Limits of Contempt of Court

DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1177/002201839906300525
Published date01 October 1999
Date01 October 1999
Subject MatterArticle
The
Journal
of
Criminal
Law
here, in a case of civil contempt. Whatever the nature of the contempt,
it would seem that Lord Denning MR's limitation to such proceedings to
cases of urgency, where it is 'imperative to act immediately' (see
Balogh
vSt Albans
CC
(1995) QB 73) would seem equally applicable to all cases
of contempt: cf
DPP
v
Channel
Four
Television
Co
per Woolf
U,
who stated that the right of the judge to act on his
own
motion is limited to cases in which: (a)
the
contempt is clear, (b) it affects
a trial already in progress or one about to begin, (c) it is urgent
and
it is
imperative to act immediately, and (d) no other procedure will do. The
observation of Ward U in the present case that 'all remedies should
be exhausted before this weapon is wielded' is equally applicable to
criminal contempts, for there is always a danger that
when
ajudge acts
on his
own
motion, without the support of any of the parties, he may
give the appearance of doing
So
for no more
than
protecting his
own
dignity, rather
than
acting in the interests of justice. And where the
contempt has occurred on proceedings which have been held in
camera,
that is
the
more difficult to deny, since the public may know nothing of
it, so that the public interest is the more difficult to establish as the
justification for the committal.
Limits of Contempt of Court
R v
Lubega
(1999) 163
lP
221
The appellant
and
aco-defendant were on bail
and
were to appear
before
the
court at a fixed time
and
date. In the event, the jury failed to
agree
and
were discharged without reaching a result. On the first day of
the trial, the appellant was late
and
received a 'strict warning' from the
judge that his lateness was a breach of the terms of his bail, which was
'another
offence'
and
that, if he were late the next day the judge would
treat it as a contempt of court
and
added, 'You'll find yourself in the
cells'. Next day, he was 20 minutes late. Before he arrived, the judge had
ordered that 'if and
when
he turns up, he could be
put
straight into the
cells'
and
that his counsel could address the court later in the day.
When
he turned up, however, the judge changed his mind
and
dealt with him
then
and
there, although his counsel twice asked for time to consider the
matter. Counsel addressed the court on the assumption that there had
been abreach of the Bail Act1976, but the judge treated his offence as
one of contempt of court and sentenced him to 28 days' imprisonment.
Next day,
when
counsel again addressed the court, the judge declined to
reconsider his decision.
Section 3( 1) of the Bail Act1976 provides that 'a person granted bail
in criminal proceedings shall be under aduty to surrender to custody'
and that duty is enforceable under s 6 of the Act. Section 6 provides that
if he has been released on bail and fails to surrender to custody, he shall,
440

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