintilla of external restraint upon a government's power to create laws contrary to the spirit of the rights granted’; R. Gittleman ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Legal Analysis’, 22 Virginia Journal of International Law (1982): 667, 692 and 694. See also R. M. D'Sa, ‘Human and Peoples’ Rights: Distinctive Features of the African Charter’, 29 Journal of African Law (1985): 72. The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights has dispelled the fear that the claw-back clauses posed. According to the Commission, laws limiting rights must serve legitimate state interest, be acceptable in an ideal democratic society, and limit the rights only to the extent strictly necessary and absolutely proportionate to the desired goal, not to an extent that makes the rights illusory. The Commission also held that, once a prima facie violation has been established by the applicant, it is for the States to prove that the limitation is justifiable and proportional. Naldi observed in this regard that ‘it is encouraging to observe that the Commission has through its case law to date confounded the pessimistic predictions of many commentators’ – G. J. Naldi, ‘Limitation of Rights in the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: The Contribution of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’, 17 South African Journal of Human Rights (2001): 117.

The Commission has also adopted several resolutions that elaborate Charter rights, such as the right to fair trial and freedom of expression.6

Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa (2001); and The Declaration of the Principles of Freedom of Expression in Africa (2002).

It also interpreted the African Charter as impliedly recognising rights that were not explicitly guaranteed, such as the right to adequate housing, food and the right to be left alone and live in peace (the right to privacy).7

Social and Economic Rights Action Centre (SERAC) and Another v Nigeria (2001) AHRLR 60 (ACHPR 2001) paragraphs 59–66.

In its Advisory Opinion on the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Declaration), the Commission recognised that the African Charter, although it does not mention ‘indigenous’ peoples, protects the rights of indigenous peoples

The recognition of the right to self-determination of indigenous peoples and their collective right to land and resources with the emphasis on the development interests and priorities of indigenous peoples has created a situation in which the interests of States in development might collide with the interests of indigenous peoples. There is therefore a need to understand the exact extent to which the rights of indigenous peoples may be sacrificed to give way to development aspirations in the national interest of States. The current ‘land grab’ saga in Africa launched by several African governments to enhance economic development, for instance, may seriously affect the collective right to land and resources of indigenous peoples. Similar concerns include the extent to which environmental protection efforts may justify relocating indigenous peoples or restricting or tampering with their way of life; the extent to which the creation of national park reserves justifies restricting the access of indigenous peoples to their traditional lands; and the extent to which the extraction of resources such as minerals or forests justifies relocating indigenous peoples. Does mere consultation with indigenous peoples suffice or is there a need to ensure that States obtain the free and informed consent of indigenous peoples before restricting their rights?

This article assesses the approach of the Commission in determining the delicate balance between the interest of States in national development and the survival needs of indigenous peoples. For this purpose, section II discusses the recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples by the African Commission and the potential conflict of rights of indigenous peoples with development projects in the national interest. Section III analyses the extent to which the general limitation standards may be applied in relation to the rights of indigenous peoples based on the jurisprudence of the Commission in the Endorois case.8

Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights Group International on Behalf of the Endorois Welfare Council v Kenya, communication no 276/2003, African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (2010) (Endorois case). This was the first time that the Commission had considered a contentious case on the rights of indigenous peoples. It was also the first time that the Commission had considered the possibility of limiting the rights of indigenous peoples.

The article concludes by assessing whether the standards of limitation on the rights of indigenous peoples as developed by the Commission can serve as tools to reconcile the legitimate development interests of States with the rights of indigenous peoples
THE RECOGNITION OF THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN AFRICA

Indigenous communities have in so many cases been pushed out of their traditional areas to give way for the economic interests of other more dominant groups and to large scale development initiatives that tend to destroy their lives and cultures rather than improve their situation.9

Report of the African Commission's Working Group on Indigenous Populations/Committees (2005), p. 20, available at http://www.pro169.org/res/materials/en/identification/ACHPR%20Report%20on%20indigenous%20populations-communities.pdf (accessed 4 February 2011).

Indigenous peoples have historically been the most marginalised and this state of affairs has been perpetuated even in modern times.10

J. P. Kastrup ‘The Internationalization of Human Rights from Environmental and Human Rights Perspective’, 32 Texas International Law Journal (1997): 97; see also Faruque and Begum positing that ‘The suffering of indigenous peoples is not a thing of the past, it continues and remains a contemporary global problem’; see A. Al Faruque and N. Begum, ‘Conceptualizing Indigenous rights: An Emerging New Category of Third-generation Rights’, 5 Asia-Pacific Journal on Human Rights and the Law (2004): 1.

They are among the
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